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ABSTRACT 
Previous research indicates that community context impacts social control. 
Several scholars have identified social, economic and political factors to be important 
predictors of police force size, arrests rates and incarceration rates. Few studies, however, 
have examined jail use as an indicator of formal social control. Millions of individuals 
pass through jails every year, and these local facilities are at the center of the criminal 
justice system, reflecting mobilization of social control by law enforcement, courts and 
corrections.  
Drawing from a social threat perspective and political framework, this study seeks 
to understand how community context affects local incarceration. Specifically, this study 
examines to what extent jail use is influenced by racial and ethnic heterogeneity, 
economic inequality, and political conservatism using a nationally representative sample 
of U.S. jails. The main dataset for this study was developed from the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics’s 2013 Census of Jails. Using the Law Enforcement Crosswalk File and 
government identifiers, the Census of Jails was merged with other secondary datasets to 
investigate county-level variation in local incarceration.  
This study finds that community context impacts jail use. It is found that county-
level black presence and Hispanic presence differentially impact jail use. Specifically, 
racial threat has a U-shaped curvilinear relationship with local incarceration, and ethnic 
threat has an inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship with jail use. The economic
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characteristics of counties also differentially impact jail use. Income inequality is 
negatively related to jail use, and both the unemployment rate and poverty rate are 
positively associated with jail use. Political conservatism among county residents is also 
associated with higher rates of jail use. This study reveals the importance of examining 
the impact of minority threat by assessing the racial make-up of local areas separately 
from ethnic composition. Additionally, the importance of testing for nonlinear effects is 
revealed. Further, inclusion of counties’ economic conditions and political ideology are 
critical in more fully accounting for how variations in the local community impact jail 
use.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 As any correctional scholar knows, the United States is the world’s leading jailer 
with more than 2.1 million adults behind bars (Kaeble & Cowhig, 2018). Of these 
inmates, nearly one-third are held in one of the approximately 3,000 local jails across the 
United States (Minton & Zeng, 2016). An even more striking number of people 
encounter these locally run facilities. The latest estimates show roughly 11 million 
admissions to local jails every year (Minton & Zeng, 2016), a number 18 times greater 
than persons admitted to state and federal prisons (Carson & Anderson, 2016). Sparse 
knowledge on jails exist despite their reach (Backstrand, Gibbons, & Jones, 1992; Bales 
& Garduno, 2016; Frost & Clear, 2012; Klofas, 1990a). This is especially salient in light 
of our nation’s current discussion surrounding mass incarceration (Lynch, 2011; 
Subramanian, Delaney, Roberts, Fishman, & McGarry, 2015).  
There have been several recent calls for scholars to further examine jails (e.g., 
Frost & Clear, 2012; Henrichson & Fishman, 2016) and, more specifically, to study the 
contribution of local jurisdictions to mass imprisonment (Lynch, 2011; Subramanian et 
al., 2015). The American Jail Association featured an article in their 2016 Jail Resource 
Guide written by the Vera Institute of Justice (Henrichson & Fishman, 2016). To 
highlight gaps in current knowledge regarding jail use, the authors of this essay posed 
several questions local jurisdictions should be asking about their jail population.
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 Identification of the factors that drive jail population growth, as well as issues 
that may impact female, racial and ethnic minority overrepresentation in our nation’s jails 
were but a few of the areas Henrichson and Fishman (2016) mentioned in calling for 
more data. These questions are commonly considered in discussions of state and federal 
incarceration, but they are relevant too in the discussion of jail incarceration. It is at the 
local level that “mass incarceration begins” (Subramanian et al., 2015, p. 2) and “the 
power to imprison resides” (Lynch, 2011, p. 674). Through examination of the 
community context, important factors may be identified that extend our understanding of 
the forces behind jail use (Applegate & Sitren, 2008; Klofas, 1990a, 1991; Thompson & 
Mays, 1991), overall incarceration (Frost & Clear, 2012), and mass imprisonment 
specifically (Lynch, 2011). 
 One theoretical framework that has been used by scholars to understand the scope 
of the criminal justice system has been social threat theory. Research on social threat 
theory has shown that population composition and economic factors impact arrests (e.g., 
Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Parker, Stults, & Rice, 2005), law enforcement size and 
expenditures (e.g., Kent & Jacobs, 2005; McCarty, Ren, & Zhai, 2012), correctional 
expenditures (e.g., Jacobs & Helms, 1999), and incarceration (e.g., Brown, 2016; 
Campbell, Vogel, & Williams, 2015). In addition to social and economic determinants, 
research on political determinants reveals that citizen ideology and partisanship impact 
criminal justice outcomes (e.g., Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001, 2002).  
Few studies simultaneously examine social, economic and political determinants 
of incarceration. Additionally, previous research examining the effect of community 
context on incarceration has largely relied on national and state-level data, not local or 
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county-level data (Lynch, 2011). As a result of aggregation at a higher geographic level, 
these studies have been unable to assess how local variations in the scale of incarceration 
may be connected to social, economic, and political characteristics. The purpose of this 
research is to explore the extent to which community context impacts jail use. 
Specifically, this research seeks to understand how racial and ethnic heterogeneity, 
economic inequality and political conservatism impact local incarceration across the 
United States. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature regarding jail use. 
Notably, this chapter examines the various entry points into the local jail. Jails have been 
referred to as the “hub” of the criminal justice system (Bales & Garduno, 2016, p. 268), 
with the nature and size of their inmate populations reflecting decisions made by police, 
prosecutors, judges and community correctional officers. From police stops to arrests, to 
charging, pretrial and sentencing decisions, and probation and parole revocations, these 
decisions and operations of U.S. law enforcement, courts and corrections influence who 
goes to jail and how long they stay.   
Jail use, much like prison use, has expanded greatly in the past few decades. Its 
growth began in the 1970s and continued to rise until it reached its peak in 2008 with 
roughly 777,000 people being detained (Minton & Zeng, 2016), nearly five times the 
1970 level. Today, we are in a period of recent stability with an estimated 741,000 people 
being held in local jails in 2016, and a rate of 217 per 100,000 U.S. residents (Zeng, 
2018). Even greater are the number of people jails encounter on a yearly basis (Minton & 
Zeng, 2016). These aggregate numbers inform the public about the use of jail at the 
national level, but do not reveal the impact of local incarceration across jurisdictions. 
While the national rate of jail incarceration stands at 217 per 100,000, there is wide 
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variation in local incarceration. Some counties have similar incarceration rates to the 
national average while others are well above the national average, and still, some 
counties do not incarcerate much of their population (Vera Institute of Justice, 2017).  
Chapter 2 also examines the social threat perspective and political climate with 
particular emphasis on incarceration. The social threat perspective will be explored by 
examining the minority and economic threat perspectives. The minority threat thesis 
proposes that a relationship exists between the relative size of the minority population 
and incarceration (Liska, 1992). An alternative perspective examining the threat thesis 
has focused on the economic underclass, arguing that higher incarceration rates are the 
result of the rise of income inequality (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Garland, 1990). A 
political explanation of the use of incarceration differs from minority or economic threat 
in that it is not the relative size of marginalized groups which poses a threat; rather, it is 
the politics of crime and punishment that influence greater social control (Smith, 2004).  
This chapter also discusses the current empirical status regarding these 
community characteristics and their relationship to incarceration. Overall, it appears that 
minority threat is positively related to incarceration (Beckett & Western, 2001; Campbell 
et al., 2015); economic threat as measured by income inequality has largely been shown 
to have no effect on incarceration (Jacobs & Kleban, 2003; Padgett, 2002); and 
conservative citizen ideology and partisanship typically is found to be significant and 
positively associated with incarceration (Keen & Jacobs, 2009; Jacobs & Carmichael, 
2001). To be sure, some empirical research shows that minority threat (Jacob & Helms, 
2001) and political climate are not related to incarceration (Yates & Fording, 2005), and 
at times, economic threat is significant and positively associated with incarceration 
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(Arvanites & Asher, 1998). These varied findings are largely attributable to 
methodological issues regarding conceptualization, operationalization, and research 
design (Liska, 1992; Campbell et al., 2015). These issues will be discussed in Section 2.9.  
The primary purpose of my study is to determine the impact of community 
context on aggregated and disaggregated jail incarceration. To date, no research has 
simultaneously examined the impact of racial and ethnic heterogeneity, economic 
inequality, and political conservatism on jail admission and population rates and race- 
and ethnic-specific population rates at the county level; the present study addresses this 
gap. Chapter 2 concludes with a brief overview of the current study and hypotheses. 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the current study’s methodology. This 
chapter provides conceptualization and operationalization of jail use and community 
context. Additionally, the proposed analytic strategy to examine the effects of social, 
economic and political factors on aggregated jail admission and population rates, and 
disaggregated jail population rates is outlined. Specifically, this chapter discusses the use 
of a nationally representative sample of all publicly operated jails at the county level 
(n=2,394). Federal facilities, privately run facilities and regional jails are excluded. This 
study draws from several data sets. The main dataset for this study comes from the 2013 
Census of Jails. Other data sets examining social and economic characteristics are drawn 
from the 2010 Decennial Census. Political affiliation is drawn from the 2012 election 
data provided by The Guardian. Additionally, several factors which have been identified 
as important predictors of imprisonment or are predicted to impact imprisonment, are 
controlled for in this study. These data are drawn from the Census of State and Local 
Law Enforcement and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Chapter 4 reports the results of the ordinary least squares regressions of jail 
admission rates, jail population rates, non-Hispanic black jail population rates and 
Hispanic jail population rates on racial and ethnic population composition, income 
inequality, political conservatism and control variables. Overall, the results indicate that 
percent black and percent Hispanic contribute to local corrections use, though not entirely 
in the direction hypothesized. County-level black presence is associated with jail use and 
when significantly related, reveals a U-shaped curvilinear pattern, while county-level 
Hispanic presence reveals an inverted U-shaped curvilinear pattern with jail use. 
Additionally, income inequality appears to be negatively associated with jail use, and 
political conservatism is positively associated with local corrections use. These results 
and other findings will be described in detail in Chapter 4.  
 Chapter 5 begins with a discussion of the main findings of this study, placing 
them in a broader context by reviewing prior research regarding social, economic and 
political determinates of social control mechanisms. In light of the main findings, the 
implications for both theory and research are considered. Next, the limitations of this 
study are acknowledged, and finally, recommendations for future research are presented.  
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The sheer number of persons who come into contact with local jails across the 
United States is by itself justification to explore the determinants of local incarceration. 
Additionally, the importance of including local jailing in the current discussion of mass 
imprisonment is demonstrated by examining its diverse functions and the central role jails 
play in our criminal justice system. A description of the role of jails, the extent of their 
use, and the interrelationship with local criminal justice agencies follows to provide a 
clearer understanding of local incarceration.  
2.1 Jail Functions 
Jails are correctional institutions that serve every criminal justice agency (Bales & 
Garduno, 2016). These facilities are largely run at the county level by a local law 
enforcement agency such as a sheriff’s department (Bales & Garduno, 2016; Minton, 
Ginder, Brumbaugh, Smiley-McDonald, & Rohloff, 2015). In 2013 there were 3,163 
local and 12 federal jail facilities across 2,872 jail jurisdictions nationwide (Minton et al., 
2015). Due to the unique functions of local jails, these facilities are responsible for 
holding a wide variety of persons.  
In contrast to prisons, which are typically responsible for holding persons 
sentenced to a period of incarceration for at least one year, jails hold persons convicted of 
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an offense with a sentence usually of 12 months or less (Bales & Garduno, 2016).1 Jails 
also detain defendants who have not yet been convicted of an offense. For these 
individuals incarceration in jail is a matter of being held pending legal processing – such 
as those who have been booked but not yet arraigned – or to assure appearance in court or 
protect the public (Applegate, 2011). Others may have been convicted but not yet 
sentenced, or waiting for a sentence to be executed. Additionally, jails incarcerate 
persons who violate probation, parole and bail conditions and house inmates awaiting 
transfer to state or federal prisons, as well as hold inmates who are awaiting transfer 
between prisons. In some cases, jails also hold individuals on behalf of state and federal 
authorities when prisons are overcrowded. In some jurisdictions, jails also are responsible 
for the supervision of persons sentenced to a community sanction (Minton & Zeng, 
2016). Individuals may come into contact with and remain in the custody of the local jail 
through a series of avenues, all interrelated to some degree.  
2.2 Local Criminal Justice Policies and Practices and Their Impact on Jail Use 
Jails, sometimes referred to as the “hub” (Bales & Garduno, 2016, p. 268) of, or 
“gateway” (Subramaniam et al., 2015, p.4) to, the criminal justice system are influenced 
by local conditions (Klofas, 1990a; Lynch, 2011). While in theory law dictates 
incarceration, local surroundings influence how law is practiced and thus shape jail use 
(Lynch, 2011). Criminal justice actors—police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges 
and community correctional officers—are part of the community structure. Indeed, these 
                                               
1 In California, however, county jails are responsible for detaining some offenders for longer periods of 
time. The California Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 made community corrections, including 
jails, responsible for supervising low-level felony offenders with no prior serious, violent or sex 
convictions—persons who previously would have been sentenced to state prison facilities. Section 1170(h) 
states that if probation is denied to a defendant then he/she must be sentenced to a county jail, typically for 
a term of 16, 24 or 36 months in a California county jail (Couzens & Bigelow, 2017, p. 6).   
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agencies and actors have different agendas that influence their decisions and impact local 
corrections (Bales & Garduno, 2016; Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2000; Greenberg & 
West, 2001; Hall, Henry, Perlstein & Smith, 1985; Mattick, 1974; Subramanian et al., 
2015). An examination of the various entry points into the local jail illustrates the impact 
of local practices on jail populations.   
Police and Prosecutors. Police provide the first point of entry in the criminal 
justice system. Upon contact with an individual, law enforcement agents have several 
options available to them. Not all police encounters result in arrest, and arrest does not 
guarantee jail booking; some individuals are given a warning, cited and released, or 
referred to a community program (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2000; President’s 
Commission, 1968; Subramanian et al., 2015). For many people, however, arrest means 
transport, booking and admission to a local jail. The Vera Institute reports that arrest and 
booking rates have nearly doubled from a rate of 51 admissions for every 100 arrests in 
1983 to 95 admissions for every 100 arrests in 2012 (Subramaniam et al., 2015, p. 22). 
Since the 1980s and 1990s, it appears many more persons are being admitted to jail after 
arrest.  
A number of developments in policing policies and practices have impacted the 
number of persons who are arrested and subsequently jailed. In particular, the war on 
drugs and broken windows policing has impacted the number of people in our nation’s 
jails (Alexander, 2010; Beckett, 2016; Petteruti & Walsh, 2008). For example, zero-
tolerance policies, borne from broken windows policing, require police action toward 
minor offenses and disorder in an effort to combat quality-of-life offenses; such a policy 
may result in a greater number of low-level, non-violent persons being booked into jail 
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(Petteruti & Walsh, 2008; Subramanian et al., 2015). Additionally, the war on drugs led 
to more drug law enforcement officers and increased the number of low-level drug arrests 
(Alexander, 2010; Petteruti & Walsh, 2008). In 2010, for example, there were roughly 
1.3 million arrests for drug possession or use, an increase of 80% from 1990 reported 
drug arrest data (741,600) (Snyder, 2012). It appears that despite recognition of the 
collateral consequences of the policies and practices associated with the war on drugs, 
substantial resources are still being used to police drugs and drug users (Alexander, 2010; 
Beckett, 2016).  
After arrest and jail booking, prosecutors’ charging decisions influence who will 
be held and for how long in a local jail. Prosecutors may decline to file charges due to 
insufficient evidence or a clear indication a person did not commit the crime for which 
they were arrested; increase, reduce or dismiss charges after they were officially filed; or 
recommend alternatives outside the formal criminal justice system (President’s 
Commission, 1968; Subramaniam et al., 2015). When formal charges are filed, 
prosecutors make pretrial recommendations while persons await trial. These 
recommendations include pretrial release or detention and are influenced by a variety of 
factors (see, e.g., Applegate, 2011; Subramaniam et al., 2015; Williams, 2016). Many 
cases are resolved before trial through plea agreements which prosecutors negotiate 
(Ostrom & Hanson, 2000; President’s Commission, 1968). Additionally, prosecutors 
recommend sentencing for convicted persons (President’s Commission, 1968) which may 
entail a period of incarceration or a community-based sanction (Subramaniam et al., 
2015), for which a person may or may not be under the supervision of local jail 
authorities.  
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Pretrial Release. It is presumed that persons are innocent until proven guilty, and 
as such will be released prior to adjudication if several legal circumstances are met 
(Applegate, 2011). The decision on whether to detain or release is often based on the 
severity of charges, flight risk, community safety, and prior criminal history (Applegate, 
2011; Demuth, 2003; Williams, 2016). If no risk is posed, it is to the benefit of the 
individual, the courts and the local jail to release individuals pretrial (Applegate, 2011; 
Demuth, 2003; Klein, 1997; President’s Commission, 1968; Williams, 2016). For 
individuals, even short stays in jail have collateral consequences (Irwin, 1985; Petteruti & 
Walsh, 2008; Weisheit & Klofas, 1990; Williams, 2003), and when facilities are 
overcrowded, pretrial release offers facilities a mechanism to reduce their over-
population (Demuth, 2003; Williams, 2016). Yet, over 60% of persons held in jail on any 
given day are held pretrial (Minton & Zeng, 2016).  
Defendants who are granted pretrial release may be ordered released by a court 
prior to their trial with no conditions, or they may have to meet nonfinancial or financial 
conditions to be released (Applegate, 2011; Williams, 2016). First, a person may be 
released ROR, or released on her or his own recognizance where he or she, in a signed 
agreement with the court, promises to appear in court and is required to pay nothing to 
secure release (Applegate, 2011; Williams, 2016). Another condition of release is an 
unsecured bond (Applegate, 2011). An unsecured bond releases a person with a set bail 
amount that will be paid only in the event that the person does not appear for a court 
hearing (Applegate, 2011). ROR and unsecured bonds may include other conditions such 
as substance or alcohol abuse treatment, electronic monitoring, or supervision 
(Applegate, 2011; Jones, 2013). Financial conditions of pretrial release involve a number 
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of different bail bonds. A cash bond requires full payment of a set bail amount to the 
court in order for an individual to be released (Applegate, 2011; Williams, 2016). A 
property bond requires an individual to post property that is of equal or greater value than 
the set bail amount (Williams, 2016). A surety bond is perhaps the most widely known 
mechanism of release. For a surety bond, an individual pays a service fee and/or 
percentage of their bail amount to a third party, such as a bail agent (Applegate, 2011; 
Williams, 2016).  
Over the past thirty years, bail bonds have dominated. More individuals are 
offered financial conditions and required to post bail than nonfinancial prelease 
conditions (Smith, 1993; Reeves, 2013). In 1990, roughly 2 in 5 defendants (37%) were 
released pretrial with financial conditions (Smith, 1993). Nearly 20 years later, this 
number had increased to 3 in 5 defendants (Reeves, 2013). This increase in the number of 
defendants being released with financial conditions is largely attributed to the rise in the 
number of surety bonds ordered (Reeves, 2013). In 1990, over one-third of defendants 
were released on their own recognizance (40%) and roughly one-quarter were released on 
surety bond (24%) (Smith, 1993). By 2009, this pattern had reversed with nearly half of 
defendants being released on a surety bond (49%) and one-quarter released on their own 
recognizance (24%) (Reeves, 2013). Additionally, there has been an increase in the 
amount of bail that defendants are ordered to pay (Smith, 1993; Reeves, 2013). In 1990, 
roughly 20% of defendants had a bail amount set at $10,000 or more, in 2009 the 
percentage of defendants with a bail amount set at $10,000 or more had risen to roughly 
58% (Smith, 1993; Reeves, 2013). Roughly 82% and 90% of defendants in 1990 in 2009, 
respectively, had bail set but were held pretrial because they were unable to post bail 
13 
 
(Smith, 1993; Reeves, 2013). More than 40 years ago, Mattick (1974) observed that 
monetary bail impinges more acutely on defendants with limited financial resources. It 
appears the pattern of disparate outcomes for the poor continues today. Recently, 
Subramanian et al., (2015) concluded that defendants’ inability to pay bail amounts has 
been and continues to be a large factor in the number of pretrial detainees. 
Judiciary. In 2000, the Bureau of Justice Assistance stated, “no other actors have 
more control over the ebb and flow of jail populations than judges…judges are involved, 
directly and indirectly, in all aspects of criminal case processing” (p. 53). Judges may 
issue a court summons rather than an arrest warrant, schedule arraignments, make bail 
decisions, hold bond review hearings, and determine adjudication and disposition of case 
outcomes (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2000). Case processing by itself can greatly 
influence the jail population dependent on how quickly each of the above-mentioned 
stages occur. Although jails typically hold people for short lengths of time, even brief 
delays in court processing can increase the average daily population in a jurisdiction; 
whether it be delays in scheduled court hearings or on decisions regarding bail, inmates 
spend longer periods of time incarcerated. Given that millions of individuals are admitted 
to local jails every year, such delays in court processing for defendants are likely to add 
up and affect jail populations. To be sure, case processing and its subsequent time are 
influenced by all court agents, including district attorneys, prosecutors, bail agents, and 
judges (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2000; Subramanian et al., 2015).  
Probation/Parole. Far more adults are under community supervision than those 
incarcerated in jails or prisons across the United States. In 2015, roughly 70 percent of 
U.S. adults under correctional supervision were on probation or parole (Kaeble et al., 
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2015). Community corrections play a vital role, however, in jail population rates as these 
sanctions can reduce jail populations by diverting potential inmates (Frase, 2000). As an 
alternative to incarceration, offenders may receive a period of probation without 
incarceration, a lesser sentence with a period of probation to follow incarceration, or 
parole after serving only a portion of their sentence in prison (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
2000). Community corrections can also contribute to increased jail populations (Frase, 
2000). Typically, conditions such as electronic monitoring, work, and substance abuse 
counseling are ordered on probationers or parolees. Failure to meet these requirements 
can result in revocation and subsequent incarceration (Subramanian et al., 2015). In a 
national sample of nearly 7,000 jail inmates, James (2004) reports an estimated 46% of 
jail inmates were on probation or parole when they were arrested, and nearly two-thirds 
had their release revoked. Of these, over half had their release revoked because of a 
technical violation – not a new crime, but a violation of the conditions of community 
supervision (James, 2004).  
Entry into a local jail involves numerous agencies and actors whose decisions 
impact whether someone is arrested, booked into jail, charged, detained or released 
pretrial, convicted and sentenced to a period of incarceration or given a community 
sanction. Differing agendas among these agencies and actors impact decisions that affect 
who is housed in local jails and ultimately the overall jail population. Local criminal 
justice actors acknowledge their role in jail use and note that issues such as overcrowding 
pose problems for public safety and disrupt smooth criminal justice processes among 
many agencies (Davis, Applegate, Otto, Surette, McCarthy, 2004; Welsh, 1995). It is 
clear that jail use is impacted by criminal justice community relations. Drawing on 
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surveys and interviews with local criminal justice actors, Davis et al. (2004) conclude, 
“Jail does not operate autonomously. Rather, each component of the local criminal justice 
system is in a symbiotic relationship with the other components” (p. 470-471). Put 
another way, the scope of a community’s jail population reflects the culmination of the 
social control polices, practices, and decisions of numerous actors spread across multiple 
agencies. The size of that community’s jail operation is a natural indicator of the 
comprehensive extent of legal control exerted by police, prosecutors, judges, community 
correctional officials and others.  
2.3 Growth and Trends  
While national estimates of jail use can be found as early as 1880 (Cahalan & 
Parsons, 1986), interpreting these figures is problematic. At that time, the U.S. Census 
Bureau counted only persons who had been sentenced. The data exclude an unknown 
number of jail inmates held before trial and those who were convicted but not yet 
sentenced. It was not until 1970 that national estimates on all jail inmates, regardless of 
conviction status, were collected by the U.S. Census Bureau (Cahalan & Parsons, 1986). 
For comparative purposes, this discussion of jail trends will begin with the year 1970.  
During the past four decades, the number of persons held in jail facilities has 
grown considerably. In 1970, the United States incarcerated roughly 161,000 persons in 
its local jails (Cahalan & Parsons, 1986). Data show the jail population remained 
relatively stable from 1970 to 1978 and then began to grow through 1983 (Cahalan & 
Parsons, 1986). During the following ten-year period, the nation saw its largest increase 
in jail inmates when the number of confined inmates nearly doubled climbing from 
227,541 in 1983 to 446,155 in 1993 (Perkins, Stephan, & Beck, 1995) and continued to 
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rise until the jail population reached its peak in 2008 with 776,600 persons detained 
(Minton & Zeng, 2016). The most recently available data show an estimated 740,700 
people were held in local jails at midyear 2016 (Zeng, 2018), four and a half times the 
1970 level. In addition to examining raw data or frequencies to demonstrate jail use in the 
United States, incarceration rates provide another view of jail use while accounting for 
population growth. Incarceration rates, much like the average daily population (ADP), 
demonstrate our increasing use of local corrections in the United States over the last few 
decades. In 1983, 96 U.S. residents were incarcerated in jails per 100,000 population 
(Perkins et al., 1995); by 2006 and continuing through 2008, that rate had nearly tripled 
to 260 per 100,000 (Minton & Zeng, 2016). The national jail incarceration rate stood at 
217 per 100,000 U.S. residents at year-end 2016 (Zeng, 2018).  
A unique feature of jails not reflected by the average daily population and 
incarceration rate is the amount of people such facilities encounter on a yearly basis. 
Across the United States every year, local jails admit millions of individuals. For 
example, in 2016, roughly 10.6 million individuals were admitted to local jails (Zeng, 
2018). In comparison, state and federal prisons admitted roughly 608,000 inmates that 
same year (Carson & Anderson, 2016). While on any single day, the number of 
individuals held in state and federal prisons is nearly 1.5 times (1, 526,800 million) 
greater than those held in local jails (740,700), across a one-year span local jails admit 
nearly 18 times the number of individuals than do state and federal authorities (Carson & 
Anderson, 2016; Minton & Zeng, 2016) – a number that is largely attributable to 
differences in the typical length of stay in state and federal prison and local jails. Recall 
that state and federal authorities typically house individuals for one or more years 
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(Carson & Anderson, 2016), whereas the average length of stay in local jails is 
approximately three weeks (Minton et al., 2015).2 As Minton and Zeng (2016) point out, 
higher turnover rates suggest shorter periods of confinement in local jails (p. 8).  
In 1983, the first year national estimates of annual jail admissions were made 
available, there were roughly 6 million admissions to local jails (Perkins et al., 1995); a 
number 25 times the size of jails’ average daily population. Since the early 1980s, jail 
admissions have increased, reaching their peak in 2008 (13.6 million) (Minton et al., 
2015; Perkins et al., 1995). Following a slight decline, the latest available estimates 
report roughly 10.6 million admissions in 2016; a number approximately 14.5 times the 
size of the average daily population (Zeng, 2018). 
National jail estimates provide an important overview of jail use, but do not reveal 
the wide variation that exists among states and counties. For example, in 2013, the rate of 
incarceration for Maine was 160 per 100,000 while in Louisiana, 870 U.S. residents were 
incarcerated per 100,000 (Minton et al., 2015). Great variation exists at the county level, 
even within states. For example, in Waldo County, Kentucky, 1080 U.S. residents were 
incarcerated per 100,000 whereas in Scott County, Kentucky, the county-level rate is 
closer to the national average with 260 per 100,000 U.S residents incarcerated (Vera 
Institute of Justice, 2017).  
The discussion of jail growth and trends often include jail population or jail 
admissions descriptives. Prior research has shown inclusion of both indicators of jail use 
levels are important to examine simultaneously. For example, Klofas (1987, 1991) 
developed a typology to explain jail use patterns and found that the stock (i.e., average 
                                               
2 This excludes combined jail and prisons systems, as well as federal jurisdictions (Minton et al., 2015).  
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daily population rate) and flow (e.g. booking rate) of jails differ and as a result impact the 
jail function. Specifically, Klofas (1987, 1991) identified “holding” facilities which are 
described as high-low jails in that they have a high stock rate and low flow rate. In 
contrast, low-high facilities are those with low flow rates and high stock rates and are 
characterized as “processing” jails (Klofas, 1987, 1991). Further, jails that have both high 
stock and flow rates are “high-use” facilities, while those with low stock and flows rates 
are “low-use” facilities (Klofas, 1987, 1991). If local jails were always high-use or low-
use, one could argue there is nothing to be gained by using both indicators of jail use. 
However, research conducted by Klofas (1987, 1991) and Applegate (2004) reveal that 
while patterns of high-high or low-low facilities are more common than high-low or low-
high facilities, they are not universal. For example, Klofas’s (1987, 1991) examination of 
Illinois county jails revealed that most facilities (64%) were operating as low-use (n=30) 
or high-use (n=31), yet 36% were holding (n=17) or processing facilities (n=17). 
Similarly, Applegate (2004) examined 1,445 Southern and Midwestern county jail 
systems to understand community jail use patterns and found the distribution of jail use 
types were largely high-high and low-low. That is, roughly 62% of his sample were high-
use (31%) and low-use (31%) facilities, however, 38% were high-low (19%) or low-high 
(19%). Similar results are also found among large jail jurisdictions across the country 
(Klofas, 1990b). To summarize, some communities may be high on one indicator and low 
on the other, suggesting population and admissions capture different dimensions of 
community jail use. It is important, therefore, to examine both population and admission 
rates to capture a more complete understanding of local incarceration across jurisdictions.  
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The extent to which the jail population is pretrial is important to consider as it 
affects the average daily population. In fact, the average daily population is influenced by 
admissions, lengths of stay and releases (Olson & Huddle, 2013). Importantly, the 
increase in the jail population over the past few decades is due largely to the number of 
jail inmates being held pretrial (Minton & Zeng, 2016). In 1970, approximately half of 
jail inmates had been convicted (Cahalan & Parson, 1986). The most recent estimates 
report approximately one-third of persons incarcerated have been convicted (Minton & 
Zeng, 2016). When more defendants are held in jail, whether due to pretrial detention or a 
defendant’s inability to post bail, this contributes to local jails average daily population 
(Olson & Huddle, 2013). As some scholars have indicated, the increasing number of 
persons being held pretrial reflect a system that is primarily functioning as “holding 
facilities” (Cahalan & Parsons, 1986, p. 75; Klofas, 1990). Still, there are a variety of 
factors that can influence whether persons will be released prior to resolution of their 
cases (see, for a discussion, Applegate, 2011).   
It is assumed individuals who are arrested, booked and detained in local jails have 
committed or are suspected of having committed a criminal offense. This view suggests 
jails are simply a reflection of the amount of crime in a community. An alternative 
perspective suggests that jails are primarily used as “rabble management” (Irwin, 1985). 
This viewpoint was forwarded by John Irwin (1985) in his now classic work The Jail: 
Managing the Underclass in American Society. In it, Irwin (1985) suggests that jail use 
levels reflect discretionary justice in which people who are viewed as offensive in some 
way are arrested, booked and housed in local jails to control the underclass. Specifically, 
Irwin (1985) notes those identified as “rabble” are both detached and disreputable and 
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become targets of the police and the courts (p.2). That is, individuals who are not a part 
of conventional society and who engage in behaviors society has deemed deviant are the 
focus of arrest and holding practices. In his field work, in which he randomly selected 
100 individuals who had been arrested and booked in a large San Francisco jail for felony 
offense(s), Irwin (1985) found that many individuals were held for a period of 10 or more 
days based largely on offensiveness rather than crime seriousness. Similar findings have 
been found in more recent data in which homeless persons were more likely than 
domiciled persons to be arrested and booked into local jails for less serious crimes such 
as order maintenance and property crimes, after controlling for prior criminal history, 
offense seriousness, and other offenses types (Fitzpatrick & Myrstol, 2011). This 
suggests those who are “detached” and “disreputable” are managed due to their 
offensiveness rather than their threat to society (Fitzpatrick & Myrstol, 2011). Scholars 
have discussed “rabble management” among police officers in urban areas (Stuart, 2014). 
Law enforcement policies and practices such as order-maintenance policing often result 
in officer encounters with “disorderly” neighborhoods and citizens – homeless, addicts, 
mentally impaired individuals, etc.—encouraging their removal from the streets 
(Harcourt, 1998, 2005; Stuart, 2014).  Harcourt (1998) notes, “The fine art of policing 
creates the disorderly as a person with a full biography of habits, inclinations and desires. 
It simultaneously creates the disorderly as an object of surveillance and control” (p. 298). 
Indeed, the characteristics of persons held in jail show a diverse and impoverished 
population.  
Many individuals incarcerated in local jails, especially those with mental health 
disorders, are often homeless, unemployed, and have a history of physical and/or sexual 
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abuse (James & Glaze, 2006).  Mental health and substance abuse problems are 
prevalent. Jail inmates have higher rates of mental health disorders than state or federal 
prisoners (James & Glaze, 2006). Roughly 60% of jail inmates report symptoms of a 
mental health disorder in the prior twelve months; the percentage is higher for females 
(75%) than males (63%) (James & Glaze, 2006, p. 1). Many inmates with a mental health 
disorder also report substance abuse problems (76.4%) (James & Glaze, 2006). Those 
incarcerated persons without a mental health disorder also report high rates of substance 
dependence or abuse with alcohol or drugs. It is apparent that several issues characteristic 
of the “disorderly” are found in local jails across the United States.  
The latest data seem to lend support to the view that jails serve an instrumental 
purpose; that is, jails function to control crime. In 2002, roughly one-quarter of inmates 
were held for a violent offense and 41% had a current or past violent offense (James, 
2004). Many inmates, however, were held for nonviolent offenses, with roughly half 
being held for drug and public-order offenses, and one-third held for property offenses 
(James, 2004). In contrast, the most recent estimates report nearly two-thirds of jail 
inmates are being held for a felony offense (Minton & Zeng, 2016). It appears jails today 
typically hold persons accused or convicted of more serious types of crimes (Backstrand 
et al., 1992; Minton & Zeng, 2016). This estimate, however, is not categorized into 
violent and nonviolent offenses so the latest available data cannot speak to crime 
seriousness and are over a decade old.  
Differential Representation. No discussion of trends in jail populations would 
be complete without considering representation of minorities and women in local 
incarceration. Most jail inmates are male (86%) (Minton et al., 2015). The latest available 
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census data show there are roughly 627,000 male inmates and 101,000 female inmates 
confined in local jails (Minton et al., 2015). In 2015, male inmates comprised roughly 
80% of the 10.9 million admissions to local jails (USDOJ BJS, 2016, ICPSR36128).3 The 
rate of male jail incarceration stands at about 377 per 100,000 male U.S. residents while 
the female jail incarceration rate is 62 per 100,000 female U.S. residents (Zeng, 2018). 
While females comprise a smaller number of jail inmates and have a lower rate of 
incarceration than do their male counterparts, females are the fastest growing segment of 
the jail inmate population.  
Over the past 45 years, the number of women held in local jails has increased 
nearly 11-fold (Cahalan & Parsons, 1986; Minton et al., 2015). The female jail 
population grew from roughly 6% (7,751) of the total jail population (Cahalan & Parsons, 
1986) in 1970 to more than 14% of its total in 2013 (Minton et al., 2015). Similarly, the 
number of women held in local jails in 2013 was 101,000; a 48% increase from 1999 
(Minton et al., 2015). In comparison, the male jail population increased by roughly 17% 
during this same period (Minton et al., 2015). While both the male and female jail 
population have increased, the female jail incarceration rate continues to grow faster than 
the male incarceration rate (Minton & Zeng, 2016).  
It is difficult to draw historical jail trends regarding race and ethnicity because in 
the 1970s and early 1980s individuals of Hispanic heritage were included in counts of 
race (Cahalan & Parsons, 1986). The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported Hispanic 
                                               
3 The Census does not collect disaggregated race- or ethnic-admission counts, therefore race- and ethnic-
specific admissions rates regarding gender cannot be reported. Further, it is not possible to discuss the 
number of inmates on a given day with reference to race- and ethnic-specific figures (e.g., black, non-
Hispanic males or females) regarding gender because the number of jail inmates on a given day are 
collected separately for males and females and race and ethnicity. 
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ethnicity separately, however, an inmate was also classified as belonging to a racial group 
such as black, white, Asian and American Indian (Cahalan & Parsons, 1986). More 
recently, the Bureau of Justice Statistics clearly distinguishes between counts of race and 
ethnicity—inmates may be classified as White, non-Hispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; 
America Indian/Alaska Native, non-Hispanic; Asian, non-Hispanic; Native Hawaiian or 
Other Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic; Two or more races, non-Hispanic; and Hispanic or 
Latino (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013). With this challenge in mind, apparent changes 
in the racial composition of jail populations should be interpreted with appropriate 
caution. In 1978, the racial composition of jail inmates was 57% white, 41% black, 2% 
other and 10% of these individuals considered themselves Hispanic (Cahalan & Parsons, 
1986).4,5 Nearly identical counts were found among inmates in 1982 (Kalish, 1983). 
Through the late 1980s and early 1990s the racial and ethnic composition of jail inmates 
remained relatively stable. In 1994, roughly 39% of inmates were white, non-Hispanic; 
44% black, non-Hispanic; 15% Hispanic; and 2% other (Asian, Pacific Islanders, 
American Indians, and Alaska Natives) (Perkins et al., 1995). Between 2000 and 2016 
there has been an increase in the white non-Hispanic population – from 42% to 48% – a 
decline in the black non-Hispanic population – from 41% to 34% – and the portion of 
Hispanic inmates have remained relatively stable at 15% (Zeng, 2018).6 Despite the 
                                               
4 “Other” races were reported by Cahalan and Parsons (1986) as “primarily includ[ing] Indians and Asians” 
(p. 91). 
5 Note: this is the first year in which race, to include the category of “other,” and Hispanic origin were all 
reported. Further, it is also the first year that most state-unified systems were excluded from counts 
(Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Vermont) (Cahalan & Parsons, 1986).   
6 Note: The figures for year 2000 represent mid-year percentages, while the 2016 figures represent year-end 
percentages because the Annual Survey of Jails collected data at year-end rather than at midyear in 2016 
(Zeng, 2018, footnote p. 4).  
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decline in non-Hispanic black jail incarceration, black residents have the highest jail 
incarceration rate of any other racial or ethnic group in the United States (Zeng, 2018).  
Minority incarceration rates at the state and county level are much higher than the 
national rate of jail incarceration which stands at 217 per 100,000 U.S. residents (Zeng, 
2018). For example, in South Carolina the black, non-Hispanic incarceration rate stands 
at 678.3 per 100,000 residents and in Florida the black, non-Hispanic rate of incarceration 
stands at 1003.5 per 100,000. At the county level, high minority incarceration rates are 
also evident. For example, Charleston County, South Carolina, has a black, non-Hispanic 
incarceration rate of 1089.4 per 100,000, and in Martin County, Florida, the black, non-
Hispanic incarceration stands at 3283.7 per 100,000 residents. These rates are much 
higher than the overall national rate, the black, non-Hispanic national rate (599 per 
100,000) (Zeng, 2018), and the state jail incarceration rate in South Carolina and Florida 
(340.4 per 100,000 and 416.4 per 100,000, respectively) (Vera Institute of Justice, 2017). 
Taken together, these figures reflect not only high minority incarceration rates, but also 
significant variation in state and county jail incarceration rates for minorities.  
National estimates of ethnic incarceration rates suggest that those of Hispanic 
origin are not disproportionality impacted by jail. The national rate of incarceration 
among Hispanics stands at 185 per 100,000 residents, a rate that is slightly lower than the 
overall national average of jail incarceration (217 per 100,000) (Zeng, 2018). While 
nationally Hispanics are proportionately represented in U.S. jails, examination of state- 
and county-level estimates of Hispanic jail incarceration reveal Hispanics are 
disproportionality impacted in some locations, though overall, this situation does not 
appear to be as pervasive as we find for racial minorities. For example, the Hispanic rate 
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of incarceration in Montana is 722.5 per 100,000, and in South Dakota, the rate of 
incarceration for Hispanics is 628.4 per 100,000 residents; both much higher than the 
overall national or Hispanic national rate of jail incarceration. At the county level, the 
disparate outcomes for ethnic minorities is more evident. For example, in Silver Bow 
County, Montana, the Hispanic rate of incarceration is 2272.7 per 100,000 residents and 
in Hughes County, South Dakota, the rate of incarceration for Hispanics is 1408.8 per 
100,000 (Vera Institute of Justice, 2017). Similar to the jail incarceration rates of racial 
minorities, ethnic minority rates reflect significant variation across states and counties 
and, at least in some cases, disproportionate contact with U.S. jails.   
The overrepresentation of minorities in incarceration relative to their percentage 
in the population is commonly referred to as disproportionate minority confinement 
(DMC). There are several perspectives that have been forwarded to help identify the 
causes of DMC but largely, the two more common explanations are differential 
involvement and differential treatment. The differential involvement perspective argues 
that minorities engage in more crime than do whites (Blumstein, 1982). In comparison, 
the differential treatment thesis assumes that minorities are treated differently than whites 
and are targets of discriminatory practices whether due to overt racism or implicit bias in 
the criminal justice system (Mauer, 2017).  
Alfred Blumstein’s work (1982) work in this area was one of the first to examine 
the effect of differences in arrest rates and subsequent incarceration. The argument is that 
if arrest rates are similar to corresponding incarceration rates, then the criminal justice 
system is not inherently engaged in discriminatory practices, rather it is a system that 
merely reflects the amount of crime in a given community. Blumstein (1982) posited that 
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if no discrimination occurred after arrest then the proportion of black and white 
imprisonment rates for an offense would match black and white arrest rates for the same 
crimes. Blumstein’s (1982) influential study on racial disparities in imprisonment found 
that arrest rates explain a relatively large percentage of the disparity among black and 
white imprisonment (80% and 76%, in 1979 and 1991, respectively) (Blumstein, 1982, p. 
1268, 1983, p. 751; for similar findings utilizing victimization data, see Langan, 1985). 
Specifically, the racial differences in arrests for violent offenses explained a larger 
proportion of racial disparities in imprisonment (80% and 77%) than did less serious 
crimes like property and drug crimes—approximately half for less serious crimes 
(Blumstein, 1982). In a more recent study, Tonry and Melewski (2005) utilized data from 
2004 and found unexplained disparities between arrest rates and imprisonment to be 
much greater than those in the 1970s and 1990s. Roughly 39% of disparities in 
incarceration could not be explained by arrest rates (Tonry & Melewski, 2005), 
suggesting that differential treatment could explain incarceration disparities. To be sure, 
arrest rates reflect crime rates and policing practices and are thus not a wholly accurate 
measure of criminal involvement (Pettit & Western, 2004; Travis, Western, & Redburn, 
2014). While Blumstein’s (1982, 1993) findings could be construed simply as a system 
reflecting differences due to differential involvement in crime, one cannot rule out 
differential treatment (e.g., racial bias and stereotyping).  
It is unclear at the county level whether similar analyses would produce similar 
results regarding differential treatment or differential involvement (Garland, Spohn, & 
Wodahl, 2008). Given that larger percentages of unexplained disparities are found for 
less serious crimes, perhaps a similar analysis conducted at the local level—where 
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individuals are often held for less serious crimes—would reveal that jail confinement, 
more that state imprisonment reflects a system of greater social control.  
Recently, the National Academy of Sciences committee summarized their review 
of the literature on disparities in sentencing outcomes and mass imprisonment and stated, 
“[R]acial bias and discrimination are not the primary causes of disparities in sentencing 
decisions or rates of imprisonment. There are differences, but they are relatively small. 
No doubt they result partly from the various forms of attribution and stereotyping 
discussed below. Minority defendants are, however, treated differently at several stages 
of the criminal justice process, and those differences influence resulting disparities” 
[emphasis added] (Travis et al., 2014, p. 97).  
Decades of research suggest this general conclusion of cumulative disadvantage 
to be true. Examples of racial disparities have been documented at every stage of the 
criminal justice system. For example, while non-Hispanic blacks, non-Hispanic whites, 
and Hispanics are stopped by police at similar rates, it is black (6%) and Hispanic (7%) 
drivers more often searched than whites (2%) (Langton & Durose, 2013). Once arrested, 
minorities are more likely to be negatively affected by pretrial release decisions and 
outcomes. Nonfinancial release decisions appear to be distributed in fairly equal 
proportions across race; however, financial release disproportionately restricts release 
among minority members (Demuth, 2003). It appears that higher bail amounts are set for 
Hispanics and blacks and they are less likely to afford bail and meet these requirements, 
and they are more likely to be detained pretrial (Demuth, 2003; Demuth & Steffensmeier, 
2004). Relatively little is known about prosecutorial decision making because their work 
occurs at the city or county level (Mauer, 2011), however, still there is evidence that 
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minority disparities in plea negotiations as well as at the charging and sentencing stage 
exist (Spohn, 2000, 2013; Spohn & Holleran, 2000). For example, black defendants 
receive harsher charges than do white defendants in Federal court, after controlling for 
extra-legal factors, criminal history, and offense characteristics (Starr & Rehavi, 2014). 
Evidence of harsher penalties in Federal sentencing outcomes among Hispanic 
defendants has also been reported (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000). In sum, disparities in 
incarceration outcomes stem, in part, from the cumulative nature in differences in 
policing, charging and sentencing decisions.  
2.4 Conceptual Frameworks 
There are several explanations of the nature and operation of the legal system. 
The two main perspectives typically used to explain the legal system are the consensus 
and conflict models. The consensus perspective assumes all members of a society have 
shared beliefs about norms and laws (Durkheim, 1984). Specifically, there are shared 
understandings and agreement on what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable—
criminal—behaviors, as well as shared expectations on appropriate responses to such 
behaviors. That is, all members of a community come together to decide on definitions of 
right and wrong as well as the consequences of violations. These decisions are thought to 
be equally distributed throughout members of society. The alternative model argues that 
these choices are made primarily by some—not all—members of society. The conflict 
perspective also asserts that people hold conflicting beliefs and as such have different 
definitions on what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. Due to the 
unequal distributions of power and differing views in society, definitions of right and 
wrong held by powerful members of society become codified (Quinney, 1970; Spitzer, 
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1975). Social and racial inequality in the legal system has often been described through 
this lens. It is the powerful who construct a legal system that defines what is and is not 
acceptable behavior and operate the law to their advantage. As a result of this unequal 
distribution of power and group conflict, disadvantaged members of society are 
disproportionally impacted (Quinney, 1970, 1977; Spitzer, 1975; Turk, 1969). The 
criminal justice system, then, is an instrument used by powerful groups to control 
segments of the population and to maintain the social hierarchy (Turk, 1969).  
A derivative of this perspective, social threat theory, posits greater social control 
will be utilized when the number of acts and people who are threatening to the prevailing 
social order increase (Liska, 1992). It is assumed certain behaviors and activities pose 
more of a threat than others, and this threat is more pronounced when such behaviors and 
activities are committed by some people more than others (Liska, 1992). As such, crime 
control is used by the powerful—often wealthy, white individuals—to protect the status 
quo. The law, then, criminalizes behaviors and activities that are viewed by the powerful 
as a threat and these laws are enforced more often, and against the subordinate—often, 
poor minorities—in an effort to control threatening acts and people and maintain the 
social structure (Liska, 1992; Quinney, 1970). This perspective asserts that any increase 
in the level of social control is a response to the threat posed to the dominant group by the 
subordinate group (Liska, 1992). Research examining the factors that influence crime 
control using social threat theory have typically been disaggregated into two components: 
minority threat and economic threat. 
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2.5 Minority Threat 
Minority threat posits that crime control efforts increase when there is an increase 
in the presence of minorities. The increase in social control is a direct result of the threat 
minority members pose to the majority. This threat, whether real or perceived, can be 
presented through three different avenues—political, economic or criminal.  
Blalock (1967) provides one of the first explicit arguments about minority threat 
theory. His discussion focused on the power relationship between blacks and whites but 
also drew on political and economic conditions. Blalock (1967) suggested that blacks 
pose an economic and political threat to whites which leads to increased discrimination 
and inequality. Specifically, Blalock (1967) asserts that as the proportion of the black 
population increases, discrimination will also increase because minority group members 
pose an economic threat to whites through perceived competition for jobs. He argued 
further that blacks also pose as a political threat, more commonly referred to as power-
threat to whites because of their assumed ability to gain numbers and mobilize on the 
political front (Blalock, 1967). Blalock (1967) believes it is these power relationships 
between minority and dominant group members for economic and political resources and 
their ability to mobilize such resources which effect discrimination and segregation (p. 
111).  
Blalock (1967) posited the relationships between the relative size of the minority 
population—which can pose an economic and political threat—and discrimination or the 
motivation to discriminate would be nonlinear. In both cases, social control will increase 
with the relative size of the minority population until they reach a certain threshold, and 
then discrimination will reverse as a result of minority mobilization of resources. 
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Specifically, Blalock (1967) proposed these relationships would be positive, curvilinear 
relationships but the direction for both economic and political threat differ. Specifically, 
Blalock (1967) argues economic threat would be curvilinear with a positive and declining 
slope. That is, as the minority population increases so too will various forms of 
discrimination because minority members are perceived to compete with whites for 
economic resources (e.g., employment). However, the intensity of social control or 
discrimination will begin to decline as the minority population increases because it is 
assumed that with larger minority population, there is already a great deal of 
discrimination preventing blacks from gaining economic resources. Therefore, the greater 
proportion of blacks in a community, the greater level of discrimination and less 
competition for employment from blacks to whites; less threat predicates less of a need to 
control (Blalock, 1967, p. 148). In contrast to economic threat, Blalock (1967) proposes 
that a political threat will have an increasing slope, rather than a declining slope. It is 
assumed that discrimination will increase along with the relative size of the minority 
population. Blalock (1967) proposes that for whites to maintain their power on the 
political front they must not only maintain their level of discrimination consist with the 
relative size of the minority population but the discrimination “must also rise at an 
increasing rate” (p. 153). More recent empirical research suggests this social control or 
discrimination does increase but occurs only to a certain point. The threshold at which 
social control will begin to decline occurs when the minority population comprises a 
relatively large proportion of the population (Keen & Jacobs, 2009). Once this population 
shift has occurred, it is assumed that blacks will have gained enough political 
mobilization to offset white control (Keen & Jacobs, 2009).  
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A more recent conceptualization of minority threat includes the criminal threat 
hypothesis (Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Chamlin & Liska, 1992; Eitle, D’Alessio, & 
Stolzenberg, 2002). This thesis advances Blalock’s (1967) sociological discussion of 
minority threat and provides an application to the criminal justice system. The criminal 
threat hypothesis holds that greater demands for social control occur because nonwhites 
are perceived to be a criminal threat (Liska & Chamlin, 1984). Specifically, it is the fear 
of black-on-white crime—not economic or political threats—that will trigger greater 
levels of criminal control of minorities (Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Chamlin & Liska, 
1992). The criminal threat hypothesis parallels the economic and political threat 
hypotheses in that it asserts a larger proportion of minority members will result in greater 
social control. This association, however, is assumed to be positive and linear.  
Liska and Chamlin (1984) outline a benign neglect hypothesis. In contrast to the 
minority threat thesis, the benign neglect hypothesis proposes formal social control will 
decline as the percentage of minorities increase in a community. It is assumed that as the 
relative size of the minority populations increases, so too will intraracial crime. A greater 
ratio of black-on-black crime may not pose a significant threat to the dominant group, 
resulting in less social control (Liska & Chamlin, 1984).  Liska and Chamlin (1984) also 
suggest that intraracial crime among minorities may be subject to less crime control 
because fewer resources are allocated to minority victims because they are viewed as less 
worthy than whites.  
A key assumption of minority threat is that the racial minority population is 
viewed in a negative way, as a potential challenge to the social hierarchy. Available 
empirical evidence is consistent with this position. Prior research shows that racial 
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prejudice, stereotypes and punitive attitudes are linked to minority group members 
(Chiricos, McEntire, & Gertz, 2001; King & Wheelock, 2007; Ousey & Unnever; 2012; 
Welch, Payne, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2011). Punitive attitudes are related to perceived 
minority threat to public safety and perceived interracial competition for economic 
resources (King & Wheelock, 2007). Large proportions of minority populations are also 
linked to fear of crime (Chiricos et al., 2001; Eitle & Jacobs, 2008; Liska, Lawrence, & 
Sanchirico, 1982) and perceived levels of neighborhood crime, controlling for crime rates 
(Quillian & Pager, 2001). For example, Liska, Lawrence and Sanchirico (1982) found 
that metropolitan residents are more fearful of crime in areas where larger proportions of 
blacks reside, controlling for crime rates. Eitle and Taylor (2008) found fear of crime was 
higher in areas where a large proportion of the population was Hispanic, but that fear of 
crime did not extend to the black population. In another study, Quillian and Pager (2001) 
examine the effect of neighborhood racial composition on the level of perceived 
neighborhood crime level, controlling for crime rates. They find that neighborhoods with 
a larger proportion of young black men are perceived as having a larger crime problem. 
These research findings lend support to the theoretical assumption that stereotypes 
regarding criminality are attached to minority group members (Liska et al., 1982; Welch 
et al., 2011). While this literature fills an important gap in the minority threat perspective, 
it does not speak to whether large or growing percentages of minority population result in 
greater utilization of crime control.  
Much of the empirical work on minority threat has been conducted at the macro-
level and shows an association between large or growing minority populations and 
increased crime control activities. For example, areas marked with larger minority 
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populations have been associated with more police arrests (e.g., Eitle et al., 2002), greater 
police strength and expenditures (Kent & Jacobs, 2005; McCarty et al., 2012), higher 
incarceration rates (Campbell et al., 2015), corrections expenditures (Jacobs & Helms, 
1999) and prioritization of corrections spending (Breunig & Ernst, 2011). The minority 
threat perspective has also been associated with the use of capital punishment and support 
for the death penalty (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002, 2004; Jacobs, Carmichael, & Kent, 
2005).  
Empirical Research on Minority Threat and Incarceration. Given the premise 
of the minority threat perspective, imprisonment rates will be higher in areas with large 
or growing minority group populations. Consistent with the racial threat prediction, there 
has been support that areas with larger black populations have higher incarceration rates 
(Arvanites, 1993; Arvanites & Asher, 1995, Beckett & Western, 2001; Brown, 2016; 
Phelps & Pager, 2016; Myers, 1990; Western 2006). For example, percent black is 
positive and statistically correlated with jail admission rates at the county level 
(Applegate, 2004) and in major U.S. cities (Carmichael, 2005). In fact, Applegate (2004) 
found that percent black was significantly correlated with both jail admission rates and 
the average daily population rate across 1,445 jail systems in Southern and Midwestern 
counties. Appendix A provides a summary of empirical studies on the effects of minority 
threat, economic threat and/or political determinants on jail incarceration. Additionally, 
support for the racial threat hypothesis has also been found in studies examining overall 
prison admission rates (Padgett, 2002) and state incarceration rates (Greenberg & West, 
2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001). For example, in a recent study conducted by 
Campbell et al. (2015), percent non-Hispanic black was associated with higher state 
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incarceration rates in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010. In 2010, the only positive and 
statistically significant factor related to incarceration rates was the non-Hispanic black 
population, and this variable was the only factor to have a stronger effect in 2010 than in 
1970, after controlling for crime, economic and political factors.  
While the majority of studies examining racial threat have found positive 
associations, others have found that the relative size of the black population does not 
impact incarceration rates (Jacob & Helms, 2001; Stucky, Heimer, & Lang, 2005) nor 
have been negatively associated with incarceration rates (Liska, Markowitz, Whaley, & 
Bellair, 1999). For example, Liska, Markowitz, Whaley and Bellair (1999) sought to 
determine the effects of the mental health system and criminal justice system on jail 
admissions across 100 cities in 1978, 1983 and 1988. Liska et al. (1999) found that 
percent black was negatively related to jail admission rates in 1978 and 1983. 7 In 1988, 
Liska et al. (1999) found percent black was not correlated with jail admission rates.  
In some cases, scholars have tested minority threat by not only examining the 
effect of minority presence but also by examining the presence of minority political 
figures, tapping more closely into Blalock’s (1967) political threat thesis. For example, 
Carmichael (2005) examined the impact of minority mayor presence on jail admissions, 
hypothesizing that repression of the black population should be reduced when a black 
mayor holds political office. Liska et al. (1999) also examined the extent that white or 
nonwhite mayor presence could influence the jail admission rate. In both cases, the 
presence of a nonwhite or white mayor (Liska et al., 1999) and black mayor (Carmichael, 
2005) had no independent effect on the jail admission rate.  
                                               
7 Liska et al. (1999) note that it is possible race has a positive, indirect effect through its effect on jail 
capacity, which influences jail admissions. 
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Some scholars argue that the lack of significant findings for minority threat 
among formal control mechanisms may be due in part to due methodological issues 
(Keen & Jacobs, 2009). Specifically, the vast majority of studies examining racial threat 
have largely focused on linear relationships. When researchers have examined nonlinear 
relationships, they often find support for the benign threat hypothesis (Greenberg & 
West, 2001, Keen & Jacobs, 2009). For example, Keen and Jacobs (2009) examined 
prison admission rates for the years 1983-1999 and found that percent black had a 
positive and statistically significant impact on black-to-white prison admissions until 
percent black reached roughly 23% and then the trend reversed. With regard to state 
imprisonment rates, Greenberg and West (2001) found that the relative size of the black 
population was related but “at higher levels of percent black” the association was weaker 
(p. 630).  
In recent years, several scholars have extended the traditional minority threat 
hypothesis to include Hispanics; this is commonly referred to as ethnic threat. In 
comparison to racial threat, fewer studies have examined the effect that the presence of 
Hispanics has on incarceration (for exceptions, see Applegate, 2004; Campbell et al., 
2015; Carmichael, 2005; Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Johnson, 
1992; Padgett, 2002). To date, there seems to be a lack of support for ethnic threat as an 
explanation of state imprisonment rates (Greenberg & West, 2001) or prison admission 
rates (Stucky et al., 2005), after controlling for other relevant variables.8 For example, 
Greenberg and West (2001) utilized a pooled time-series design to examine the effect of 
                                               
8 For an exception, see Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) who found percent Hispanic had a positive and 
statistically significant effect on incarceration rates in 1990, after other relevant variables are controlled. 
These findings will be described briefly in section 2.8.  
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black and Hispanic composition on state-level imprisonment rates in 1971, 1981 and 
1991. They found the proportion of the population that was Hispanic was not related to 
state imprisonment when controlling for violent crime and economic and political factors. 
In comparison, Carmichael (2005) found that percent Hispanic was positively associated 
with jail admission rates in 100 large U.S. cities, independent of statistical controls. 
Additionally, at the county level Applegate (2004) found that percent Hispanic was 
positively correlated with jail admission rates but not on the average daily population. 
Consistent with these findings, at the county level Padgett (2002) found that percent 
Hispanic had a positive and statistically significant effect on prison admission rates in the 
state of Florida, but not the average daily jail population. It may also be the case that the 
effect of ethnic threat is dependent on region. In one study, Campbell et al., (2015) used 
state-level decennial data from 1970 to 2010 to determine whether differences of social, 
economic and political factors between Sunbelt and non-Sunbelt states explain 
incarceration. They found percent Hispanic was not associated with incarceration rates in 
non-Sunbelt states, yet the proportion of Hispanics was negatively related to incarceration 
in Sunbelt states. The discrepancy between positive, negative and null findings between 
percent Hispanic and incarceration may be the result of aggregation; national- and state-
level data may mask county-level effects (Lynch, 2011). Further, these inconsistencies 
may be due to the use of different outcome measures.   
While most studies of minority threat have examined overall incarceration rates, 
some scholars have investigated minority threat and race-specific incarceration rates. 
Examining disaggregated rates of incarceration in light of minority threat theory provides 
an opportunity to explain black and white incarceration disparities and offer possible 
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avenues to combat the disproportionate impact of incarceration on people of color. Some 
have found a positive and statistically significant association between percent nonwhite 
and non-white imprisonment rates at the county level. Bridges, Crutchfield and Simpson 
(1987) found the percent of the population that was nonwhite—black, Hispanic, and 
Native American—had no effect on white imprisonment rates, but it was positively 
related to nonwhite imprisonment rates. Conversely, some researchers have found a 
negative association between the percent of the population who is black and black 
imprisonment rates (Bridges & Crutchfield, 1988) and black prison admission rates 
(Padgett, 2002). Interestingly, while Padgett (2002) found that percent black resulted in 
lower black admission rates, she found that percent Hispanic was statistically significant 
and positively related to black admission rates. Padgett (2002) speculates that it could be 
possible that ethnic threat also produces greater social control for racial minorities. 
Unfortunately, Padgett (2002) does not have an outcome measure for Hispanic admission 
rates so it is unclear whether percent Hispanic would impact Hispanic incarceration rates.  
2.6 Economic Threat  
An alternative facet of the social threat perspective emphasizes that social control 
mechanisms are mobilized against an economic rather than a minority underclass 
(Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Garland, 1990). Similar to the racial threat hypothesis, the 
economic threat perspective argues that social control efforts respond to the perceived 
threat of disadvantaged groups. Economic threat theories propose, however, that the 
unequal distribution of wealth in society influences the exercise of social control 
(Chambliss & Seidman, 1971). The theory proposes that areas marked with greater 
economic inequality experience greater class conflict. In turn, the dominant group views 
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the economic underclass as a threat and uses its power to increase crime control measures 
against the underclass to maintain its interests (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Jacobs, 
1979; Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Spitzer, 1975). Chambliss and Seidman (1971) summarize 
the effect of class inequality on social control: “The more economically stratified a 
society becomes, the more it becomes necessary for the dominant groups in the society to 
enforce through coercion the norms of conduct which guarantee their supremacy” (p. 33). 
It is the affluent—who have economic and political power—who are capable of 
influencing the creation and implementation of law which represent their best interests 
(Chambliss & Seidman, 1971). The law then is used as an instrument by the affluent to 
control the economic underclass. The economic underclass is a threat to the wealthy’s 
interests through the possibility that they are a criminal threat and may steal from the 
wealthy, they oppose traditional values of hard work as evidenced by their unwillingness 
or inability to work, and they may view the inherent social order negatively and propose 
change to the social organization (Spitzer, 1975, p. 642).   
Empirical Research on Economic Threat and Incarceration. A review of the 
literature reveals that economic inequality is often included in studies examining race and 
incarceration. Sometimes economic inequality is cast as an alternate explanation for 
incarceration (Arvanites & Asher, 1998; Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 
2001; Jacobs & Kleban, 2003; Phelps & Pager, 2016) while in other studies it is included 
as a control against other competing theoretical explanations (Campbell et al., 2015; 
Padgett, 2002).  
With few exceptions, the majority of studies find that income inequality is either 
weakly related or unrelated to state incarceration rates, independent of statistical controls 
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(Campbell et al., 2015; Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Jacobs & 
Kleban, 2003). For example, in time-series analyses utilizing decennial census data from 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, Greenberg and West (2001) and Jacobs & Carmichael 
(2001) found income inequality was not related to state prison incarceration rates, after 
controlling for crime and other important predictors such as racial composition. Still, 
other scholars have found income inequality is positively associated with state 
imprisonment rates, after controlling for crime rates and other pertinent variables (Jacobs 
& Helms, 2001; Phelps & Pager, 2016; Western 2006). The research on jail incarceration 
also reveals that income inequality is related to local incarceration. For example, in 
Padgett’s (2002) analysis of jail county-level incarceration rates in Florida, income 
inequality was statistically significant and positively related to the jail population rate, 
but not the prison or black prison admission rates. In another study, Arvanites and Asher 
(1998) examined state-level jail census data for 50 states and DC for 1993 and found that 
income inequality was statistically significant and positively related to jail incarceration 
rates when controlling for violent crime. However, when controlling for total crime rather 
than violent crime, income inequality was insignificant for jail incarceration rates but was 
positive and significantly related to combined state and county incarceration rates.  
Other researchers have found positive associations between incarceration and 
other economic indicators, such as unemployment (Applegate, 2004; Greenberg & West, 
2001; Inverarity & Grattet, 1988) and poverty (Applegate, 2004; Arvanites & Asher, 
1995; Beckett & Western, 2001). These indicators have often been used to explain 
overall incarceration rates and are often utilized as measures of economic inequality in 
studies which examine race-specific incarceration rates. Examination of aggregate 
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incarceration rates have also revealed no association between unemployment and 
incarceration (Arvanites, 1993; Carmichael, 2005; Johnson, 1992; Michalowski & 
Pearson, 1990; Padgett, 2002) and poverty and incarceration (Jacobs & Carmichael, 
2001). For example, both Padgett (2002) and Carmichael (2005) found that 
unemployment was unrelated to jail incarceration rates (Padgett, 2002) and jail admission 
rates (Carmichael, 2005). The inconsistent results could be, in part, be due to outcome 
measures. As an example, in an examination of the effect of race on sentences to 
California state prisons and county jails, McCarthy (1990) found that poverty influences 
the use of prison but not jail confinement, and unemployment is related to jail use but not 
prison confinement, after controlling for crime.  
Studies examining race-specific incarceration utilize race-specific poverty rates 
and unemployment rates (Yates & Fording, 2005) and overall unemployment rates 
(Padgett, 2002), while others examine black-to-white ratios of unemployment (Keen & 
Jacobs, 2009; Western, 2006; Yates & Fording, 2005) and black-to-white ratios of 
poverty (Bridges & Crutchfield 1988; Bridges, Crutchfield, & Simpson, 1987; Yates & 
Fording, 2005) or some combination of these, such as both overall unemployment and 
black-to-white ratios of unemployment (Keen & Jacobs, 2009). One could argue that 
differences in unemployment and poverty between blacks and whites are more closely 
aligned with the minority threat hypothesis. That is, such measures are an indicator of the 
“competition” for economic resources, rather than the threat associated with 
economically marginalized groups. Nevertheless, research reveals that regardless of 
measurement, unemployment is unrelated to black prison admissions (Padgett, 2002), 
black to white prison admission ratios (Keen & Jacobs, 2009) and black and white 
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imprisonment rates and imprisonment disparity (Yates & Fording, 2005). In contrast, the 
examination of race-specific incarceration rates utilizing poverty as an indicator of 
economic inequality reveals inconsistent results. For example, Yates and Fording (2005) 
in an examination of state imprisonment rates and racial imprisonment disparity from 
1977-1995 found that poverty was statistically significant and positively related to white 
and black imprisonment rates as well as imprisonment disparity, while Bridges et al. 
(1987) found poverty was not related to white or nonwhite rate of sentences to prison. 
Still, in another study, the black-white ratio of poverty was found to be significantly and 
negatively related to white state imprisonment rates and unrelated to black state 
imprisonment rates (Bridges & Crutchfield, 1988).9  
2.7 Political Characteristics 
 In addition to social and economic determinants of incarceration, another 
perspective describes incarceration as largely being determined by the political landscape 
(Beckett, 1997; Beckett & Sasson, 2003; Simon, 2007). A political explanation of the use 
of incarceration differs from the minority or economic threat theses in that the key is not 
the relative size of the racial minority or economic population, rather, it is the politics of 
crime and punishment that produce greater social control (Simon, 2007; Smith, 2004). 
Although “tough on crime” rhetoric has been used by both Republicans and Democrats, 
explanations used to account for the association between politics and imprisonment 
typically revolve around conservative partisanship and citizen ideology (Beckett & 
Sasson, 2004).   
                                               
9 Bridges and Crutchfield (1988) calculated state black-white economic inequality by dividing percent 
black below the poverty level by percent white below the poverty level (p. 706).  
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The notion that conservative party affiliation will influence the use of 
incarceration has been referred to as the partisanship hypothesis (Smith, 2004). Law and 
order politics have been a successful strategy among Republicans to gain swing voters 
(Alexander, 2010; Beckett & Sasson, 2003; Smith, 2004). Often referred to as the 
Southern Strategy, racial rhetoric was used to gain the votes of lower- and middle-class 
whites who were socially conservative but who traditionally did not vote Republican 
because they were often did not benefit from conservative economic policies (Beckett & 
Sasson, 2004). By appealing to these groups’ implicit biases regarding crime, 
conservative politicians were able to collect more votes through endorsements of harsh 
punishment (Alexander, 2010). The infamous “Willie Horton” ad is but one example 
where politicians used racial rhetoric and framed crime as a result of Democrats who are 
“soft on crime” (Alexander, 2010; Beckett & Sasson, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005). 
Scholars point out that such anti-minority sentiments today are more implicit then they 
were in the past (Alexander, 2010; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005). There is evidence that law 
and order political rhetoric increases citizens’ fear of crime and that such racial rhetoric 
and racialized code words influence citizens’ support for harsher policies and practices 
(Beckett, 1997; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005).  
In addition to partisanship, it has been argued that the use of incarceration is a 
response to the public calling for harsh punishment regarding crime (Smith, 2004). The 
public’s perception regarding crime, whether real or imagined, does not drive punitive 
policies and practices; rather, it is their demand for harsh sanctions (Smith, 2004). 
Typically, political conservatives call for punitive policies regarding crime (King & 
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Wheelock, 2007), while liberals are often less supportive of punitive practices 
(Langworthy & Whitehead, 1986).  
Empirical Research on Political Characteristics and Incarceration. Empirical 
research on the political determinants of incarceration reveal that indeed politics do 
contribute to incarceration use. Prior research shows that states with more politically 
conservative citizens typically have higher incarceration rates (Campbell et al., 2015; 
Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001). Scholars have used a variety of measures to gauge citizen 
political ideology to include public opinion polls (Greenberg & West, 2001), the percent 
of citizens voting for a Republican political candidate (Keen & Jacobs, 2009), as well as 
scales constructed from political roll calls and voter outcomes with specific intent to 
measure citizen and political ideology (Campbell et al., 2015; Jacobs & Carmichael, 
2001). These operationalizations will be discussed briefly in Section 2.9. For now, 
evidence of the effects of politically conservative citizens is presented. Greenberg and 
West (2001) found that states with more conservative constituents, as measured through 
CBS News-New York Times polls, not only had higher rates of incarceration but also 
these areas had the sharpest increases in incarceration over time (p. 637). Additionally, 
conservative citizen ideology, as measured by the percent of citizens voting for the 
Republican presidential candidate, has also been reported to be positively associated with 
the ratio of black-to-white prison admissions (Keen & Jacobs, 2009). The portrait painted 
by studies in this area, however, is not completely consistent. While some studies support 
that conservative ideology impacts incarceration rates, other analyses find that 
conservative public attitudes do not impact prison admission or incarceration rates 
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(Smith, 2004; Stucky et al., 2005), and they do not explain imprisonment disparities 
between blacks and whites (Yates & Fording, 2005).  
 Scholars have also approached this issue using an alternative method of gauging 
politics. They have considered a possible link between variation in the use of state 
incarceration and differences across geographic areas in the relative size and strength of 
political parties. Several studies report a significant positive association of Republican 
Party strength on state imprisonment (Beckett & Western, 2001; Campbell et al., 2015; 
Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Jacobs & Helms, 1996, 2001; Keen & Jacobs, 2009; Phelps 
& Pager, 2016; Smith, 2004: Stucky et al 2005; Yates & Fording, 2005). Existing 
empirical research finds that Republican Party strength matters at the national and state 
level. For example, Republican control of the executive and legislative branches of 
government have been linked to increases in prison admissions (Jacobs & Helms, 1996) 
and imprisonment rates (Jacobs & Helms, 2001). In a nuanced study, Stucky, Heimer, 
and Lang (2005) found that the effect of Republic strength depended, in part, on the 
competition among state legislatures. When competition among state legislatures 
increased so too did admission rates and this association increased over time (Stucky et 
al., 2005). Republican legislative control, but not executive control was statistically 
significant and positively related to racial imprisonment disparities (Yates & Fording, 
2005), yet executive control is not associated with black and white imprisonment rates 
(Yates & Fording, 2005). Still, others have found no significant association between 
Republican strength and incarceration rates in the United States (Greenberg & West, 
2001) or Canada (Neil & Carmichael, 2015). This finding has also been found among 
scholars investigating racial disparities in prison admissions (Keen & Jacobs, 2009). All 
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of these studies have operationalized social control through prison incarceration, not by 
considering variation in jail use.  
2.8 Social, Economic, and Political Context  
Thus far, I have discussed the impact of minority threat, economic threat, and 
politics individually for greater clarity regarding the empirical status of each theory on 
incarceration. While some scholars have tested individual positions to determine the 
independent effects of racial or ethnic threat, economic threat, or politics on 
incarceration, others have included two or all three potential determinants of 
incarceration. These scholars have advanced the literature and simultaneously examined 
the effect of the presence of minorities, economic inequality and public conservatism 
and/or political climate on incarceration rates. The examination of these multiple 
theoretical perspectives contributes to a better overall understanding of the underlying 
causes of incarceration use.  
Many of the studies I have examined throughout this chapter have tested two 
(Arvanites, 1993; Arvanites & Asher, 1995; Bridges & Crutchfield, 1988; Bridges et al., 
1987; Michalowski & Pearson, 1990) or all three (Beckett & Western, 2001; Brown, 
2016; Campbell et al., 2015; Greenberg & Western, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; 
Jacobs & Helms, 2001; Keen & Jacobs, 2009; Neil & Carmichael, 2015; Phelps & Pager, 
2016; Stucky et al., 2005; Smith, 2004) determinants of state incarceration. Those studies 
that have included two determinants exclude political factors and instead focus on the 
minority threat and economic threat theses. Generally, these studies find support for 
racial threat but not economic threat (Arvanites, 1993; Arvanites & Asher, 1995; Bridges 
47 
 
& Crutchfield, 1988; Bridges et al., 1987; Michalowski & Pearson, 1990), after 
controlling for crime.   
Inclusion of social, economic and political determinants largely reveals that 
minority threat and political factors impact incarceration. Contrary to the economic threat 
hypothesis, however, economic features tend not to predict the imprisonment scale once 
other variables are considered (Campbell et al., 2005; Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & 
Carmichael, 2001; Smith, 2004; Stucky et al., 2005). In one of the most comprehensive 
studies conducted on political determinants of incarceration, Smith (2004) examined 
several social, economic and political factors utilizing a pooled state-level analysis for the 
years 1980 through 1995. He found no association among economic predictors—Gini 
index, poverty, unemployment—and incarceration rates, nor citizen ideology or 
presidential election years. However, the percent black was significantly related to 
incarceration rates as was Democrat Party strength in the state legislature and 
gubernatorial election year. In another study, Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) utilized 
decennial census data from 1970, 1980, and 1990 to explore the impact of percent black, 
percent Hispanic, Republican strength, political ideology, unemployment, poverty and 
income inequality on state incarceration rates, they found associations between racial 
composition and political factors and higher incarceration rates, but economic factors 
were not related to incarceration, after controlling for other relevant variables. These 
studies show the importance not only of simultaneously examining social, economic and 
political factors, but also of including multiple explanations of economic and political 
factors when determining their impact on incarceration (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001).  
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To date, most studies examining local incarceration in light of social, economic 
and political factors have examined minority and economic threat and excluded political 
variables (Applegate, 2004; Arvanites & Asher, 1998; Carmichael, 2005; Liska et al., 
1999; McCarthy, 1990; Padgett, 2002). Broadly, the literature on local incarceration 
examining minority and economic threat lends support to the minority threat hypothesis 
and fails to find support for economic threat; similar to those studies examining state 
imprisonment. The extent to which politics as defined by politically conservative citizen 
ideology or partisanship influence local incarceration is unclear has only one study to 
date has examined social, economic and political determinants. Johnson (1992) examined 
jail population rates across states for 1983 and 1987 using the Census of Local Jails. He 
found minority threat was positively associated with jail populations for both years. 
Specifically, young black males, not young Hispanic males had an independent effect, net 
of statistical controls on jail population rates. Similarly, economic threat—
unemployment—was unrelated to jail population rates (Johnson, 1992). It appears 
Johnson (1992) initially had a measure for conservative citizenry, however, it is not 
possible to determine whether conservative citizenry was considered in Johnson’s (1992) 
final model because no covariates are reported for 1983 or 1987 (Table 5.12 and Table 
5.13, pp. 98-99). Johnson (1992) reports that he retained from his initial models a control 
for crime and composite measure of drug sales and all variables he believed were 
marginally significant (p ≤ .20) included. It seems that Johnson (1992) excluded 
conservative citizenry from the final model because it was not marginally significant in 
the initial model. With that said, it is impossible to interpret whether this study did in fact 
test all three theoretical explanations of jail use.  
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2.9 Methodological Issues  
The empirical research on the effect of minority threat, economic threat, and 
political factors on incarceration rates is decidedly mixed and inconsistent. Many scholars 
have written about the difficulty in making conclusive statements regarding these 
explanations, noting the challenge can largely be attributed to varying methodological 
choices among researchers (Bridges & Crutchfield, 1988; Campbell et al., 2015; Liska, 
1992; Stucky et al., 2005). For example, many scholars have operationalized minority 
threat in terms of the relative size of the black population (Campbell et al., 2015; 
Carmichael, 2005; Greenberg & West, 2001), or the percent of young black—Hispanic 
and non-Hispanic—males (Brown, 2016), or percent nonwhite (Arvanites & Asher, 1995; 
1998; McCarthy, 1990). Failing to separate race and ethnicity is problematic. Defining 
minority threat only in terms of race may obscure important differences between blacks 
and Hispanics. Recent studies have extended minority threat to include examination of 
the Hispanic population (Campbell et al., 2015; Carmichael, 2005; Greenberg & West, 
2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Padgett, 2002), but this literature is sparse. The 
Hispanic population has grown nearly four-fold since 1980 and is now the largest 
minority group in the U.S. comprising 57.5 million people or 17.8% of the U.S. total 
population (American FactFinder, 2016; Hobbs & Stoops, 2002). The U.S. Census 
projects Hispanic population growth will continue and by 2060 will comprise 119 million 
or roughly 29% of the U.S. total population (Colby & Ortman, 2015). Additionally, the 
forecast suggests the non-Hispanic White population will drop below 50 percent of the 
population (43.6%) making the current majority the “majority-minority” in 2044 (Colby 
& Ortman, 2015, p. 13). Given our changing ethnic landscape in the United States, 
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examination of the impact of ethnic minorities on crime control is especially important. 
In 2010, Markert (2010) asserted that Hispanics may soon be viewed as a threat by both 
the majority and traditional minority—whites and blacks, respectively. Recent work 
conducted by Craig and Richeson (2014; 2017) lends support to Markert’s (2010) claim. 
Both majority (Craig & Richeson, 2014) and non-Hispanic minority group members were 
more supportive of conservative policies when the Hispanic population was believed to 
be a larger proportion of the population (Craig & Richeson, 2017). It is still unclear, 
however, whether Hispanics are viewed as a real threat and the impact of ethnic threat on 
local incarceration. 
Conceptual and operational issues also complicate the literature on economic 
threat and incarceration. Economic factors have been measured as a dimension of racial 
threat (e.g., white-to-black household mean income), as a direct test of economic threat, 
and indirectly as a control variable in studies examining racial threat. Further, the 
operationalization of economic threat is quite varied: income inequality as measured by 
the Gini index (Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001), poverty as 
measured by the percentage of the population living in poverty (Jacobs & Carmichael, 
2001; McCarthy, 1990) and unemployment as measured by the percent of unemployed 
persons or unemployment rate (McCarthy, 1990; Padgett, 2002). When economic threat 
is conceptualized as economic stratification, the operationalization differs. For example, 
Jacobs and Helms (1996) measured income inequality by both the Gini index and 
variance of incomes and found these measures impacted state prison admission rates 
differently. The Gini index was not associated with admission rates, but the variance of 
incomes had a positive and significant effect on admission rates (Jacobs & Helms, 1996).  
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Likewise, the political climate has been conceptualized and operationalized in 
numerous ways. Republican strength has been measured by the percentage of 
Republicans in state legislatures (Brown, 2016; Beckett & Western, 2001; Stucky et al., 
2005), governor’s party affiliation (Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & Helms, 2001; 
Smith, 2004), or a combination of the presence of a Republican governor and the percent 
of Republicans in state legislatures (Campbell et al., 2015; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; 
Jacobs & Helms, 2001; Phelps & Pager, 2016). In another study, Jacobs & Helms (2001) 
operationalized Republican strength as Republican presidency, the number of consecutive 
years a Republican held the presidency and the percentage of Republican governors or 
Republicans in state legislators. Rather than focusing on political leadership, other 
scholars have assessed the impact of politics on social control through characteristics of 
the jurisdiction’s populace. The political climate has been measured by the percentage of 
voters who voted for a Republican presidential candidate (Keen & Jacobs, 2009; Johnson, 
1992; Smith, 2004) or based on a scale constructed by Berry, Ringquist, Fording and 
Hanson (1998) (Campbell et al., 2015; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001). Berry et al. (1998) 
measure citizen ideology as the average score on a liberal-conservative scale of voters in 
a state. The scale relies on the ideological position of states legislators and the governor 
in each year using the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and AFL-CIO 
Committee on Political Education (COPE) interest group ratings which reflect voting of 
state congressional leaders. An ideology score for constituents in a congressional district 
is then calculated based on the district’s incumbent, then an ideology score for the 
individual challenging the incumbent, and election results of voters which are assumed to 
demonstrate divisions in citizen ideology (Berry et al., 1998, p. 330-331; Berry, Fording, 
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Ringquist, Hanson, & Klarner, 2010). Scores from each congressional district are then 
computed to represent citizen ideology in a state (Berry et al., 1998; Berry et al., 2010). 
While existing studies may shed light on various theoretical constructs, to date, no one 
has systematically examined how these different methods of operationalizing minority 
threat, economic threat, and political context impact outcomes. 
Complicating matters further is the reality that incarceration has been measured 
multiple ways. Incarceration has been defined as prison population rates, prison 
admissions, jail admissions, or jail population rates. As McCarthy (1990) points out, it is 
important to examine different types of incarceration as there may be different operating 
mechanisms that influence these outcomes. The few studies that have examined federal 
and state incarceration rates and jail incarceration rates indeed show there are likely 
different mechanisms at play (Arvanites & Asher, 1998; McCarthy, 1990; Padgett, 2002). 
For example, in examining the effect of race on sentences to California state prisons and 
county jails, McCarthy (1990) found that percent nonwhite influences the use of jail but 
not prison confinement, after controlling for crime. In contrast, Padgett (2002) found that 
percentage of blacks in the population was unrelated to jail population rates but did 
influence total prison admission rates. The discrepancy between these studies could be 
attributed to many things—differences in the operationalization of minority threat and 
incarceration, the state where the study was conducted, as well as the time-period. 
Various studies suggest that the effects of social, economic and political determinants on 
state incarceration vary over time (Brown, 2016; Campbell et al., 2016; Phelps & Pager, 
2016). An additional concern, then, involves the use of cross-sectional designs (e.g., 
Arvanites & Asher, 1995; 1998; Beckett & Western, 2001; McCarthy, 1990; 
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Michalowski & Pearson, 1990) which cannot speak to changes over time. The diverse 
methodological issues including the operationalization of incarceration make it difficult 
to draw conclusive remarks regarding different theoretical explanations of incarceration.  
2.10 The Current Study 
 The current study extends previous research examining the effects of contextual 
factors on incarceration in a number of ways. Many of the studies examining community 
impact on incarceration have relied on state and federal data. Millions of individuals pass 
through local jails every year and many individuals who are sentenced to state or federal 
prison will first pass through a local jail. Yet, the focus of incarceration remains at the 
state and federal level. As a result, jails have been studied less thoroughly than prisons. 
The need for research regarding jails is urgent. This project’s use of an enumeration of all 
county jails in the United States allows the examination of contextual effects at the local 
level throughout the United States. As previously discussed, jails are the “gateway” to the 
criminal justice system (Subramaniam et al., 2015, p. 4) and reflect mobilization of social 
control by law enforcement, courts and corrections. Prisons and jails are both affected by 
sentencing policies and practices made locally by criminal justice actors, however, jails 
reflect a more immediate decision or what Lynch (2011) calls “microlevel variation” 
which speaks to how “local norms and culture” effect how criminal justice is 
implemented (p. 674; see also Klofas, 1990b). Communities are potentially more 
sensitive than are states to changes in the local community (Bridges et al., 1987; Lynch, 
2011) and therefore, examination of jail use across the United States may provide a better 
understanding of mass imprisonment. As Lynch (2011) argues “[T]o understand the 
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proliferation of penal populations, we also must look at where the power to imprison 
resides, which is typically at the county level in the United States” (p. 674).  
To date, only one study has examined the impact of social, economic and political 
factors on jail use. Johnson’s (1992) study used data that is now more than thirty years 
old and examined jail use aggregated to the state level. Since the early to mid-1980s the 
United States social and economic landscape has experienced many changes. The system 
of mass incarceration has continued to grow in some jurisdictions, while in others, 
incarceration has slowed or even reversed (Vera Institute of Justice, 2017). The nation’s 
social landscape is experiencing an ever-changing racial and ethnic makeup that will 
continue to expand (Colby & Ortman, 2015). In fall 2008, the United States experienced 
the worst economic recession since the Great Depression witnessing nationwide 
unemployment rates that nearly reached 10-percent (Council of Economic Advisors, 
2010; 2017). However, since 2009 the nation has been in a period of recovery, adding 
millions of jobs to the U.S. economy, experiencing rising median household family 
incomes and declining poverty rates (Council of Economic Advisors, 2017). Given the 
changes in the last few decades and the acknowledgment that mass incarceration cannot 
and should not be sustained, the question remains – what impacts jail use?   
My study extends prior work by examining jail use at the county level with the 
latest available jail data, and it will examine the microlevel of incarceration—counties. 
Further, the current study will assess the impact of social, economic and political factors 
on minority-specific rates of incarceration in local jails. The minority and economic 
threat theories speak to mobilizing social control against minority members and 
economically disadvantaged groups, and race and crime have been conflated in 
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conservative, tough-on-crime political rhetoric. Examining disaggregated rates of 
incarceration considering these three determinants may provide useful insight into how 
community structure impacts community use of local jails. To date, no study has 
examined how social, economic and political factors impact minorities held in local jails. 
That is, no study has utilized race- and ethnic-disaggregated jail incarceration rates. 
Relatedly, the current study will also examine curvilinear relationships, which few 
studies examining state incarceration rates have modeled, and no study of jail 
incarceration rates have modeled.  
Two primary research questions will be addressed in this study: (1) What is the 
impact of racial and ethnic heterogeneity, economic inequality, and political conservatism 
on jail admission and population rates? and (2) what is the impact of these factors on 
race- and ethnic-specific jail population rates? Based on the theoretical arguments and 
guided by the existing empirical research on the minority and economic threat 
perspectives and political determinants of incarceration, I propose 14 specific hypotheses 
to be tested.10 Appendix B provides a summary of these hypotheses and predicted signs.  
Hypothesis 1: Racial threat, as measured by the relative size of the black, non-
Hispanic population, will have a curvilinear relationship with overall jail 
admission rates. That is, jail admission rates will increase as the county-level 
percent black, non-Hispanic grows, but only until the percent black, non-Hispanic 
population reaches a certain threshold, at which point jail admission rates will 
reverse, resulting in lower overall jail admission rates. 
                                               
10 It must be acknowledged that the hypotheses are not completely independent as all measures of jail use 
are related. While the bivariate correlations indeed show the outcome variables are significantly related, the 
correlations are relatively low ranging from .06 to .32 (see Appendix E), indicating the outcome variables 
represent distinct features of jail use.   
56 
 
Hypothesis 2: Racial threat, as measured by the relative size of the black, non-
Hispanic population, will have a curvilinear relationship with overall jail 
population rates. That is, jail population rates will increase as the county-level 
percent black, non-Hispanic grows, but only until the percent black, non-Hispanic 
population reaches a certain threshold, at which point jail population rates will 
reverse, resulting in lower overall jail population rates. 
Hypothesis 3: Racial threat, as measured by the relative size of the black, non-
Hispanic population, will have a curvilinear relationship with jail population rates 
of black inmates. That is, black jail population rates will increase as the county-
level percent black, non-Hispanic grows, but only until the percent black, non-
Hispanic population reaches a certain threshold, at which point black jail 
population rates will reverse, resulting in lower black jail population rates. 
Hypothesis 4: Ethnic threat, as measured by the relative size of the Hispanic 
population, will have a curvilinear relationship with overall jail admission rates. 
That is, jail admission rates will increase as the county-level percent Hispanic 
grows, but only until the Hispanic population reaches a certain threshold, at which 
point jail admission rates will reverse, resulting in lower overall admission rates. 
Hypothesis 5: Ethnic threat, as measured by the relative size of the Hispanic 
population, will have a curvilinear relationship with overall jail population rates. 
That is, jail population rates will increase as the county-level percent Hispanic 
grows, but only until the Hispanic population reaches a certain threshold, at which 
point jail population rates will reverse, resulting in lower overall population rates. 
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Hypothesis 6: Ethnic threat, as measured by the relative size of the Hispanic 
population, will have a curvilinear relationship with jail population rates of 
Hispanic inmates. That is, Hispanic jail population rates will increase as the 
county-level percent Hispanic grows, but only until the percent Hispanic 
population reaches a certain threshold, at which point Hispanic jail population 
rates will reverse, resulting in lower Hispanic jail population rates. 
Hypothesis 7:  Economic threat, as measured by income inequality, will result in 
higher overall admission rates.  
Hypothesis 8: Economic threat, as measured by income inequality, will result in 
higher overall jail population rates. 
Hypothesis 9: Economic threat, as measured by income inequality, will result in 
higher black jail population rates. 
Hypothesis 10: Economic threat, as measured by income inequality, will result in 
higher Hispanic jail population rates. 
Hypothesis 11: Political conservatism, as measured by the percent of U.S. 
constituents who voted for Mitt Romney in the 2012 presidential election, will 
result in higher overall jail admission rates.  
Hypothesis 12: Political conservatism, as measured by the percent of U.S. 
constituents who voted for Mitt Romney in the 2012 presidential election, will 
result in higher overall jail population rates. 
Hypothesis 13: Political conservatism, as measured by the percent of U.S. 
constituents who voted for Mitt Romney in the 2012 presidential election, will 
result in higher black jail population rates. 
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Hypothesis 14: Political conservatism, as measured by the percent of U.S. 
constituents who voted for Mitt Romney in the 2012 presidential election, will 
result in higher Hispanic jail population rates.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data Sources and Sample 
The main dataset for this study was created from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 
2013 Census of Jails and was obtained through the Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (USDOJ BJS, 2016, ICPSR36128). The Census of Jails was 
first administered in 1970 and has been conducted on ten occasions (1970, 1972, 1978, 
1983, 1988, 1993, 1999, 200511, 2006, and 2013) (USDOJ BJS, 2016, Codebook). In 
2013, the Census of Jails was combined with the Deaths in Custody Reporting Program 
(DCRP) to reduce subject burden (Minton et al., 2015; USDOJ BJS, 2016, Codebook).12 
The Census of Jails collects facility-level data on a variety of jail features including 
information about the physical plant, jail operations, and staff and inmates.  
The 2013 Census of Jails is a complete enumeration of all local jails in the United 
States (Minton et al., 2015; USDOJ BJS, 2016, Codebook). It includes all local, regional 
and federally administered jails that hold individuals past arraignment. Excluded from the 
Census of Jails are “physically separate temporary holding facilities such as holding tanks 
and police lockups” which release persons after arraignment (USDOJ BJS, 2016,
                                               
11 This data was part one of two collections and measured individual-level data (USDOJ BJS, 2007, 
Codebook).  
12 The DCRP is conducted by BJS and collects data on national, state and incident-level adult deaths in 
correctional facilities nationwide (Minton et al., 2015). 
 
 
60 
 
Codebook, p. 5). Also excluded from the Census of Jails are state unified systems (i.e., 
Alaska,13 Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island and Vermont) which are operated 
by state departments of correction rather than local administrations (Minton et al., 2015; 
USDOJ BJS, 2016, Codebook).14 In total, the 2013 Census of Jails questionnaire was 
administered to 3,163 jail facilities across 2,872 jurisdictions in the United States (Minton 
et al., 2015; USDOJ BJS, 2016, Codebook). The final response rate was 92.4% (Minton 
et al., 2015).  
The sample for this study was drawn from the 2013 Census of Jails (USDOJ BJS, 
2016, ICPSR36128). This study focuses on jails that operate at the local level, therefore, 
several cases were eliminated to maintain a county-level analysis.15 First, regional jails 
(87 facilities) were eliminated as these jails incarcerate persons from two or more 
counties.16 No measure in the questionnaire details individuals’ residency so it is not 
possible to separate regional jail data into the constituent counties to determine county-
level effects. Second, privately operated jails (41 facilities) were omitted. Features such 
as financing, oversight and incentives to incarceration suggest privately-run correctional 
facilities may operate differently from public institutions (Blakely, 2005; Shichor, 1995). 
                                               
13 The Census included fifteen independently operated jails in Alaska (Minton et al., 2015; USDOJ BJS, 
2016, Codebook).  
14 For a review of state unified systems see e.g., Krauth (1997). 
15 Data on a single jurisdiction that includes all Federal Bureau of Prison (BOP) facilities that operate as 
jails (12 facilities) were not available for public use and thus excluded from this study.  
16 The Census defines regional jails as those with “2 or more jail jurisdictions having a formal agreement to 
operate” (Minton et al., 2015, p. 20). A list of regional jails (and identification of private facilities) was 
obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (T. Minton, email correspondence, December 12, 2017). 
Many jails, in addition to regional jails, have informal and formal agreements to house inmates from 
neighboring counties, perhaps due to issues of overcrowding in other jails and/or prisons, for example. A 
limitation of the current data then is the inability to determine how many jails not defined as regional have 
informal or formal agreements which nonetheless impact the location where someone is incarcerated and 
may inflate county-level rates of incarceration.  
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In summary, the sample includes all publicly-operated, county-level jails in the United 
States (n=2,411).17 
County-specific data were obtained through various secondary data sources and 
merged with the Census of Jails data using codes provided in the 2012 Law Enforcement 
Agency Identifiers Crosswalk (LEAIC) (USDOJ BJS, 2015, ICPSR 35158). The LEAIC 
dataset was created by the Bureau of Justice Statistics to facilitate data mergers such as 
the one used for this study (Lindgren & Zawitz, 2001). County-level measures of social 
and economic predictors were compiled from the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2010b, 2010c, 2012) the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2010) and the University of Michigan Population Studies Center (“Racial Residential 
Segregation,” n.d.). County-level crime rates were calculated from the 2012 Uniform 
Crime Reports (USDOJ FBI, 2014, ICPSR 35019). A scale of political conservatism was 
created using 2012 county-level election data provided, open access, by The Guardian 
(Rogers & Cage, 2012). Criminal justice capacity measures were extracted from the 2013 
Census of Jails and the 2008 Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
(USDOJ BJS, 2011). Following Brown (2016), determinate sentencing was accessed by 
researching individual state sentencing websites.   
3.2 Dependent Variables 
Jail Use. While the vast majority of incarceration studies have utilized population 
rates rather than admission rates, some scholars argue these rates reflect different 
processes in our criminal justice system (Klofas, 1987; McCarthy, 1990). Indeed, as 
                                               
17 Here, the term “sample” is not used in the traditional sense, but rather as a convenient way to refer to the 
group of facilities being analyzed. That is, my sample includes the whole population of U.S. jails minus 
those I excluded (i.e., regional and privately-run facilities.) to maintain focus on county-level social control.   
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evidenced in my discussion of jail growth and trends in Chapter 2, population and 
admission rates vary considerably. McCarthy (1990) contends that admission rates rather 
than population rates should be the primary measurement of incarceration as admission 
rates reflect “a more simple and more direct measure of social control practices” (p. 330) 
that are not affected by sentence length and release rates. McCarthy’s (1990) 
observations have merit, but sentence lengths and other determinants of release also 
characterize a community’s overall orientation toward social control through 
incarceration. Omitting these factors by considering only jail admission rates risks 
misrepresenting the extent of jail use. Klofas (1987) explains the difference between 
admission and populations rates by describing which populace is represented by each 
rate. He argues population rates may overrepresent serious offenses because population 
rates represent persons in jail on any given day, whereas admission rates may better 
represent those persons held in jails as many persons may not be incarcerated for lengthy 
periods of time and as such may not be represented in data collected on population rates. 
Overall, Klofas (1987) argues that jail use measurements must include both admission 
and population rates due to the amount of variability in jail use.  
Given the importance of both indicators, the current study measures jail use based 
on the size of a jail’s population and the extent of admissions. Jail use was measured 
using overall admission and population rates, as well as and race- and ethnic-specific jail 
population rates (USDOJ BJS, 2016, ICPSR36128). Rather than use the raw counts 
provided by the 2013 Census of Jails, rates were computed to account for variations in 
the size of respective jurisdictions. The overall population count was obtained using the 
item “On December 31, 2013, how many persons CONFINED in this facility were…” 
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(USDOJ BJS, 2013, Form CJ-9A/10A, pp. 3). Response categories include adult males 
(age 18 or older), adult females (age 18 or older), males under age 18, females under age 
18, and total (sum of all items). The category of “total” was used as this best represents 
overall jail population rates.18 This count also included persons confined to a local jail for 
other authorities (e.g., state and federal). Because this study focuses on local 
incarceration, inmates held under other authority, including local, state, federal and tribal 
authorities were subtracted from the count before calculating rates. The count for persons 
held under other authority was obtained using the item “On December 31, 2013, how 
many persons CONFINED in this facility were held for…” (USDOJ BJS, 2013, Form 
CJ-9A/10A, pp. 3). Response categories include federal authorities (e.g., U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA); U.S. 
Marshals Service), state prison authorities (in-state and out-of-state), American 
Indian/Alaska Tribal governments (excluding those housed for BIA), other local jail 
jurisdictions (in-state and out-of-state), and total (sum of all items).19  The jail population 
rate was computed by dividing the one-day population count by the county population 
size and multiplying by 100,000 using population data from the 2010 U.S. Census (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2010b). The admission count was obtained with the item “Between 
January 1, 2013, and December 31, 2013, how many persons were new admissions to this 
facility?” (USDOJ BJS, 2013, Form CJ-9A/10A, pp. 4).20 The admission rate was 
                                               
18 Youth under 18 years of age are included because (1) jurisdictions differ in the definition of juvenile, so 
excluding them would introduce bias across jurisdictions, (2) they are part of the overall use of jail, and (3) 
the data do not allow exclusion from the admission rates or from race- and ethnic-specific population rates, 
therefore, including them in the overall population count maintains some consistency across the dependent 
variables.  
19 Other local jail jurisdictions include inmates being housed for a county or city other than the responding 
jail.  
20 Includes: (1) "persons officially booked into and housed in [the] facility by formal legal document and by 
the authority of the courts or some other official agency,” (2) “repeat offenders booked on new charges,” 
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computed by dividing the number of admissions by the county population size and then 
multiplying by 100,000 using population data from the 2010 U.S. Census. Responses to 
the admission count items include males, females, and total (the sum of the male and 
female category). The category “total” was used as it best represents overall admission 
counts. 
Race- and ethnic-specific jail population rates were calculated using the item “On 
December 31, 2013, how many persons CONFINED in this facility were…” (USDOJ 
BJS, 2013, Form CJ-9A/10A, pp. 3). 21  Response categories included (1) White, not of 
Hispanic origin; (2) Black or African American, not of Hispanic origin; (3) Hispanic or 
Latino; (4) American Indian/Alaska Native, not of Hispanic origin; (5) Asian, not of 
Hispanic origin; (6) Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, not of Hispanic origin; (7) 
Two or more races, not of Hispanic origin; (8) Additional categories in your information 
system – Specify; and  (9) Not known. The items also asked for a total (sum of all items). 
As they are the primary interest in this study, the categories Black or African American, 
not of Hispanic origin; and Hispanic or Latino provided race- and ethnic-specific jail 
population counts, respectively. These raw figures were converted to rates per 100,000 
using population data provided by the 2010 U.S. Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b). 
Specifically, I divided the Black count by county Black population, and the Hispanic 
count by county Hispanic population, then multiplied these figures by 100,000 to obtain 
                                               
and (3) “those persons serving a weekend sentence coming into the facility for the first time,” (USDOJ 
BJS, 2013, Form CJ-9A/10A, pp. 4). Excluded are “returns from escape, work release, medical 
appointments/treatment facilities, furloughs, bail/bond releases, and court appearances” (USDOJ BJS, 
2013, Form CJ-9A/10A, pp. 4). 
21 “Confined” includes: (1) persons on transfer to treatment facilities but who remain under the jurisdiction 
of this facility, (2) persons held for other jurisdictions, (3) persons in community-based programs (e.g., 
work release, day release, drug/alcohol treatment) who return to jail at night, and (4) persons out to court 
while under the jurisdiction of [the] facility (USDOJ BJS, 2013, Form CJ-9A/10A, pp. 2).  
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the Black jail population rate and Hispanic jail population rate, respectively. Race- and 
ethnic-specific admission rates were not calculated because the census does not provide 
admission counts disaggregated by race or ethnicity.22  
3.3 Independent Variables  
 Minority threat. Black population composition and Hispanic population 
composition were obtained from the 2010 U.S. Census of Population and Housing (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2010b) and consist of the percent of county residents who are Black or 
African American not Hispanic or Latino and the percent of county residents who are 
Hispanic or Latino, respectively. Including separate measures of black residents and 
Hispanic residents allows inclusion of two important dimensions of minority threat: racial 
threat and ethnic threat. Prior research reveals racial prejudice and punitive attitudes are 
linked to minority group members (King & Wheelock, 2007). Today, explicit forms of 
overt racism are unacceptable in mainstream society. Arguments are made that 
incarceration today is merely “The New Jim Crow” (Alexander, 2010), implicit bias that 
serves to control poor, minority members of society in response to the changing social 
and demographic landscape (Alexander, 2010; Mauer, 2017, pp. 33). This landscape also 
includes Hispanics who are now the fastest growing and largest minority group in the 
United States. Prior research shows that fear of crime (Eitle & Taylor, 2008) and support 
for conservative initiatives among whites (Craig & Richeson, 2014) and non-Hispanic 
racial minorities (Craig & Richeson, 2017) are greater in areas with marked Hispanics. 
                                               
22 A potential limitation to the data is that persons being held for other authorities (i.e., local, state, tribal, 
and federal) cannot be excluded from these nor the admission count. Therefore, these rates may be inflated 
to some degree due to persons being held for other jurisdictions.  
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Given the changing social landscape in American society, it is important to examine both 
the potential impact of incarceration on both African Americans and Hispanics.  
Economic threat. Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, was 
obtained from the 2012 American Community Survey 5-year estimates (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2012). Given the premise of economic threat, areas with greater economic 
stratification will experience greater class conflict and subsequent social control – the 
Gini index is the most appropriate measure of economic threat because it is a precise 
measure of income differences across counties. Still, because the unemployment rate and 
poverty rate have been used as alternative measures of economic threat, they too will be 
examined. The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality that varies between 0.0 
and 1.0, where G = 0 indicates complete equality (proportionate income distribution 
among households) and G = 1 indicates perfect inequality (uneven income distribution 
among households where one household has all the income and everyone else has an 
income of zero). The Gini coefficient is derived from the Lorenz curve which represents 
the observed cumulative income distribution among households and is represented by the 
function l = l(z), where z is the cumulative share of income receivers and l is the 
cumulative share of income received (Abounoori & McCloughan, 2003, p. 505; Bee, 
2012; U.S. Census Bureau, 2018b).  
The Gini coefficient is calculated as: 
! = 1 − 2	' ((*)d*-.  
Unemployment. Unlike the class inequality argument, which suggests power 
differentials between the rich and the poor result in increased crime control due to greater 
class conflict, the labor market explanation argues incarceration is used to control the 
67 
 
surplus labor force (Inverarity, 1992; Rusche-Kirchheimer, 1968). This explanation posits 
that when unemployment is high, the economic underclass threatens the “social 
relationships of production” (Liska, 1987, p. 80) and incarceration rates therefore may 
increase (Rusche-Kirchheimer, 1968). Likewise, when unemployment is low, 
incarceration rates may decrease because there is a need for additional workers (Rusche-
Kirchheimer, 1968). The evidence regarding the effects of the unemployment-
incarceration relationship are mixed. Some studies have found a positive and statistically 
significant association between unemployment and imprisonment rates (Greenberg & 
West, 2001; Inverarity & Grattet, 1988; Jankovic, 1977; McCarthy, 1990; Padgett, 2002), 
while others have found no association (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Jacobs & Helms, 
2001; Keen & Jacobs, 2009). Chiricos and Delone (1992) conducted a review that 
examined the association between imprisonment and unemployment and found that of the 
147 reported relationships, 60% were positive. Because some studies have found a 
positive association between unemployment and incarceration, I include this variable as a 
control by including county-level unemployment rates obtained from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics for 2010 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). The unemployment rate is a 
percent of the labor force who are unemployed and represents persons who are not 
employed, have in the prior month actively sought employment, are available for work, 
and those who have been temporarily laid off and waiting to be recalled to their place of 
employment (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018). Every month, the Census Bureau 
disseminates the Current Population Survey (CPS) to roughly 60,000 eligible households 
or 110,000 individuals and collects these data as well as a variety of other labor force 
information for the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018).  
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Poverty. In addition to using unemployment as a measure of economic threat, 
some scholars have utilized poverty. Similar to the findings on the unemployment-
incarceration relationship, results on the poverty-incarceration relationship are also 
mixed. Some studies have found poverty is positively related to incarceration (Arvanites, 
1993; Arvanites & Asher, 1995; Beckett & Western, 2001) while others find no 
relationship (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001). The poverty-incarceration relationship has 
also been found to differ for prison and jail sentences. McCarthy (1990) found that 
poverty was correlated with state prison admission sentences but not jail admission 
sentences. Poverty is defined as the percent of residents living below federal poverty 
thresholds as measured by and obtained from the U.S. Census Small Area Income and 
Poverty Estimates for 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010c). The Census Bureau determines 
the poverty rate by examining total family annual before-tax income (e.g., earnings, 
unemployment compensations, social security, veterans’ payments, child support) to a set 
of federal poverty thresholds (i.e., dollar value) that vary by family size and age of related 
family members (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018a). For persons not living with family 
members, poverty status is determined by comparing their total income to their individual 
poverty threshold (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018a). The federal poverty thresholds are 
updated yearly to account for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2018a). A person or family (and every individual in it) are considered in 
poverty if their total money income is less than the federal dollar value threshold (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2018a).  
 Political Conservatism. Ideally, the political affiliation of prosecutors and judges 
would be used in this study as these officials are often voted into office and likely 
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represent the local preferences of constituents. Such data, however, do not exist. The best 
available county-level data comes from the 2012 presidential election which is available 
from The Guardian (Rogers & Cage, 2012). This data was used to create a measure of 
political conservatism consisting of the percent of constituents who voted for Mitt 
Romney, the Republican Party candidate, in the 2012 presidential election.  
3.4 Control Variables 
Prior research examining social threat theory and political determinants of 
incarceration and their impact on various forms of social control has identified several 
variables that may be important to include in a well-specified model. Below, I discuss 
briefly the controls that are common in studies examining social control, and how these 
variables were operationalized for the current study.  
Crime Rates. Both violent and property crime rates are shown to be positively 
related to imprisonment rates (Arvanites & Asher, 1998; Greenberg & West, 2001; 
Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; McCarthy, 1990). Crime rates, as defined by offenses known 
to the police, were obtained from the 2012 Uniform Crime Reports (USDOJ FBI, 2014, 
ICPSR 35019). Violent Crime Rate is measured as the rate of murder, rape, robbery and 
assault per 100,000 people. Property Crime Rate is measured as the rate of burglary, 
larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson per 100,000 people.  
Police Strength. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the use of incarceration is a 
function of various policies and practices implemented by criminal justice actors (see 
e.g., Greenberg & West, 2001; Subramanian et al., 2015; Travis et al., 2014). As such, it 
stands to reason that criminal justice capacity influences jail use. In areas with large 
numbers of sworn police officers, it is possible the chance of arrest is greater which in 
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turn could lead to higher local incarceration rates. Prior studies have revealed statistically 
significant and positive associations between percent black and police strength 
(Greenberg, Kessler, & Loftin, 1985; Liska, Lawrence, & Benson 1981), as well as 
economic inequality and police force size (Jacobs, 1979; Kent & Jacobs, 2005). Police 
strength was measured using the item “Enter the number of AUTHORIZED FULL-
TIME paid positions in your agency’s budget as of September 30, 2008 – and enter the 
number of ACTUAL FULL-TME and PART-TIME paid agency employees during the 
pay period that included September 30, 2008” and was extracted from the 2008 Census of 
State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (CSLLEA) (USDOJ BJS, 2008, Form CH-
38S).23  Response categories include sworn personal, officers with restricted or no arrest 
power, all other personnel, and total authorized positions/actual employees (USDOJ BJS, 
2008, Form CH-38S). The full-time sworn personnel category was used as this best 
represents the number of officers with general arrest powers. This raw figure was 
computed to a rate by dividing the total number of full-time sworn personnel by the 
county population size and multiplying by 100,000 using population data from the 2010 
Decennial Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b).  
Jail Capacity. In addition to police strength or force size, it is also possible jail 
capacity influences local criminal justice actors ’decisions (Bolduc, 1995). Prior research 
has shown jail capacity influences judges’ bail decisions (Williams, 2016) and impacts 
admission rates (Liska et al., 1999) and population rates (D’Alessio & Stolzenberg, 
1997). Jail capacity was obtained from the 2013 Census of Jails and measured with the 
                                               
23 The 2014 Census of Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies was still being fielded in late 
2016, and is not yet available (Banks, Hendrix, Hickman, & Kyckelhahn, 2016). 
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item “On December 31, 2013, what was the total rated capacity of this facility, excluding 
separate temporary holding areas?” (USDOJ BJS, 2013, Form CJ-9A/10A, p. 4).  
Determinate Sentencing Laws. Contrary to popular belief, the vast majority of 
studies show determinate sentencing has a negative or no effect on incarceration rates 
(Bridges & Crutchfield, 1988; Brown, 2016; Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & 
Carmichael, 2001, Smith, 2004; Yates & Fording, 2005). While many observers believed 
that implementing determinate sentencing laws would increase incarceration rates by 
limiting discretion in sentencing decisions, the empirical research shows either a null 
effect or that such laws decrease imprisonment rates. Only a few studies have examined 
the effects of determinate sentencing laws (DSL) on jail incarceration and these have 
produced mixed results. For example, D’Alessio and Stolzenberg (1995) found that DSLs 
had a positive and significant effect on jail incarceration rates in Minnesota, while 
Carmichael (2005) found DSLs have no effect on large city jails. Due to these 
discrepancies, it is not clear that the presence or absence of a determinate sentencing 
scheme will affect the scope of jail use across jurisdictions. Even so, I will include a 
control variable for determinate sentencing laws. Currently, a list of states’ determinate 
sentencing laws does not exist. Following Brown (2016), I conducted a manual search of 
state sentencing websites to determine whether a state did (=1) or did not (=0) have 
determinate sentencing laws in 2012 (see Appendix C).  
Region. Many scholars have noted the historical significance of examining region 
in the United States with regard to imprisonment (Arvanites, 1993; Arvanites & Asher, 
1995; Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Klofas, 1990; Michalowski 
& Pearson, 1990; Padgett, 2002). The South, compared to other regions in the United 
72 
 
States, has a long history of strained race relations (Alexander, 2010) and is typically 
considered to be more punitive (Borg, 1997; Kutateladze, 2009). Indeed, while some 
scholars have found no regional effects on incarceration rates, after controlling for crime 
rates (Arvanites & Asher, 1995; Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001), 
others have found Southern regions (Applegate, 2004; Klofas, 1990; Michalowski & 
Pearson, 1990) and areas characterized as being more representative of the South (i.e., 
“Old” Florida; Padgett, 2002) tend to have higher incarceration rates. Region, then, is 
included as a control variable and is measured according to the U.S. Census Bureau 
classification of region (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010; see Appendix D). 
Urbanization. Measures of urbanization are frequently controlled for in studies 
examining incarceration. While many studies have found urbanization is not related to 
incarceration (Beckett & Western, 2001; Campbell et al., 2015; Greenberg & West, 
2001), others have found urbanization is positively related to incarceration, net of 
statistical controls (McCarthy, 1990; Padgett, 2002). Because of its potential empirical 
relevance, urbanization was measured using 2013 county-level data provided by the 
Economic Research Service (ERA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The 
ERA established rural-urban continuum codes, which range from 1 (Metro – Counties in 
metro areas of 1 million population or more) to 9 (Nonmetro – Completely rural or less 
than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area) (Economic Research Service, 
2013).  
Residential Segregation. Measures of residential segregation have been 
introduced as control variables in studies examining racial threat and social control 
mechanisms. Residential segregation is a mechanism in and of itself that is used to 
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control minority group members (Massey & Denton, 1993). Therefore, in areas where 
residential segregation is high – that is, minority and majority group populations do not 
live in close proximity to one another – minority group members are not viewed as a 
threat and formal social control mechanisms are utilized less often (Carmichael, 2005; 
Liska & Chamlin, 1984). Two studies have examined residential segregation and jail 
incarceration measures (Carmichael, 2005; Liska et al., 1999). In one study, Carmichael 
(2005) found a curvilinear relationship between racial residential segregation and jail 
admission rates at the city level. Specifically, he found that the most segregated cities 
have the lowest rates of jail admission, while those cities with moderate integration or 
segregation have the highest rates of jail admission. In another study, Liska and 
colleagues (1999) found racial residential segregation was unrelated to jail admission 
rates in 1978, 1983, and 1988 in 100 U.S. cities. Yet, Liska et al. (1999) found racial 
residential segregation was significantly and positively associated with jail capacity in 
1983 and 1988. Recall too that Liska et al. (1999) found jail capacity is significant and 
positively related to jail admissions. It is unclear, then, the effect of residential 
segregation on local incarceration use. For this reason, residential segregation is 
examined in the analyses. Residential segregation was measured using the dissimilarity 
index at the county-level. The dissimilarity index was calculated and provided, open 
access, by the University of Michigan Population Studies Center using 2000 U.S. Census 
Bureau data (“Racial Residential Segregation,” n.d.).  
The dissimilarity index is estimated as   
/ = 12012345 − 63751839-  
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where n is the number of census tracts in the county, ai is the number of minority 
residents (i.e., blacks or Hispanics) in the ith census tract, AT is the total minority 
population count in the county, bi is the number of White residents in the ith census tract, 
and BT is the total White population count in the county (“Racial Residential 
Segregation,” n.d.). D represents the percentage of the minority or majority group 
population who would have to move to reach parity. The index ranges from 0 (no 
segregation) to 100 (complete segregation).  In the models presented below, residential 
segregation is represented by two variables.  White_black captures the level of racial 
segregation between white and African American residents, while White_Hispanic is the 
extent of ethic segregation between white and Hispanic residents. 
3.5 Analytic Strategy   
The analytic strategy consists of thirty-two ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression and polynomial regression models to determine the effects of minority threat, 
economic threat and political conservatism on the outcome variables: jail admission rates 
(section 4.1), jail population rates (section 4.2), black population rates (section 4.3) and 
Hispanic population rates (section 4.4). Each section includes a series of eight models 
that examine the impact of racial and ethnic composition, income inequality and political 
conservativism, holding all other variables constant. To construct the best-fitting models, 
I examine the nature of linear and nonlinear relationships for percent black and percent 
Hispanic. The eight models in each section examine the following: the first model (Model 
1) and third model (Model 3) present the findings for the linear effects of percent black 
and percent Hispanic compositions, respectively, net of statistical controls. The second 
and fourth models (Model 2 and 4) introduce quadratic terms of percent black and 
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percent Hispanic, respectively, to test nonlinear effects of racial and ethnic threat, net of 
statistical controls. Model 5 tests the effects of income inequality, net of statistical 
controls. Model 6 examines the effects of political conservatism, net of statistical 
controls. The seventh and eighth models test the linear (Model 7) and nonlinear (Model 
8) effects of minority threat, economic threat and political conservatism, simultaneously, 
net of statistical controls.  Two control variables—region and determinate sentencing 
laws (DSL)—will be constants across many counties and therefore are not independent 
and identically distributed. To account for the nested nature of these variables I calculate 
robust standard errors as these relax the independent and identically distributed 
assumption inherent in OLS models (Berry & Feldman, 1985). 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent 
variables. On average, there are 5,696 admissions per 100,000 county residents yearly. 
The sample used in the analyses for the admission rates has fewer cases and is 
substantially different than the full population—the reduced sample will be explained 
below. These data reveal roughly 4,738 admissions per 100,000 residents yearly. On a 
given day in county jail the jail population rates is roughly 180 per 100,000. The rate of 
minority jail population on a given day is much greater than the overall jail population 
rate. On average, the Black jail population rate reaches about 2,400 per 100,000 black 
county residents individuals and the Hispanic jail population rate is approximately 570 
per 100,000 on a given day.  
Substantial variation exists across counties in the key independent variables—
social, economic and political demographics. In some counties, there are no reported 
black residents, while in others, black non-Hispanic residents constitute roughly 82 
percent of the population. Representation of Hispanic residents is as low as one-tenth of 
one percent of the population and a high as 96 percent of county residents. Turning to 
county economic demographics, income inequality ranges from 0.34 to 0.55. The 
unemployment and poverty rates range from a low of 2.20 and 3.20 percent to a high of 
28.80 and 43.30 percent, respectively. Political divides are present among counties, with
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Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics for independent and dependent variables.   
 
 N    Mean    S.D. Min    Max 
Dependent Variables      
Admission ratea 2,394 5695.52 13315.54 0.00 389508.20 
Admission rateb 2,364 4738.40 3007.47 0.00 21785.82 
Population ratea 2,286 182.94 243.11 0.00 9095.41 
Population rateb 2,278 179.17 130.33 0.00 1028.92 
Black, non-Hispanic population rate 2,394 2399.51 9639.50 0.00 238584.67 
Ln black, non-Hispanic population rate 2,394 24.40 1.33 0.00 5.38 
Hispanic population rate 2,394 569.20 4109.74 0.00 150158.39 
Ln Hispanic population rate 2,394 0.77 0.40 0.00 1.99 
  
 
 
  
Independent Variables  
 
 
  
Percent black, non-Hispanic 2,394 8.63 13.89 0.00 82.20 
Percent black, non-Hispanic 2 2,394 267.33 735.02 0.00 6756.84 
Percent Hispanic 2,394 8.83 13.42 0.10 95.70 
Percent Hispanic 2 2,394 257.93 875.16 0.01 9158.49 
Income inequality (Gini coefficient) 2,394 0.44 0.03 0.34 0.55 
Unemployment rate (%) 2,394 9.53 3.06 2.20 28.80 
Poverty (%) 2,394 16.58 5.84 3.20 43.30 
Political conservatism (% Romney) 2,394 59.86 14.25 7.12 93.29 
 
 
    
Control Variables  
    
Jail capacity  2,394 326.00 893.11 2.00 22943.00 
Ln jail capacity 2,394 2.06 0.60 0.48 4.36 
Violent crime rate 2,394 250.32 192.44 0.00 1470.59 
Property crime rate 2,394 2161.57 1178.59 0.00 6622.34 
Police strength rate 2,394 204.58 148.11 11.46 2487.57 
Ln police strength rate 2,394 2.26 0.19 1.10 3.40 
Urbanizationc 2,394 4.74 2.59 1 9 
Residential segregation      
White_black, non-Hispanic 2,394 36.61 17.26 0.00 86.30 
White_Hispanic 2,394 23.79 13.62 0.00 71.80 
Southd 2,394 0.44 -- 0 1 
Determinate sentencinge 2,394 0.37 -- 0 1 
Note: Ln denotes the variable is log-transformed. 
a Full population 
b Population used in OLS regressions 
c Coding: 1 (metro—metro areas 1 million population or more) through 9 (nonmetro—completely 
rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to metro area) 
d 1 = South, 0 = Otherwise 
e 1 = Determinate sentencing, 0 = Indeterminate sentencing 
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the number of constituents voting for Mitt Romney in the 2012 presidential election, 
varying between roughly 7 percent and 93 percent. County-level differences exist too 
among jail capacity, crime rates, police strength, urbanization and residential segregation 
of blacks and Hispanics and can be seen in Table 4.1.  
Prior to analyses, diagnostic tests were run to test the assumptions of ordinary 
least squares regression. The initial step of data screening revealed that 13 cases had 
missing values on political conservatism, violent and property crime, police strength, or 
black and/or white residential segregation. These cases were deleted, leaving 2,398 cases 
in the population. Missing data was less than 5% of the sample, an acceptable percent to 
choose deletion of cases over other practices of handling missing data (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2004). Additionally, four cases were identified as multivariate outliers for all 
outcome variables through examination of the plotted residuals of independent variables 
and outcomes. These cases were also deleted. With all four outliers and the 13 cases with 
missing values deleted, 2,394 cases remain in the sample. Thirteen additional cases were 
identified as multivariate outliers for the jail admission outcome, as such, these cases 
were eliminated. With all 17 outliers and the cases with missing values deleted, 2, 364 
cases remain for analyses of jail admission rates. For the jail population outcome, there 
were 108 cases with missing values for the item which summed the number of 
individuals held for other authorities (i.e., local, state, tribal and federal).24 These cases, 
along with eight additional cases that were identified as multivariate outliers, were 
                                               
24 Recall that the one-day incarceration rate was calculated by first subtracting the number of inmates held 
for other authorities from the one-day incarceration count, and then divided by the county population total 
and multiplied by 100,000.   
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deleted from the sample. With all 12 outliers and the cases with missing values deleted, 
2,278 cases remain for analyses of population rates.  
Four variables were highly skewed – two of the dependent variables, Black, non-
Hispanic jail population and Hispanic jail population, and two independent variables, 
jail capacity and police strength – and contributed to regression residuals violating the 
assumption of normality. All violations were resolved by replacing the original variables 
with their natural logs to reduce skewness and the influence of outliers and move them 
toward a more normal distribution (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 25  
Collinearity diagnostics demonstrated that collinearity was present among the 
linear and quadratic terms of percent black and percent Hispanic (see Appendix E). 
Collinearity of product terms and polynomial (i.e., quadratic) terms, also known as 
nonessential ill-conditioning is expected, as the quadratic term is calculated from the 
product term (Aiken & West, 1991; DeMaris, 2004). Therefore, the issue with 
collinearity here is due to scaling and not an issue of essential ill-conditioning, or 
independent variables that are entirely different and related (Aiken & West, 1991; 
DeMaris, 2004). One recommendation to reduce problems associated with collinearity 
due to nonessential ill-conditioning is mean-centering variables before creating nonlinear 
terms, as centering changes the scale of the variables (Aiken & West, 1991; DeMaris, 
2004). Another advantage of centering is the interpretation of the main effect or lower 
order term in quadratic models (DeMaris, 2004). Therefore, percent black and percent 
                                               
25 Pre-transformation (N=2,394): Black, non-Hispanic jail population rate skewness = 13.579, kurtosis = 
252.221; Hispanic jail population rate skewness = 25.975, kurtosis = 822.292; jail capacity skewness = 
12.020, kurtosis = 226.552; police strength skewness = 7.501, kurtosis = 82.409. Post-transformation 
(N=2,394): Black, non-Hispanic jail population rate skewness = -.965, kurtosis = -.371; Hispanic jail 
population rate skewness = -.358, kurtosis = -1.362; jail capacity skewness = .234, kurtosis = -.034; police 
strength skewness = .655, kurtosis = 5.125.  
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Hispanic are mean-centered for all models. The quadratic terms, percent black2 and 
percent Hispanic2, were calculated by squaring these centered variables. Correlations for 
linear and quadratic terms for percent black and percent Hispanic were reduced by only 
minor amounts (0.09 and 0.07, respectively). However, prior to mean centering, the 
variance inflation factors for the racial and ethnic population composition were above or 
close to the threshold of 10.0 (DeMaris, 2004). Post transformation the variance inflation 
factors fell below 10.0 threshold and ranged from 4.649 to 6.753. 26 Lastly, variance 
inflation factors for all other variables were below 3.0, and bivariate correlations fell 
below an absolute value of 0.57 (see Appendix E), indicating multicollinearity is not 
problematic among any other variables (DeMaris, 2004; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
4.1 Jail Admission Rates 
 Table 4.2 shows the results of ordinary least squares regressions that estimate the 
impact of racial and ethnic threat on jail admission rates. In Model 1, the unstandardized 
regression coefficient (B) suggests that percent black is associated with the rate of jail 
admission (B = -38.292, p < .001). Generally, areas with more black residents have lower 
jail admission rates. Several control variables were also significantly associated with jail 
admissions, but discussion of relationships among the control variables will be reserved 
for the fully specified model (Model 8) below. Overall, Model 1 was significantly 
different from zero (F = 43.70, p < .001) and accounts for approximately 15 percent of 
the variance in jail admission rates.
                                               
26 Pre-mean centering VIF scores: Percent black = 11.651; Percent black2 = 9.178; Percent Hispanic = 
8.126; Percent Hispanic2 = 8.036. Post-mean centering VIF scores: Percent black = 6.753; Percent black2 = 
4.649; Percent Hispanic = 4.770; Percent Hispanic2 = 4.672. Note: these values reflect the jail population 
rates (Model 8). All other outcome variables produced similar VIF scores pre- and post-transformation of 
the linear and quadratic terms.   
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Table 4.2. Ordinary least squares regressions of jail admission rates on racial and ethnic threat and control variables. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β 
         
Percent blacka,b -38.292*** 
(6.797) 
-.177 -78.099*** 
(12.439) 
-.361 -- -- -- -- 
Percent black2 -- 
 
-- 1.061** 
(.332) 
.185 -- -- -- -- 
Percent Hispanica,c -- -- -- -- 7.077 
(5.735) 
.031 4.080 
(9.674) 
.018 
Percent Hispanic2 -- -- -- -- -- -- .068 
(.232) 
.015 
Income inequality (Gini)  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
 
Unemployment (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
Poverty (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
Political conservatism  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
Ln jail capacity 1107.733*** 
(172.467) 
.220 1201.371*** 
(170.411) 
.239 1082.475*** 
(172.394) 
.215 1087.459*** 
(173.212) 
.216 
Violent crime rate .676 
(.475) 
.043 .841 
(.465) 
.054 -.076 
(.464) 
-.005 -.073 
(.463) 
-.005 
Property crime rate .429*** 
(.083) 
.168 .414*** 
(.081) 
.162 .428*** 
(.083) 
.168 .426*** 
(.083) 
.167 
Ln police strength 1815.956*** 
(388.043) 
.112 1892.748*** 
(387.251) 
.117 1437.674*** 
(392.409) 
.089 1452.241*** 
(395.836) 
.090 
Urbanization 257.376*** 
(33.465) 
.222 248.379*** 
(33.441) 
.214 257.304*** 
(33.755) 
.222 257.160*** 
(33.753) 
.222 
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Table 4.2. (continued). Ordinary least squares regressions of jail admission rates on racial and ethnic threat and control variables. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β 
Residential segregation         
White_black -10.419* 
(5.660) 
-.060 -9.370* 
(4.006) 
-.054 -7.097* 
(4.070) 
-.041 -7.242 
(4.175) 
-.041 
White_Hispanic -24.153*** 
(5.660) 
-.109 -23.752*** 
(5.641) 
-.107 -28.903*** 
(5.807) 
-.130 -28.497*** 
(6.074) 
-.128 
South 1193.573*** 
(150.993) 
.197 1411.326*** 
(159.151) 
.120 729.162*** 
(136.365) 
.120 728.518** 
(136.244) 
.120 
Determinate sentencing -435.478*** 
(122.723) 
-.070 -405.228** 
(122.261) 
-.072 -447.628*** 
(123.626) 
-.072 -466.858*** 
(123.626) 
-.072 
Constant -3366.993 -- -4062.909 -- -2069.357 -- -2125.496 -- 
F test 43.70*** 41.08*** 36.98*** 33.54*** 
Adjusted R2 .151 .158 .132 .132 
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Ln denotes the variable is log-transformed. SE represents the robust standard error for the 
unstandardized coefficients. 
a Variable is mean centered 
b Percent black, non-Hispanic µ = 8.5117 
c Percent Hispanic µ = 8.7720 
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In Model 2, the percent black racial quadratic term is introduced to test the 
nonlinear relationship with jail admission rates. The unstandardized regression 
coefficients indicate that percent black (B = -78.099, p < .001) and percent black squared 
(B = 1.061, p <.01) are associated with jail admission rates, and the negative 
unstandardized regression coefficient for the linear term and positive unstandardized 
regression coefficient for the quadratic term suggest a nonlinear relationship between 
county-level black presence and jail admission rates. Figure 4.1 illustrates the curvilinear 
relationship estimated by these variables between percent black residents and jail 
admission rates. Contrary to the first hypothesis (H1), the association between percent 
black and jail admission rates reveals a U-shaped curvilinear pattern. Specifically, as the 
relative size of the black population increases, the likelihood of jail admission decreases, 
until county black presence reaches roughly 37% at which point the trend reverses, 
resulting in a positive association between county-level black composition and jail 
admission rates.27  
In Model 3, the percent Hispanic term is introduced to test the linear effects of 
percent Hispanic on jail admission rates. The model as a whole is statistically significant 
and has 1.9 percent less explanatory power (adjusted R2 = 13.2%) than Model 1, which 
tested the linear effect of percent black on jail admissions. As can be seen from Table 4.2, 
the linear term of percent Hispanic is not statistically significant. The findings in Model 4 
show a similar pattern as the findings in Model 3: Percent Hispanic (linear and quadratic 
terms) has no significant effect on the rate of jail admissions, suggesting the presence of 
                                               
27 The inflection point, also commonly referred to as the turning point, describes the minimum or maximum 
of a curve. The inflection point is calculated as follows: X = -b/2a, where “b” represents the coefficient of 
the linear term and “a” represents the coefficient of the squared term (Greenberg, Kessler, and Loftin, 1985, 
p. 696, see also Aiken & West, 1991).  
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Figure 4.1. Predicted jail admission rates at observed levels of county percent black 
(Model 2). 
 
Hispanics in a county does not contribute to local corrections use. This finding stands in 
contrast to the proposed curvilinear association stated in the fourth hypothesis (H4). 
Because the Hispanic-squared term is not significant, it is dropped from the final model 
(Model 8), but the lower order term is retained as a control. 
Table 4.3 presents tests of the economic threat and political climate explanations 
of jail admission rates. It also includes models that analyze the effects of minority threat, 
economic threat and political conservatism, simultaneously, holding all other variables 
constant. In Model 5, and as predicted in H7, income inequality is significant and 
positively associated with jail admissions (B = 9362.674, p < .001). The percentage of
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Table 4.3. Ordinary least squares regressions of jail admission rates on minority threat, economic threat, and political conservatism and 
control variables. 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β 
         
Percent blacka,b -- -- -- -- -45.024*** 
(7.981) 
-.213 -83.035*** 
(12.753) 
-.384 
Percent black2 -- 
 
-- -- -- -- -- 1.048** 
(.340) 
.182 
Percent Hispanica,c -- -- -- -- -9.581 
(5.999) 
-.042 -10.912 
(6.003) 
-.048 
 
Percent Hispanic2 -- 
 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Income inequality (Gini)  9362.674*** 
(2253.432) 
-.105 -- -- -6754.676** 
(2263.97) 
-.076 -6353.236** 
(2224.035) 
-.072 
Unemployment (%) .271 
(27.517) 
.000 -- -- 29.394 
(27.442) 
.030 26.655 
(27.482) 
.027 
Poverty (%) 66.449*** 
(17.319) 
.129 -- -- 105.931*** 
(17.397) 
.205 100.544*** 
(17.499) 
.195 
Political conservatism  -- -- 26.940*** 
(5.475) 
.128 16.654** 
(5.816) 
.079 20.258*** 
(5.794) 
.096 
Ln jail capacity 1170.678*** 
(173.914) 
.232 1168.895*** 
(173.393) 
.232 1198.137*** 
(174.341) 
.238 1304.988*** 
(172.831) 
.259 
Violent crime rate -.214 
(.480) 
-.014 .298 
(.465) 
.019 .466 
(.485) 
.030 .676 
(.474) 
.043 
Property crime rate .388*** 
(.084) 
.152 .429*** 
(.082) 
.168 .349*** 
(.084) 
.137 .338*** 
(.083) 
.132 
Ln police strength 1800.51*** 
(415.383) 
.111 1702.535*** 
(387.908) 
.105 2527.51*** 
(418.561) 
.156 2595.64*** 
(416.519) 
.161 
Urbanization 233.071*** 
(35.720) 
.201 249.201*** 
(33.458) 
.215 179.176*** 
(34.618) 
.154 173.389*** 
(34.498) 
.149 
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Table 4.3. (continued). Ordinary least squares regressions of jail admission rates on minority threat, economic threat, and political 
conservatism and control variables. 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
Β 
Residential segregation         
White_black -7.576 
(4.075) 
-.043 -8.277* 
(4.080) 
-.047 -12.706** 
(4.040) 
-.073 -11.707** 
(4.013) 
-.067 
White_Hispanic -25.455*** 
(5.738) 
-.115 -21.866*** 
(5.713) 
-.098 -16.103** 
(5.767) 
-.073 -15.009** 
(5.769) 
-.067 
South 630.653*** 
(143.436) 
.104 556.594*** 
(144.696) 
.092 802.218*** 
(177.710) 
.132 987.788*** 
(184.708) 
.163 
Determinate sentencing -468.562*** 
(128.012) 
-.075 -350.024** 
(126.062) 
-.056 -413.076** 
(129.744) 
-.066 -366.979** 
(129.318) 
-.059 
Constant 120.615 -- -4602.746 -- -4604.702 -- -5616.605 -- 
F test 32.44*** 44.22*** 35.67*** 34.87*** 
Adjusted R2 .141 .144 .174 .180 
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001. Ln denotes the variable is log-transformed. SE represents the robust standard error for the 
unstandardized coefficients.  
a Variable is mean centered. 
b Percent black, non-Hispanic µ = 8.6286 
c Percent Hispanic µ = 8.7900 
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families living below the poverty line is also significant and positively associated with 
jail admissions (B = 66.449, p < .001), while the unemployment rate does not have a 
significant effect of jail admissions. Model 6 tests the effects of political threat. As 
predicted in the eleventh hypothesis (H11), jail admissions are greater in counties with 
more conservative voters.  
Models 7 and 8 test the effects of all independent variables—racial and ethnic 
composition, income inequality and political threat—simultaneously. Model 7 tests the 
linear effects of percent black and percent Latino on jail admissions. As can be seen in 
Table 4.3, net of all control variables, percent black remains significant and negatively 
associated with jail admissions, while percent Hispanic has no significant effect on jail 
admission rates. In comparison to Model 5, which tested the independent effects of 
income inequality, the Gini coefficient is negatively associated with jail admission rates 
(B = -6754.676, p < .01).  The unemployment rate remains non-significant, and the 
poverty rate maintains a positive association with admission rates. Political threat 
continues to exert a significant and positive effect on jail admissions as well, thus 
supporting H11.   
In Model 8, the nonlinear effect of racial threat is introduced and reveals a 
curvilinear pattern, as indicated by the negative unstandardized regression coefficient of 
the linear term (B = -83.035, p < .001) and the positive unstandardized regression 
coefficient of the quadratic term (B = 1.048, p <.01). Contrary to H1 the curvilinear 
pattern is U-shaped. Figure 4.2 presents the nonlinear relationship. This figure 
demonstrates that as the relative size of the black population increases from very low to 
modest levels, the rate of jail admissions decreases. Once county-level black presence 
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reaches roughly 40% however, this trend shifts, resulting in greater jail admissions as the 
black composition increases. In fact, the standardized beta coefficients tell us that 
percentage black is the strongest predictor of jail admissions (β = -.384, p < .001). The 
Gini coefficient continues to be significant and negatively associated with jail admission 
rates (B = -6353.236, p < .01), thus contradicting H7. The unemployment rate remains 
non-significant, and the poverty rate maintains a positive association with jail admission 
rates (B = 100.544, p < .001). The political threat variable also maintains a positive 
association (B = 20.258, p < .001) with jail admission rates, supporting H11.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Predicted jail admission rates at observed levels of county percent black 
(Model 8). 
 
The final model (Model 8) shows several control variables are also significantly 
associated with jail admission rates. Both the log of jail capacity (B = 1304.988, p < .001) 
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and the log of the number of full-time police officers (B = 2595.64, p < .001) are 
positively associated with jail admissions. Generally, jail admissions are higher in areas 
that have greater jail capacity and greater numbers of police officers. Property crime is 
also positively related to jail admissions (B = .338, p < .001), while the positive 
association with violent crime did not reach statistical significance. Compared to other 
parts of the country, the South has greater jail admissions (B = 987.788, p < .001) as do 
areas marked as more rural (B = 173.389, p < .001).  
 Several control variables were significant and negatively associated with jail 
admission rates: segregation among African Americans and Latinos and determinate 
sentencing laws. Recall that higher values of residential segregation indicate greater 
segregation. Model 8 of Table 4.3 shows as segregation among whites and blacks 
increases, jail admissions decrease (B = -11.707, p < .01). Similarly, jail admissions 
decrease as white and Hispanic segregation increases (B = -15.009, p < .01). Generally, 
in segregated counties, jail admissions are lower. Jail admission rates are also smaller in 
counties with determinate sentencing legislation than those without (B = -366.979, p < 
.01).  
 The strongest predictors of jail admission rates among the primary independent 
variables, as evidenced by the standardized beta coefficients (b) are the county racial 
composition (b = -.384, p < .001, linear component; b = .182, p < .01, quadratic 
component) and poverty rate (b = .195,  p < .001). Examination of minority threat, 
economic threat, political conservatism and control variables reveal percent black 
continues to be the strongest predictor of jail admission rates. Overall, this model was 
significantly different from zero (F = 34.87, p < .001) and explained the greatest 
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proportion of variance (adjusted R2 = .180) suggesting that it is the combination of social, 
economic and political variables that best explains local admission rates. 
4.2 Jail Population Rates 
 Table 4.4 shows the results of ordinary least squares regressions that estimate the 
impact of minority—racial and ethnic—threat on overall jail population rates. Model 1 
and Model 3 show that neither percent black racial composition nor percent Hispanic 
racial composition has a significant linear effect on jail population rates. Overall, Model 
1 (F = 64.62, p < .001) and Model 3 (F = 63.79, p < .001) are significantly different from 
zero, and each explains roughly 22% of the variance in local incarceration, owing to 
control variables which will be discussed below with the presentation of Model 8.  
The introduction of the quadratic terms of percent black (Model 2) and percent 
Hispanic (Model 4) reveals a different pattern than that observed with only the linear 
terms. In Model 2, the unstandardized regression coefficient for percent black squared 
suggests the black composition in a community is associated with local jail population 
rates (B = .031, p < .05); the linear term does not reach statistical significance. This 
finding suggests the association between county-level black composition and jail 
population rates is curvilinear. Figure 4.3 presents the predicted jail population rate at 
various levels of percent black. As can be seen from Figure 4.3, the rate of jail population 
decreases, if only slightly, as county black presence increases until blacks make up 
roughly 12 percent of the county population, at which point local population rates 
increases with percent black. This curvilinear pattern stands in contrast to the proposed 
association stated in the second hypothesis (H2).    
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Table 4.4. Ordinary least squares regressions of jail population rates on racial and ethnic threat and control variables. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β 
         
Percent blacka,b .377 
(.302) 
.040 -.773 
(.516) 
-.082 -- -- -- -- 
Percent black2 -- 
 
-- .031* 
(.013) 
.122 -- -- -- -- 
Percent Hispanica,c -- -- -- -- .072 
(.241) 
.007 1.040** 
(.393) 
.107 
 
Percent Hispanic2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -.022* 
(.008 
-.112 
Income inequality (Gini)  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
 
Unemployment (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
Poverty (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
Political conservatism  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
Ln jail capacity 90.480*** 
(6.382) 
.412 93.153*** 
(6.354) 
.425 90.188*** 
(6.455) 
.411 88.564*** 
(6.531) 
.404 
Violent crime rate .055** 
(.020) 
.080 .059** 
(.020) 
.087 .061** 
(.019) 
.089 .060** 
(.019) 
.087 
Property crime rate .009* 
(.004) 
.082 .009* 
(.004) 
.079 .010** 
(.004) 
.084 .010** 
(.004) 
.089 
Ln police strength 17.536 
(14.665) 
.025 19.739 
(14.738) 
.029 19.400 
(14.780) 
.028 15.248 
(14.940) 
.022 
Urbanization 10.309*** 
(1.372) 
.205 10.074*** 
(1.380) 
.201 10.252*** 
(1.378) 
.204 10.285*** 
(1.384) 
.205 
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Table 4.4. (continued). Ordinary least squares regressions of jail population rates on racial and ethnic threat and control variables. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B (SE) 
Β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β 
Residential segregation         
White_black -.219 
(.162) 
-.029 -.186 
(.162) 
-.024 -.233 
(.166) 
-.031 -.189 
(.167) 
-.025 
White_Hispanic -.861*** 
(.206) 
-.090 -.849*** 
(.206) 
-.088 -.883*** 
(.213) 
-.088 -.973*** 
(.217) 
-.101 
South 49.445*** 
(6.183) 
.188 55.475*** 
(6.537) 
.211 53.710*** 
(5.538) 
.204 53.930*** 
(5.529) 
.205 
Determinate sentencing 11.952* 
(5.078) 
.044 12.730* 
(5.085) 
.047 12.066* 
(5.087) 
.045 11.807* 
(5.077) 
.044 
Constant -125.887 -- -145.920 -- -133.143 -- -116.119 -- 
F test 64.62*** 59.85*** 63.79*** 62.31*** 
Adjusted R2 .222 .225 .221 .224 
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001. Ln denotes the variable is log-transformed. SE represents the robust standard error for the 
unstandardized coefficients.  
a Variable is mean centered. 
b Percent black, non-Hispanic µ = 8.5117 
c Percent Hispanic µ = 8.7720 
 
 93 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Predicted jail population rates at observed levels of county percent black 
(Model 2). 
 
 Returning to Table 4.4, in Model 4, we see significant linear and nonlinear effects 
of percent Hispanic on jail population rates. The percent Hispanic linear term is positive 
(B = 1.040, p < .01), and the percent Hispanic quadratic term is negative (B = -.022, p < 
.05), indicating a curvilinear pattern. Figure 4.4 illustrates this association. Specifically, 
we see that as the percentage of Hispanic county residents increases, so too does the rate 
of jail population, but only to a point. The inflection point suggests that after county-level 
Hispanic presence reaches roughly 24%, jail population rates begin to decrease alongside 
further increases in the Hispanic population, supporting the fifth hypothesis (H5).  
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Figure 4.4. Predicted jail population rates at observed levels of county percent Hispanic 
(Model 4). 
 
In Table 4.5, the ordinary least squares regressions test the effects of income equality and 
political conservatism separately.  Then, models are presented with variables from all 
three theoretical perspectives included simultaneously. In Model 5, contrary to the eighth 
hypothesis (H8), income inequality is significant and negatively associated with jail 
population (B = -342.058, p < .0001). As income inequality increases, jail populations 
decrease (B = -342.058, p < .001). The unemployment rate (B = 2.063, p < .05) and 
percent of families living below the poverty line (B = 2.752, p < .001) are significant and 
positively associated with jail population rates. In Model 6, we see the percentage of 
conservative voters in a county effects jail population in the direction predicted in the 
twelfth hypothesis (H12). 
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Table 4.5. Ordinary least squares regressions of jail population rates on minority threat, economic threat, and political conservatism and 
control variables. 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β 
         
Percent blacka,b -- -- -- -- .733* 
(.361) 
.077 -.560 
(.542) 
-.059 
Percent black2 -- 
 
-- -- -- -- -- .033* 
(.013) 
.133 
Percent Hispanica,c -- -- -- -- .224 
(.246) 
.023 1.148** 
(.411) 
.118 
 
Percent Hispanic2 -- 
 
-- -- -- -- -- -.023* 
(.009) 
-.117 
Income inequality (Gini)  -342.058*** 
(94.326) 
-.089 -- -- -256.105** 
(94.060) 
-.066 -254.263** 
(93.800) 
-.066 
Unemployment (%) 2.063* 
(.945) 
.049 -- -- 2.784** 
(.924) 
.066 2.847** 
(.923) 
.068 
Poverty (%) 2.752*** 
(.697) 
.123 -- -- 2.758*** 
(.924) 
.123 2.882*** 
(.687) 
.128 
Political conservatism  -- -- .629** 
(.213) 
.069 1.282*** 
(.218) 
.140 1.173*** 
(.220) 
.128 
Ln jail capacity 90.930*** 
(6.500) 
.414 92.045*** 
(6.501) 
.420 92.158*** 
(6.546) 
.420 93.306*** 
(6.627) 
.425 
Violent crime rate .046* 
(.019) 
.067 .069*** 
(.019) 
.101 .041* 
(.020) 
.060 .044* 
(.020) 
.064 
Property crime rate .007* 
(.004) 
.068 24.155 
(14.894) 
.086 .008* 
(.004) 
.069 .008* 
(.004) 
.068 
Ln police strength 38.088* 
(15.124) 
.055 10.027*** 
(1.378) 
.035 40.805** 
(15.292) 
.059 39.625* 
(15.484) 
.058 
Urbanization 8.656*** 
(1.470) 
.172 -.250 
(.163) 
.200 7.703*** 
(1.468) 
.153 7.433*** 
(1.475) 
.148 
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Table 4.5. (continued). Ordinary least squares regressions of jail population rates on minority threat, economic threat, and political 
conservatism and control variables. 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β 
Residential segregation         
White_black -.252 
(.163) 
-.033 -.250 
(.163) 
-.033 -.210 
(.168) 
-.028 -.139 
(.168) 
-.018 
White_Hispanic -.724*** 
(.207) 
-.075 -.701** 
(.209) 
-.073 -.578** 
(.216) 
-.060 -.700** 
(.222) 
-.073 
South 45.567*** 
(5.811) 
.173 49.424*** 
(5.954) 
.188 24.947** 
(7.517) 
.095 32.471*** 
(7.719) 
.124 
Determinate sentencing 8.913 
(5.167) 
.033 4.228** 
(5.089) 
.052 12.458* 
(5.139) 
.046 12.652* 
(5.130) 
.047 
Constant -75.356 -- -188.362 -- -197.213 -- -198.363 -- 
F test 57.68*** 67.68*** 53.54*** 51.33*** 
Adjusted R2 .235 .225 .244 .250 
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001. Ln denotes the variable is log-transformed. SE represents the robust standard error for the 
unstandardized coefficients.  
a Variable is mean centered. 
b Percent black, non-Hispanic µ = 8.5117 
c Percent Hispanic µ = 8.7720 
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 In Models 7 and 8, show equations that include control variables, measures of 
political threat and economic threat, and the linear and nonlinear effects of percent black 
and percent Hispanic county composition on jail population rates. In Model 7, the 
county-level presence of black residents is significant and positively related to jail 
population (B = .733, p < .05), whereas in Model 1, percent black did not reach statistical 
significance. This suggests that as county-level black presence grows, jail population 
rates increase. Similar to Model 3, percent Hispanic continues not to have a significant 
linear effect on jail population. Consistent with Model 5, income inequality continues to 
be significant and negatively associated with jail population rates (B=-342.058, p < .001), 
while unemployment (B=2.784, p < .01) and poverty (B=2.758, p < .001) remain 
positively associated with jail population rates. The political threat variable also 
continues to be significant and positively related to jail population rates (B=1.282, p < 
.001). 
Model 8 assesses whether racial and ethnic threat are represented better by non-
linear effects, and the results suggest that they are in both cases.  Model 8 displays similar 
patterns to those found in Models 2 and 4. The quadratic term of percent black is 
significant and positively associated with jail population rates (B = .033, p < .05), 
suggesting a nonlinear pattern. Figure 4.5 displays this association graphically. As we can 
see from Figure 4.5, the association between percent black and jail population is negative 
until county-level black presence reaches 8%, and thereafter the association shifts, 
resulting in increases in jail population alongside increases in county-level black 
presence. This U-shaped curvilinear pattern stands in contrast to the proposed inverted U-
shape pattern predict in H2.   
98 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Predicted jail population rates at observed levels of county percent black 
(Model 8). 
 
Returning to Table 4.5, we see county Hispanic presence continues to have a 
significant effect on the jail population, and that the association between county-level 
Hispanic presence and the jail population rate is curvilinear as indicated by the positive 
percent Hispanic linear term (B = 1.148, p < .01) and negative Hispanic-squared term (B 
= -.023, p < .05). As Figure 4.6 illustrates, supporting the H5, as percent Hispanic 
increases, jail population rates increase until the Hispanic population reaches a sizeable 
proportion of the county, roughly 25%, at which point jail population rates begin to 
decrease with further increases in the Hispanic citizenry.  
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Figure 4.6. Predicted jail population rates at observed levels of county percent Hispanic 
(Model 8). 
 
Model 8 also reveals that income inequality remains significant and, in contrast to 
H8, is negatively associated with jail population rates (B = -254.263, p < .01). The 
unemployment rate (B=2.847, p < .01) and poverty rate (B=2.882, p < .001) maintain 
positive associations with jail population rates. Political conservatism continues to be 
significant and positively associated with jail population rates, thus supporting H12.  
Several control variables also appear to be significant predictors of jail population 
rates. The log of jail capacity is positively associated with jail population rates (B = 
93.306 p < .001). Both the violent crime rate (B = .044,  p < .05) and property crime rate 
(B = .008, p < .05) are positively associated with jail population rates. Police strength is 
also significant and positively associated with jail population rates (B = 39.625, < p .05). 
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Counties marked as more rural have greater jail population rates (B=7.433, p < .001). 
Similarly, compared to other areas of the country, jails in the south have greater estimated 
jail population rates (B=32.471, p < .001). Likewise, jail population rates in states with 
determinate sentencing are greater than those that have indeterminate sentencing 
(B=12.652, p < .05). It is notable that determinate sentencing legislation was significant 
and positively associated in all models except for Model 5. It appears that economic 
factors—income inequality, unemployment and poverty—may account for the apparent 
relationship observed in the other models. Similarly, both property crime and 
urbanization are significant and positively associated in all models except for Model 6, 
which explored the impact of political conservatism. It may be that the percentage of 
conservative voters in a county accounts for the apparent relationship observed in the 
other models.   
Residential segregation among whites and Hispanics results in a smaller jail 
population rate (B = -.700, p < .01). Generally, in segregated counties, jail population 
rates are lower, but the negative association of racial residential segregation between 
black and white residents did not reach statistical significance. Overall, it appears that jail 
capacity (b = .425, p < .001) and urbanization (b = .148, p < .001) are the strongest 
predictors of jail population rates. The standardized beta coefficients show that the log of 
jail capacity is the strongest predictor of jail population rates (b = .425, p < .001). 
However, three of the primary independent variables are also strong predictors – county 
Hispanic composition (b = .118, p < .01, linear component; b = -.117, p < .05, quadratic 
component), poverty (b = .128, p < .001), and political conservatism (b = .128, p < .001) 
of jail population rates. The final model was significantly different from zero (F = 51.33, 
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p < .001) and explains the greatest amount of variance (adjusted R2 = .250) in jail 
population rates.  
4.3 Black, non-Hispanic Jail Population Rates 
Turning to analysis of race-specific jail population rates, Table 4.6 reports 
ordinary least squares regression models that estimate the impact of racial and ethnic 
threat on black jail population rates. In Model 1, percent black does not have a significant 
linear effect on black jail population rates. In Model 2, however, the unstandardized 
regression coefficient for the percent black quadratic term indicates (B = 1.555x10-4, p < 
.05) that percent black is associated with black jail population rates. Specifically, the 
negative coefficient for the linear term and positive coefficient for the quadratic term 
suggest a nonlinear association between county-level black presence and black jail 
population rates. Figure 4.7 illustrates the U-shaped curvilinear pattern. As we can see in 
Figure 4.7, contrary to the third hypothesis (H3) as county-level black presence increases, 
black jail population rates decrease until percent black reaches roughly 15% of the county 
population at which point the trend reverses and black jail population rates increase 
alongside percentage black. Overall, Model 1 (F = 64.55, p < .001) and Model 2 (F = 
60.11, p < .001) are significantly different from zero, and explain roughly 23 percent of 
the variance in black jail population rates.  
Models 3 and 4 introduce the linear and nonlinear terms to test the effects of 
percent Hispanic on black jail population rates. While no prediction regarding the 
relationship between county-level Hispanic presence and black incarceration rates was 
made, it is important to examine as one prior study found county-level Hispanic presence 
impacts black incarceration (Padgett, 2002). The unstandardized regression coefficient 
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Figure 4.6. Ordinary least squares regressions of black jail population rates on racial and ethnic threat and control variables. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β 
         
Percent blacka,b .001 
(.002) 
.012 -.005 
(.003) 
-.049 -- -- -- -- 
Percent black2 -- 
 
-- 1.555c* 
(6.896)d 
.061 -- -- -- -- 
Percent Hispanica,e -- -- -- -- -.013*** 
(.002) 
.-.133 -.017*** 
(.004) 
-.175 
 
Percent Hispanic2,d -- -- -- -- -- -- 9.521 
(8.188) 
.048 
Income inequality (Gini)  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
 
Unemployment (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
Poverty (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
Political conservatism  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
Ln jail capacity 1.096*** 
(.066) 
.495 1.109*** 
(.066) 
.501 1.140*** 
(.065) 
.515 1.147*** 
(.065) 
.518 
Violent crime ratec -8.084*** 
(1.707) 
-.117 -7.837*** 
(1.717) 
-.114 -6.795*** 
(1.636) 
-.099 -6.742*** 
(1.632) 
-.098 
Property crime rated 7.670** 
(2.927) 
.068 7.454* 
(2.933) 
.066 6.196* 
(2.849) 
.055 5.973* 
(2.854) 
.053 
Ln police strength -.532*** 
(.138) 
-.076 -.522*** 
(.138) 
-.075 -.420** 
(.133) 
-.060 -.402** 
(.133) 
-.058 
Urbanization .004 
(.013) 
.008 .003 
(.013) 
.005 .009 
(.013) 
.018 .009 
(.013) 
.018 
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Table 4.6. (continued). Ordinary least squares regressions of black jail population rates on racial and ethnic threat and control variables. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B (SE) 
Β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β 
Residential segregation         
White_black -.002 
(.002) 
-.032 -.002 
(.002) 
-.030 -.004* 
(.002) 
-.054 -.004* 
(.002) 
-.057 
White_Hispanic -.001 
(.002) 
-.011 -.001 
(.002) 
-.011 .002 
(.002) 
.018 .002 
(.002) 
.024 
South .221*** 
(.060) 
.083 .252 
(.064) 
.094 .256*** 
(.052) 
.096 .255*** 
(.052) 
.095 
Determinate sentencing .038 
(.054) 
.054 .043 
(.054) 
.016 .044 
(.053) 
.016 .045 
(.054) 
.016 
Constant 1.368 -- 1.270 -- .976 -- .901 -- 
F test 64.55*** 60.11*** 70.28*** 64.34*** 
Adjusted R2 .229 .230 .245 .245 
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001. Ln denotes the variable is log-transformed. SE represents the robust standard error for the 
unstandardized coefficients. When a footnote (i.e., c, d) indicating scientific notation is placed on the variable name, rather than an 
individual coefficient or robust standard error, the point estimate and SE are multiplied by the same number.  
a Variable is mean centered. 
b Percent black, non-Hispanic µ = 8.6316 
c Coefficients and/or robust standard errors multiplied by 10-4 
d Coefficients and/or robust standard errors multiplied by 10-5 
e Percent Hispanic µ = 8.8324 
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indicates that percent Hispanic (B = -.013, p < .001) is associated with black jail 
population rates. Turning to Model 4, the linear term of percent Hispanic continues to be 
associated with black jail population rates (B = -.017, p < .001) while the percent 
Hispanic squared term is not significant. For this reason, the quadratic term is dropped 
from further analyses, but the linear term is held as a control in the final model.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Predicted black jail population rates at observed levels of county percent 
black (Model 2). 
 
Table 4.7 begins with presentations of the separate effects of economic threat 
(Model 5) and political conservatism (Model 6) on black jail population rates. Table 4.7 
also presents the results of the effects of minority threat, economic threat and political 
conservatism, simultaneously, on black jail population rates. In Model 5, income 
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Table 4.7. Ordinary least squares regressions of black jail population rates on minority threat, economic threat, and political conservatism 
and control variables. 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β 
         
Percent blacka,b -- -- -- -- -.007** 
(.003) 
-.071 -.014** 
(.004) 
-.146 
Percent black2 -- 
 
-- -- -- -- -- 2.022c* 
(6.980)d 
.079 
Percent Hispanica,e -- -- -- -- -.015*** 
(.002) 
-.156 -.016*** 
(.002) 
-.158 
 
Percent Hispanic2 -- 
 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Income inequality (Gini)  -1.976* 
(.945) 
-.050 -- -- -1.588 
(.947) 
-.041 -1.503 
(.949) 
-.038 
Unemployment (%) .036*** 
(.010) 
.084 -- -- .031* 
(.010) 
.071 .030** 
(.010) 
.070 
Poverty (%) .007 
(.007) 
.029 -- -- .022** 
(.007) 
.096 .021** 
(.007) 
.092 
Political conservatism  -- -- .004 
(.002) 
.038 .004 
(.004) 
.039 .004 
(.003) 
.046 
Ln jail capacity 1.076*** 
(.067) 
.486 1.104*** 
(.066) 
.499 1.139*** 
(.066) 
.514 1.159*** 
(.066) 
.524 
Violent crime ratec -8.829*** 
(1.710) 
-.128 -7.450*** 
(1.677) 
-.108 -6.871*** 
(1.713) 
-.100 -6.463*** 
(1.726) 
-.094 
Property crime rated 6.945* 
(2.996) 
.062 7.829** 
(2.923) 
.070 4.223 
(2.901) 
.037 4.003 
(2.897) 
.036 
Ln police strength -.374** 
(.014) 
-.054 -.499*** 
(.137) 
-.072 -.162 
(.139) 
-.023 -.151 
(.138) 
-.022 
Urbanization -.002 
(.014) 
-.003 .003 
(.013) 
.005 -.011 
(.014) 
-.022 -.012 
(.014) 
-.024 
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Table 4.7. (continued). Ordinary least squares regressions of black jail population rates on minority threat, economic threat, and political 
conservatism and control variables 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
Β B 
(SE) 
β 
Residential segregation         
White_black -.003 
(.002) 
-.035 -.003 
(.013) 
-.034 -.005** 
(.002) 
-.068 -.005** 
(.002) 
-.066 
White_Hispanic 9.430d 
(.002) 
.001 -2.577c 
(.002) 
-.003 .005* 
(.002) 
.047 .005* 
(.002) 
.049 
South .203*** 
(.058) 
.076 .211*** 
(.055) 
.079 .240** 
(.073) 
.079 .246*** 
(.073) 
.092 
Determinate sentencing -.008 
(.055) 
-.003 .051 
(.055) 
.019 .035 
(.056) 
.008 .032 
(.056) 
.012 
Constant 1.525 -- 1.037 -- .352 -- .159 -- 
F test 56.20*** 64.03*** 50.12*** 48.15*** 
Adjusted R2 .237 .230 .256 .257 
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001. Ln denotes the variable is log-transformed. SE represents the robust standard error for the 
unstandardized coefficients. When a footnote (i.e., c, d) indicating scientific notation is placed on the variable name, rather than an 
individual coefficient or robust standard error, the point estimate and SE are multiplied by the same number. 
a Variable is mean centered. 
b Percent black, non-Hispanic µ = 8.6316 
c Coefficient and robust standard error multiplied by 10-4 
d Coefficient and robust standard error multiplied by 10-5 
e Percent Hispanic µ = 8.8324 
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inequality is significant and negatively associated with black population rates, contrary to 
the ninth hypothesis (H9). In contrast, the unemployment rate is significant and positively 
associated with the black jail population (B = .036, p < .001), though the impact is small. 
The percentage of families living below the poverty line does not have a significant effect 
on black jail population rates. The model overall is statistically significant, but it results 
in slightly less explanatory power than the models testing the linear and nonlinear effects 
of percent Hispanic (adjusted R2 is reduced by .008) but has more explanatory power than 
the model testing the linear and nonlinear effects of percentage black (adjusted R2 is 
increased by .007).  
Model 6 tests the effects of political conservatism on black jail population rates. 
Contrary to the thirteenth hypothesis (H13), it does not appear that counties with more 
conservative voters have higher black jail population rates. While the unstandardized 
regression coefficient for political conservatism is positive (B = .004) it does not reach 
statistical significance.   
Models 7 and 8 test the linear and nonlinear effects of minority threat, economic 
threat and political conservatism, simultaneously, on black jail population rates. Model 7 
tests the linear effects of percent black and percent Latino on black jail population rates. 
As Table 4.7 reveals, the unstandardized regression coefficients of percent black (B = -
.007, p < .01) and percent Hispanic (B = -.015, p < .001) indicate percent black and 
percent Hispanic are negatively associated with black jail population rates. With the 
inclusion of the other theoretical variables, income inequality no longer has a significant 
effect. The unstandardized regression coefficients for poverty (B = .022, p < .01) and 
unemployment (B = .031, p < .05), however, are both positively and significantly 
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associated with black population rates. Political conservatism remains insignificant. 
Overall, the model is significantly different from zero (F = 50.12, p < .001) and explains 
roughly 25.6% of the variance in black jail population rates.  
Model 8 introduces the quadratic terms to model a nonlinear effect of percent 
black on black jail population rates. The model is statistically significant (F = 48.15, p < 
.001) and explains roughly 26 percent of the variance in black population rates. The 
unstandardized regression coefficients of percent black (B = -.014, p < .01) and percent 
black squared (B = 2.022x10-4, p < .05) suggest a statistically significant, nonlinear 
association between county-level black presence and black jail population rates. Figure 
4.8 illustrates the U-shaped pattern. Specifically, as county-level black presence 
increases, black jail population rates decrease until percent black reaches roughly 35%, at 
which point the trend reverses and black jail population rates increase alongside the 
percentage of black residents in a county. This U-shaped pattern stands in contrast to the 
predicted inverted U-shaped association proposed in H3. The county-level Hispanic 
presence remains significant and negatively related with black population rates (B = -
.016, p < .001). This, again, suggests that as county-level Hispanic presence increases, 
black jail population rates decrease.  
The final model reveals that income inequality continues to be unrelated to black 
jail population rates, contrary to H9. The unemployment rate (B = .030, p < .01) and 
poverty rate (B = .021, p < .01), however, remain positively associated with black jail 
population rates. Political conservatism remains unrelated to black jail population rates. 
Contrary to H13 then, it appears the percentage of conservative voters in a county does not 
predict black jail population rates.  
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Figure 4.8. Predicted black jail population rates at observed levels of county percent 
black (Model 8). 
 
Model 8 also shows several control variables are significant and associated with 
black jail population rates. The log of jail capacity is positively associated with black jail 
population rates (B = 1.159, p < .001). The violent crime (B = -6.463, p < .001) and white 
and black segregation (B=-.005, p < .01) are negatively associated with black jail 
population rates. In contrast, white and Hispanic segregation is positively associated with 
black jail populations. Generally, counties with greater racial residential segregation have 
lower black jail population rates. Whereas greater ethnic residential segregation results in 
higher black jail population rates (B = .005, p < .05). Compared to the northeast, Midwest 
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and west, jails in the South have higher black jail population rates (B = .246, p < .001). 
Overall, the standardized beta coefficient indicates the log of jail capacity is the strongest 
predictor of black jail populations (b = .524 p < .001). Additionally, the standardized beta 
coefficients for racial threat (b = -.146, p < .01, linear component; b = .079, p < .05) and 
ethnic threat (b = -.158, p < .001) indicate that along with jail capacity, black jail 
population rates are most strongly influenced by county racial and ethnic compositions.  
4.4 Hispanic Jail Population Rates 
The results reported in Table 4.8 used ordinary least squares regressions to 
estimate the impact of minority—racial and ethnic—threat on Hispanic jail population 
rates. Model 1 shows that percent black (B = .017, p < .001) has a significant and positive 
linear effect on Hispanic jail population rates. Although statistically significant, the effect 
is negligible. Overall, Model 1 (F = 38.43, p < .001) is significantly different from zero 
and explains roughly 12 percent of the variance in the Hispanic jail population rate.  
Model 2 introduces the quadratic term of percent black to test the nonlinear effect 
of county-level black presence on Hispanic jail population rates. Model 2 demonstrates 
that percent black continues to have a significant linear effect on Hispanic jail population 
rates (B = -.019, p < .001), but now the coefficient is negative and remains trivial. The 
quadratic term of percent black is not significantly related to Hispanic jail population 
rates, showing there is no curvilinear relationship. For this reason, the quadratic term is 
dropped from the final model, but the linear term of percent black is retained as a control. 
Models 3 and 4 test the effects of the linear and nonlinear terms of percent 
Hispanic. In Model 3, the unstandardized regression coefficient (B = .014, p <.001) 
indicates percent Hispanic has a significant and positive linear effect on Hispanic jail 
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Table 4.8. Ordinary least squares regressions of Hispanic jail population rates on racial and ethnic threat and control variables. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β 
         
Percent blacka,b .017*** 
(.002) 
-.193 -.019*** 
(.004) 
-.216 -- -- -- -- 
Percent black2,c -- 
 
-- 5.383 
(8.222) 
.023 -- -- -- -- 
Percent Hispanica,d -- -- -- -- .014*** 
(.001) 
.153 .026*** 
(.003) 
 .280 
Percent Hispanic2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -2.639c*** 
(5.407)e 
-.142 
Income inequality (Gini)  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
 
Unemployment (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
Poverty (%) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
Political conservatism  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
-- 
Ln jail capacity .687*** 
(.066) 
.333 .692*** 
(.067) 
.335 .639*** 
(.067) 
.310 .620*** 
(.067) 
.301 
Violent crime rate -4.331e 
(1.796)c 
-.007 -3.473e 
(1.805)c 
-.005 -4.798c** 
(1.773)c 
-.075 -4.947c** 
(1.773)c 
-.077 
Property crime ratee 3.621 
(2.988) 
.035 3.546 
(2.990) 
.034 4.746 
(3.054) 
.045 5.365 
(3.056) 
.051 
Ln police strength .490*** 
(.136) 
.075 .493*** 
(.136) 
.076 .254 
(.136) 
.039 .203 
(.137) 
.031 
Urbanization .008 
(.014) 
.017 .008 
(.014) 
.016 .004 
(.014) 
.008 .004 
(.013) 
.008 
  
 
112 
Table 4.8. (continued). Ordinary least squares regressions of Hispanic jail population rates on racial and ethnic threat and control variables. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β 
Residential segregation         
White_black -.005** 
(.002) 
-.074 -.005** 
(.002) 
-.073 -.002 
(.002) 
-.034 -.002 
(.002) 
-.026 
White_Hispanic .005* 
(.002) 
.051 .005* 
(.002) 
.051 8.190d 
(.002) 
.001 -.002 
(.002) 
-.017 
South .049 
(.059) 
.019 .059 
(.062) 
.024 -.178** 
(.054) 
-.071 -.175** 
(.054) 
-.070 
Determinate sentencing .049* 
(.059) 
-.048 -.121* 
(.055) 
-.047 -.133* 
(.054) 
-.052 -.137* 
(.054) 
-.053 
Constant -.867 -- -.901 -- -.022 -- .186 -- 
F test 38.43*** 35.21*** 37.70*** 35.47*** 
Adjusted R2 .120 .120 .118 .122 
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Ln denotes the variable is log-transformed. SE represents the robust standard error for the unstandardized 
coefficients. When a footnote (i.e., c, e) indicating scientific notation is placed on the variable name, rather than an individual coefficient or robust 
standard error, the point estimate and SE are multiplied by the same number. 
a Variable is mean centered. 
b Percent black, non-Hispanic µ = 8.6316 
c Coefficient and robust standard error multiplied by 10-4 
d Percent Hispanic µ = 8.8324 
e Coefficient and robust standard error multiplied by 10-5 
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population rates. Model 3 (F = 63.37.70 p < .001) is significantly different from zero and 
explains roughly 12 percent of the variation in local population.  
In Model 4, the unstandardized regression coefficient for percent Hispanic (B = 
.026, p < .001) and the percent Hispanic squared term (B = -2.639x10-4, p < .0001) 
indicate county-level Hispanic presence is associated with local Hispanic population rates 
and that the association is curvilinear. Figure 4.9 presents the predicted rates of Hispanic 
jail population at various levels of percentage Hispanic in the county. As Figure 4.9 
illustrates, supporting the sixth hypothesis (H6), the Hispanic jail population rate 
increases as county-level Hispanic presence increases, until the proportion of Hispanics 
make up a sizeable proportion of the county, roughly 49%, at which point local Hispanic 
jail population rates decrease with further increases in the Hispanic population. Overall, 
the model is significantly different from zero (F = 35.47, p < .001) and explains roughly 
the same amount of variation in Hispanic population rates as Model 3 (adjusted R2 = 
.122). 
  Table 4.9 begins with presentations of the separate effects of economic threat 
(Model 5) and political conservatism (Model 6) on Hispanic jail population rates. Table 
4.7 also presents the results of ordinary least squares regression tests of the effects 
minority threat, economic threat and political conservatism simultaneously, holding all 
other variables constant.  Model 5 tests the effects of income inequality, poverty, and 
unemployment, and the model as a whole is statistically significant (F = 28.08, p < .001). 
The standardized regression coefficient demonstrates income inequality (B = -3.712, p < 
.001) is significant and negatively associated with Hispanic jail population rates, contrary 
to the tenth hypothesis (H10). Similarly, the unemployment rate is negatively related to  
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Figure 4.9. Predicted Hispanic jail population rates at observed levels of county percent 
Hispanic (Model 4). 
 
Turning to Model 6, we see the model testing the effects of political conservatism 
is significantly different from zero (F = 33.84, p < .001) and explains roughly the same 
amount of variance as Model 5 (adjusted R2 = .111). The unstandardized regression 
coefficient reveals Hispanic jail population rates are associated with the number of 
conservative voters in a county (B = .012, p < .001), supporting the fourteenth hypothesis 
(H14).   
Models 7 and 8 test the linear relationships of economic threat and political 
conservatism as well as the linear and nonlinear effects of minority threat on Hispanic-
specific jail population rates, simultaneously. Both models are statistically significant
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Table 4.9. Ordinary least squares regressions of Hispanic jail population rates on minority threat, economic threat, and political 
conservatism and control variables. 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β 
         
Percent blacka,b -- -- -- -- -.007** 
(.003) 
-.082 -.008** 
(.003) 
-.090 
Percent black2 -- 
 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Percent Hispanica,c -- -- -- -- .012*** 
(.002) 
.132 .018*** 
(.003) 
.200 
 
Percent Hispanic2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -1.477d* 
(6.161)e 
-.079 
Income inequality (Gini)  -3.712*** 
(.927) 
-.102 -- -- -2.869** 
(.938) 
-.079 -2.960** 
(.940) 
-.081 
Unemployment (%) -.033** 
(.010) 
-.081 -- -- -.015 
(.010) 
-.038 -.014 
(.010) 
-.035 
Poverty (%) .005 
(.006) 
.026 -- -- .005 
(.007) 
.022 .007 
(.007) 
.031 
Political conservatism  -- -- .012*** 
(.002) 
.136 .007** 
(.002) 
.077 .005* 
(.002) 
.061 
Ln jail capacity .743*** 
(.066) 
.361 .714*** 
(.066) 
.346 .695*** 
(.067) 
.337 .682*** 
(.068) 
.331 
Violent crime rated -2.003 
(1.804) 
-.031 -2.245 
(1.777) 
-.035 -1.553 
(1.799) 
-.024 -1.775 
(1.809) 
-.028 
Property crime ratee 4.185 
(3.080) 
.040 3.552 
(3.003) 
.034 5.556 
(3.027) 
.053 5.683 
(3.037) 
.054 
Ln police strength .342* 
(.139) 
.053 .447* 
(.136) 
.069 .381** 
(.140) 
.059 .359* 
(.141) 
.055 
Urbanization .022 
(.014) 
.047 .004 
(.014) 
.009 .009 
(.014) 
.019 .008 
(.014) 
.018 
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Table 4.9. (continued). Ordinary least squares regressions of Hispanic jail population rates on minority threat, economic threat, and 
political conservatism and control variables. 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variable B (SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
β B 
(SE) 
Β B 
(SE) 
Β 
Residential segregation         
White_black -.004* 
(.002) 
-.051 -.004* 
(.002) 
-.061 -.003 
(.002) 
-.040 -.003 
(.002) 
-.037 
White_Hispanic .003 
(.002) 
.035 .006** 
(.002) 
.061 .003 
(.002) 
.031 .002 
(.002) 
.020 
South -.063 
(.059) 
-.025 -.234*** 
(.056) 
-.094 -.077 
(.071) 
-.031 -.065 
(.072) 
-.026 
Determinate sentencing -.102 
(.056) 
-.040 -.085 
(.055) 
-.033 -.098 
(.056) 
-.038 -.106 
(.056) 
-.041 
Constant 1.160 -- -1.414 -- .226 -- .464 -- 
F test 28.08*** 33.84*** 31.32*** 29.48*** 
Adjusted R2 .108 .111 .138 .139 
Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001. Ln denotes the variable is log-transformed. SE represents the robust standard error for the 
unstandardized coefficients. When a footnote (i.e., d, e) indicating scientific notation is placed on the variable name, rather than an 
individual coefficient or robust standard error, the point estimate and SE are multiplied by the same number. 
a Variable is mean centered. 
b Percent black, non-Hispanic µ = 8.6316 
c Percent Hispanic µ = 8.8324 
d Coefficient and/or robust standard error multiplied by 10-4 
e Coefficient and/or robust standard error multiped by 10-5 
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(Model 7, F = 31.32, p < .001; Model 8, F = 29.48, p < .001) and explain the largest 
amounts of variance in Hispanic jail population rates among the models shown in Tables 
4.8 and 4.9 (adjusted R2 = 13.8 and 13.9, respectively). In Model 7, the unstandardized 
regression coefficients for the linear terms of percent black (B = -.007, p < .001) and 
percent Hispanic (B = .012, p < .001) suggests racial and ethnic community composition 
influence Hispanic jail population rates, but they do so in opposite directions. County-
level black presence is negatively associated with Hispanic population rates, while 
Hispanic county presence maintains a positive relationship. Income inequality remains 
negatively associated (B = -2.869, p < .01) with Hispanic jail population rates, while 
unemployment no longer has a significant effect. Political conservatism remains 
positively associated with Hispanic population rates (B = .007, p < .01).  
In Table 4.9, Model 8, we see that percent black remains significant and 
negatively associated with Hispanic jail population rates (B = -.008, p .01). The 
unstandardized regression coefficients of percent Hispanic (B = .018, p < .001) and 
percent Hispanic squared (B = -1.477x10-4, p < .05) suggest a nonlinear association 
between county-level Hispanic presence and Hispanic-specific jail population rates. 
Figure 4.10 illustrates this nonlinear pattern. As predicted in H6, we see as county-level 
Hispanic presence increases, Hispanic jail population rates increase until percent 
Hispanic reaches a sizeable proportion of the county, roughly 63%, at which point the 
trend reverses and Hispanic jail population rates begin to decrease. With the addition of 
the nonlinear component to ethnic threat, the relationships between Hispanic jail 
population rates and the other theoretically important variables remain substantively 
unchanged. Specifically, income inequality continues to be negatively and significantly 
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associated with Hispanic population rates (B = 2.960, p < .01), contrary to H10. The 
unemployment rate and poverty rate remain unrelated to Hispanic jail population rates. 
Consistent with H14, political conservatism continues to be significantly and positively 
associated with Hispanic jail population rates (B = .005, p < .05).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Predicted Hispanic jail population rates at observed levels of county percent 
Hispanic (Model 8). 
 
In Table 4.9, Model 8, we see there are few control variables that significantly 
influence Hispanic jail population—the log of jail capacity (B = .682, p < .001) and the 
log of police strength (B = .359,  p < .05) are significant and positively associated with 
Hispanic population rates. The standardized beta coefficients indicate the strongest 
predictor of the Hispanic jail population is the log of jail capacity (b = .331, p < .001). It 
is notable that police strength is significant for all Models except Models 3 and 4 which 
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examined the linear and nonlinear terms of percent Hispanic on Hispanic jail population 
rates. It appears that percent Hispanic may account for the variation found in other 
models. In addition to jail capacity, the county racial and ethnic composition are the 
strongest predictors of Hispanic jail population rates as evidence by the standardized beta 
coefficients for percent black (b = -.090, p < .01) and percent Hispanic (b = .200, p < 
001, linear component; b = -.079, p < .05, quadratic component).   
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study sought to contribute to our understanding of how community context 
impacts local jail use. Prior studies examining the impact of community context on 
incarceration rely largely on state and federal data, ignoring the impact of local 
community features on jail use. The importance of including local corrections in our 
discussions of incarceration cannot be overstated – every year local jails come into 
contact with 18 times the number of individuals than do state and federal prisons (Carson 
& Anderson, 2016; Minton & Zeng, 2016). To my knowledge, no study has examined 
simultaneously the impact of racial and ethnic heterogeneity, economic inequality, and 
political conservatism on jail admission and population rates at the county level. Further, 
no study has examined how these social, economic and political factors impact minorities 
held in local jails. Recall that this study attempts to fill these gaps in the literature by 
answering two primary research questions: (1) what is the impact of racial and ethnic 
population compositions, income inequality and political conservatism on jail admission 
and population rates, and (2) what is the impact of these factors on black and Hispanic 
jail population rates? This study further sought to understand the impact of county racial 
and ethnic heterogeneity on local incarceration by examining curvilinear relationships; 
the first study on jail use to do so. 
 
121 
 
5.1 Summary of Findings  
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the findings for all outcomes (see Appendix F 
for a summary of hypotheses’ outcomes). The following is a summary of the main 
findings. The county-level black population is associated with variations in local 
corrections use, net of all theoretical covariates and statistical controls. Examination of 
the linear terms reveals that percent black is negatively associated with jail admissions 
and black jail population rates and these findings are consistent with prior research that 
has found larger black populations result in lower jail admissions (Liska et al., 1999) and 
black imprisonment rates (Bridges & Crutchfield, 1988; Padgett, 2002). In contrast, a 
positive statistically significant linear association was found among county-level black 
presence and overall jail population rates. This finding is consistent with prior empirical 
research on the racial threat hypothesis that finds a larger proportion of African 
Americans is associated with greater jail population rates (Johnson, 1992). These 
divergent findings may be due to the examination of only linear relationships, thus not 
uncovering potentially nonlinear relationships.  
Much of the research regarding the racial threat hypothesis examines linear 
relationships with few examining curvilinear relationships on state incarceration and no 
study has examined curvilinear relationships among minority threat—racial or ethnic 
threat— and local incarceration. This study finds that the relationship between African 
American county-level presence and local incarceration is nonlinear. Contrary to the 
hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3), which proposed an inverted U-shaped pattern between racial 
threat and jail use, the results reveal a U-shaped relationship between racial threat and jail 
use. Specifically, when county-level black presence is below 8% for overall jail 
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Table 5.1 Summary of findings. 
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U U U 
- 
Percent black2 --- 
Percent Hispanic ns Ո - Ո Percent Hispanic2 * --- 
Income inequality (Gini coefficient) - - ns - 
Unemployment rate (%) ns + + ns 
Poverty (%) + + + ns 
Political conservatism (% Romney) + + ns + 
Ln jail capacity  + + + + 
Violent crime rate ns + - ns 
Property crime rate + + ns ns 
Ln police strength + + ns + 
Urbanization + + ns ns 
Black residential segregation - ns - ns 
Hispanic residential segregation - - + ns 
South + + + ns 
Determinate sentencing - + ns ns 
Notes: Ln = log-transformation; “U” = U-shaped curvilinear pattern; “Ո” = inverted U-shaped 
curvilinear pattern ;“+” = positive association; “-” = negative association; “---” = no prediction; 
“ns” = nonsignificant relationship; “*” = dropped from final model due to insignificant 
relationship in earlier model.  
 
population rates, 35% for black jail population rates, and 40% for jail admission rates, the 
relationship between percent black and local incarceration is negative. When the 
percentage black population composition reaches the respective levels, the relationship 
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becomes positive.28 Prior studies examining nonlinear relationships have largely found 
inverse U-shaped relationships between racial threat and coercive controls (Greenberg et 
al., 1985; Keen & Jacobs, 2009; Stults & Baumer, 2007). Still, the results of this study, 
specifically a U-shaped curve, are supportive of Blalock’s (1967) power-threat 
hypothesis and Liska’s (1992) social threat thesis which claim greater proportions of 
African Americans pose more of a threat to the majority and, hence, result in greater 
discrimination and social control. The present results suggest that African Americans do 
not become a threat until they make up over one-third of the county population—barring 
overall jail populations—at which point local incarceration increases.  
Turning to the ethnic threat hypothesis and linear relationships, county-level 
Hispanic presence results in higher overall jail population rates and Hispanic jail 
population rates but is unrelated to jail admission rates. The positive association between 
percent Hispanic and Latino jail population rates are consistent with other findings 
examining ethnic disparities in state incarceration (Durant, 2017) and nonwhite state 
imprisonment rates (Bridges et al., 1987). However, the results regarding overall jail 
population rates are inconsistent with prior literature; several scholars have found no 
statistically significant effect of percent Hispanic on jail population rates (Applegate, 
2004; Johnson, 1992; Padgett, 2002). Further, prior studies have found percent Hispanic 
to be related to jail admission rates (Applegate, 2004; Carmichael, 2005), yet this study 
found no support for ethnic threat and jail admissions. Perhaps these differences are due 
to location. That is, Applegate (2004) examined jails in the Southeast and Midwest, and 
                                               
28 The findings regarding curvilinear trends among minority threat—either for race or for ethnicity—are 
informative, however, it would be premature to conclude that these trends, or turning points, are identical in 
every county. That is, curvilinear trends may differ across counties and obscure the relationships found 
here. Future research should attempt to disentangle these trends. 
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Carmichael (2005) examined only major cities. The current project examined jails across 
the United States at the county-level. The ethnic distribution across the United States is 
decidedly uneven, with the majority of Hispanics residing in the South and West and 
large major cities (Brown & Hugo Lopez, 2013; Ennis, Rios-Vargas, & Albert, 2011). 
Conceivably, the examination of Hispanics throughout the United States, including in 
areas where there are small numbers of Latinos, is masking relationships (Holmes et al., 
2008; Kent & Jacobs, 2005). Another plausible explanation can be gleaned from Klofas’s 
(1987, 1991) and Applegate’s (2004) work. Recall that Klofas (1987, 1991) developed a 
typology to explain jail use patterns and found that population and admission rates differ 
across jails which impact their function. Perhaps examination of the specific function of 
jails (i.e., “high-high,” “high-low,” “low-high,” and “low-low”) would reveal a better 
understanding of these differences. Future research utilizing national county-level data 
should examine these patterns to potentially uncover if and to what extent the specific 
function of jails may impact Hispanic jail population rates.  
Examination of nonlinear relationships between ethnic threat and local 
incarceration reveal a different trend than those found for racial threat. Contrary to the 
racial threat findings, county-level Hispanic presence reveals an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with jail use, supporting two of three ethnic threat hypotheses (H5 and H6).29 
Specifically, the data reveal the presence of Hispanic residents in a county is positively 
associated with overall jail population rates and Hispanic-specific population rates, but 
only until the size of the Hispanic population reaches a sizeable proportion of the 
                                               
29 Recall from Chapter 4 that the linear and quadric terms of percent Latino were not significantly 
associated with jail admissions rates. Therefore, the quadric form was dropped from the final model and is 
not discussed here.  
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county—roughly 25% for jail population rates and 63% for Hispanic jail populations 
rates—at which point overall and Hispanic jail population rates begin to decrease. These 
findings are inconsistent with some studies examining ethnic threat and social control 
which have found a U-shaped relationship (Kane, 2003; Kent & Jacobs, 2005). However, 
findings similar to those revealed in the current study have been reported in the 
sentencing literature. Feldmeyer and Ulmer (2011) in their analysis of the impact of racial 
and ethnic compositions on federal sentencing decisions found that Hispanic defendants 
receive the harshest sentences when they comprise a relatively small percentage of the 
population and experience lenient sentences when they make up a substantial percentage 
of the population. While this relationship is not identical to the inverted U-shaped 
curvilinear pattern revealed in this study, it is consistent that greater proportions of 
Latinos result in leniency rather than harsher sanctions. The results of this study suggest 
that Latinos are a threat until they make up roughly 25% or 63% of the county 
population, depending on the measure of jail use employed, at which point incarceration 
begins to decrease.  
The inverse U-shaped pattern can be explained through prior research regarding 
minority threat and incarceration in a number of ways. The first explanation is aligned 
with the benign neglect hypothesis and suggests that Hispanics are treated more leniently, 
or have little effect on jail use, because there is an assumption that greater intraracial 
crime occurs alongside increases in minority presence, thereby decreasing Whites fears 
and subsequent use of jail (Liska & Chamlin, 1984). An alternative but related 
explanation involves society’s view of Hispanic minority group members. Prior research 
has found fear of crime and support for conservative initiatives among Whites and non-
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Hispanic racial minorities are greater in areas with larger proportions of Hispanics (Eitle 
& Taylor, 2008; Craig & Richeson, 2014, 2017; Johnson et al., 2011). Scholars have 
suggested that Hispanics are viewed as less dangerous than are blacks which may not 
translate into greater social control (Wang & Mears, 2010a). Alternatively, it is plausible 
that in counties where Hispanics make-up a sizeable proportion of the population they 
have gained enough social and political power to off-set coercive control and 
discrimination (Blalock, 1967; Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011; Keen & Jacobs, 2009). 
Relatedly, it may be that in areas where greater proportions of Hispanics reside, there is 
less willingness to support more punitive sanctions and instead alternative sanctions are 
sought (Wang & Mears, 2010a). It is unclear which of these explanations is the most 
accurate since the data used in this project cannot directly explore such propositions. 
Future research should attempt to disentangle such mechanisms to further explore the 
impact of ethnic threat on local incarceration.  
Taken together, the findings regarding racial threat and ethnic threat appear to 
represent two distinct dimensions of minority threat. The relative size of the African 
American population reveals a nonlinear, U-shaped curvilinear relationship, resulting in 
harsher treatment with greater proportions of black county residents. In contrast, county-
level Hispanic presence reveals an inverted U-shaped curvilinear association with local 
incarceration, suggesting lenient treatment with greater numbers of Hispanic county 
residents. These findings suggest that the traditional minority threat thesis does not apply 
to Latinos as it does African Americans. In fact, all models are better predictors of black 
jail populations rates than Hispanic jail population rates, as evidenced by the Adjusted R2 
values. The reasons are varied, and the differential results could be due to perceived 
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threat differences among African Americans and Hispanics and Whites (Dixon, 2006; 
Wang & Mears, 2010a, 2010b), the level (or lack thereof) of social and/or political clout 
(Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011), or differences in outcome measurement (Wang & Mears, 
2010a). For example, Wang and Mears (2010a) found that minority threat differently 
impacted black and Hispanic sentencing. Specifically, their results showed that racial 
threat resulted in a greater likelihood of state imprisonment rather than jail for African 
Americans, while ethnic threat resulted in a greater likelihood of local incarceration 
rather than prison for Hispanics. Wang and Mears (2010a) point out that “drivers of jail 
sanctions may differ from those of prison sanctions” (p. 204). It is important that future 
research examine racial threat and ethnic threat separately rather than examining overall 
minority threat and compiling both African Americans and Hispanics into the category of 
“nonwhite” (Wang & Mears, 2010a, p. 210, 2010b) as there appear to be differences in 
the impact on jail use (Carmichael, 2005).30  
The results of this project also reveal interesting findings regarding the effect of 
the proportion of black and Hispanic county residents on each other’s respective jail 
populations rates. Specifically, racial threat is negatively related to Hispanic jail 
population rates, and ethnic threat is negatively related to black jail populations rates; 
both outcomes are statistically significant. One plausible explanation for the negative 
association between percent black and Hispanic jail population rates may be that larger 
proportions of African Americans pose a greater threat than do Hispanics, thus blacks 
                                               
30 It is important to exercise caution when investigating racial and ethnic differences in the criminal justice 
system (Wang & Mears, 2010a). Criminal justice actors’ (mis)identification or classification of inmates’ 
racial and ethnic identity and the lack of data on Hispanics in the criminal justice system can impact 
findings among criminal justice research whether it be underestimating the minority population, 
overestimating the white population, or both (Eppler-Epstein, Gurvis, & King, 2016; Subramanian, Riley, 
& Mai, 2018). 
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may become the target of social control in areas with greater proportions of African 
Americans, alleviating coercive control of Hispanics, and decreasing Latino jail 
population rates. The effect of percent Hispanic on black jail population rates is more 
perplexing. The models examining overall jail population rates reveal an inverted U-
shaped curvilinear pattern with percent Hispanic, suggesting greater proportions of 
Hispanics also result in greater overall leniency once Hispanic county residents reach a 
certain threshold. As discussed earlier, one plausible explanation for this relationship is 
that Hispanics support alternative sanctions more than punitive sanctions (Wang & 
Mears, 2010a, 2010b). Perhaps greater proportions of Hispanics similarly result in lower 
black jail population rates because, generally speaking, Latinos prefer alternative 
sanctions for all racial and ethnic groups.31 Examination of nonlinear trends among racial 
and ethnic threat and respective jail population rates reveal no statistically significant 
relationships.  
Along this line of inquiry, the importance of examining curvilinear relationships 
is revealed in this study. Most of the prior literature examining minority threat and social 
control mechanisms has investigated linear relationships. Nonlinear relationships should 
be examined because even when linear effects do not exist, nonlinear effects may be 
present (Wang & Mears, 2010a). This project’s examination of the impact of county level 
black presence on jail population rates and black jail population rates reveal insignificant 
linear trends, yet a nonlinear relationship is revealed when the percent black quadratic 
                                               
31 Recall that Padgett (2002) found percent Hispanic was positively associated with black prison admission 
rates. While my finding stands in contrast to Padgett’s (2002) results, the differences may be due to 
measurement. I examined jail population rates, while Padgett focused on prison admission rates. Further, 
my examination includes counties throughout the United States, while Padgett focused her attention on 
Florida counties.  
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term is introduced. Modeling only linear terms, for example, might lead one to conclude 
there is no relationship between county-level black presence and jail use (Wang & Mears, 
2010a). Studies examining racial threat and ethnic threat and social control mechanisms 
should also examine nonlinear relationships because Blalock (1967) argued that the 
relationship between percent minority and discrimination would be curvilinear.  
In addition to the findings associated with racial and ethnic population 
compositions, the results also point to other important community factors that are related 
to local incarceration. This project examined the influence of three economic factors: 
income inequality, unemployment and poverty. The findings of this study offer mixed 
support for the economic threat thesis. According to economic threat theory, social 
control will be greatest in areas marked with greater economic inequality. The analysis of 
income inequality reveals that increases in the Gini coefficient result in reductions in jail 
admission rates, jail population rates, and Hispanic jail population rates. This finding 
stands in contrast to the proposed positive relationship among jail use and economic 
threat theory (H7, H8, H9, and H10) and is somewhat inconsistent with prior studies. 
However, several scholars have indeed found a negative association between income 
inequality and incarceration, though the findings have been statistically insignificant 
(e.g., Campbell et al., 2015; Campbell & Vogel, 2017; Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs 
& Helms, 1996; Western, 2006).  
It is unclear how greater income inequality results in lower jail use. Greenberg 
and West (2001) state, “where the gap in wealth and income between rich and poor is 
higher, the social distance between the classes will be larger, and the well-off are 
expected to be less concerned about the well-being of the poor” (p. 624), thus resulting in 
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greater incarceration. The results of this study suggest greater social distance results in 
less incarceration. Conflict theory posits that it is the dominant group that has the power 
to control the poor and influence social control agents to conform to their preferences, 
maintaining their economic position in society. Perhaps, then, greater social distance 
among these two groups diminishes the threat posed to the well-off by the underclass, 
resulting in less social control. While the wealthy have the means to control the poor, 
perhaps they do not use their power to control the poor; at least, not through local 
incarceration. Given historical preferences to control the working poor and the underclass 
(Alexander, 2010; Beckett & Western, 2001), however, it seems an unlikely explanation 
for these findings. Perhaps these communities have other resources which control and 
take the visibly disadvantaged out of the public’s view. It would be worthwhile for future 
research to examine the impact of community resources (e.g., pretrial and bail reform, 
drug courts, mental health and substance abuse services) on jail use.  
The findings regarding unemployment are decidedly uneven. The results of this 
study show the unemployment rate is positively associated with overall jail population 
rates and black jail populations rates. The positive association among unemployment 
rates and jail use is consistent with studies of local incarceration (Applegate, 2004) and 
state incarceration (Greenberg & West, 2001). The results regarding unemployment and 
black jail populations rates, however, are inconsistent with prior research which has 
found unemployment is not associated with black prison admissions (Padgett, 2002), 
black-white prison admission ratios (Keen & Jacobs 2009) or black-white imprisonment 
disparities (Yates & Fording, 2005). Yet the finding is consistent with prior research that 
has explored disaggregated rates of unemployment. For example, Durante (2017) found 
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black-white disparities in unemployment are significant and positively related with black-
white prison admission disparities. The results of my study also reveal that 
unemployment is unrelated to jail admissions and Hispanic jail population rates. These 
results are consistent with prior studies which have found unemployment is unrelated to 
jail admissions (Carmichael, 2005).  
The poverty rate is positively associated with all jail outcomes, except Hispanic 
jail population rates. These finding are consistent with prior literature that finds poverty 
rates are positively related to local and state incarceration (Applegate, 2004; Greenberg & 
West, 2001; Inverarity & Grattet, 1988). The results are also consistent with studies that 
have examined race-specific incarceration. Specifically, black-to-white ratios of poverty 
are positively related to black imprisonment rates (Bridges et al., 1987; Yates & Fording, 
2005). While no prediction was made regarding poverty and jail use, the results of this 
study lend further support to the economic threat thesis.  
Several null relationships were revealed among the key economic independent 
variables and black- and Latino-jail population rates: (1) economic inequality is unrelated 
to black jail population rates, (2) unemployment is unrelated to Hispanic jail population 
rates, and (3) poverty is unrelated to Hispanic jail population rates. The findings 
regarding the Hispanic jail population stand in contrast to some prior research that has 
found unemployment inequality among whites and Hispanics is related to Latino-white 
disparities in prison admissions (Durant, 2017). Future research should conduct 
disaggregated analyses of economic inequality measures and incarceration (Western, 
2006). As an example, Padgett (2002) found differential effects of income inequality on 
prison admissions rates when examining time periods with low and high unemployment 
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rates. Specifically, in county-years with low unemployment rates, income inequality was 
positively associated with prison admissions, while in county-years with high 
unemployment rates, income inequality was negatively associated with prison admission 
rates. It may that a similar analysis conducted with local incarceration may potentially 
uncover a more nuanced understanding of how the economic structure impacts jail use. It 
is also important that future work examine disaggregated measures of economic variables 
among black and Hispanic residents, rather than aggregate measures of economic 
structure across the United States. This issue will be addressed following a discussion of 
the political threat findings.  
In addition to examining socio-economic effects on jail, this study included 
political effects. While most studies examining local incarceration and community 
context ignore political determinants, this study offers support to a political threat 
explanation and jail use. Consistent with the literature, this study shows that counties 
with more conservative voters use local incarceration to a greater extent (Campbell et al., 
2015; Greenberg & West, 2001; James & Carmichael, 2001; Keen & Jacobs, 2009; 
Percival, 2010). Supporting H11, H12, and H14, political conservatism is positively 
associated with jail admission rates, overall jail population rates, and Hispanic jail 
populations rates. County-level political conservative ideology, however, is unrelated to 
black jail population rates, thus not supporting H13. Prior research on African American 
state imprisonment rates (Percival, 2010) and black-to-white prison admission disparities 
(Keen & Jacobs, 2009) shows greater racial imprisonment in areas where conservative 
ideology among residents is greatest. Further, much of the law-and-order rhetoric, or 
racialized crime rhetoric, forwarded by some conservative candidates promotes the 
133 
 
perception that African Americans are violent criminals to be feared and managed—a 
stereotype that has been linked to citizens’ support for harsher policies and practices 
(Beckett, 1997; Beckett & Sasson, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; 2005). This stereotype 
also perpetuates the view that African Americans and the criminal justice system are 
inevitably linked (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; 2005). It is perplexing, then, why the 
proportion of conservative voters in a county is unrelated to black jail population rates. 
Prior research has found citizen ideology is unrelated to black state incarceration rates 
and black-to-white state imprisonment disparities (Yates & Fording, 2005), yet several 
other political variables (i.e., republican legislature, judicial conservatism, and female 
legislators) strongly influence these outcomes. Perhaps, then, additional measures of 
political conservatism should be included in studies examining black jail incarceration.  
As stated earlier, the majority of the null relationships among the key independent 
predictors and outcomes variables were found among the race- and ethnic-specific jail 
population rates. Specifically, the relationships between economic factors and political 
conservatism and black and Hispanic jail population rates did not reach statistical 
significance. These null relationships could be due to the measurement of socio-economic 
and political factors in the aggregate (Western, 2006). Several scholars have called for 
research that more closely aligns with Blalock’s minority threat—specifically the 
economic and political threat causal mechanisms (e.g., Eitle et al., 2002). Some scholars 
have answered this call and examined economic differences in unemployment, poverty 
and/or income among minority and majority group members, and some have examined 
political power differences among minority and majority groups (e.g., representation 
among criminal justice actors and voting), or both (e.g., Bridges & Crutchfield, 1988; 
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Durante, 2017; Eitle et al., 2002; Parker et al., 2005; Wang & Mears, 2010a). Similar to 
analyses examining aggregate rates of economic and political factors, studies examining 
these disaggregated factors have found varying results with reported positive 
associations, negative associations, and  no significant correlations with incarceration, 
sentencing, and arrests (see e.g., Bridges & Crutchfield, 1988; Durante, 2017; Eitle et al., 
2002; Parker et al., 2005; Wang & Mears, 2010a). To date, two studies focusing on local 
incarceration have examined one of these more specific dimensions—political threat—
and found the presence of nonwhite and black mayors to have no independent effect on 
jail admission rates (Carmichael, 2005; Liska et al., 1999). Future research should 
examine jail use in light of both of these more specific dimensions—racial/ethnic 
economic threat and political threat—to potentially discover a more nuanced 
understanding of the impact of socio-economic and political factors on African American 
and Latino jail population rates.  
A few findings among the control are notable. First, jail capacity is positively and 
significantly associated with all jail outcomes—jail admission rates, jail populations rate, 
black jail population rates, and Hispanic jail population rates. In fact, it is the strongest 
predictor of jail use for every outcome measure, save jail admission rates. The results of 
this study, then, reveal the importance of including jail capacity as a control when 
examining aggregated and disaggregated (i.e., race- and ethnic-specific jail rates) 
measures of jail use. Prior research has established that jail capacity strongly influences 
jail use (Carmichael, 2005; D’Alessio, & Stolzenberg, 1997; Liska et al., 1999). This 
study lends further support to claims that increasing the number of jail beds results in 
greater numbers of people being locked up (Liska et al., 1999).  
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A second notable finding concerns the influence of county police strength on jail 
use. The number of full-time sworn police officers is significant and positively related to 
three of the four outcome measures: jail admission rates, jail population rates, and 
Hispanic jail population rates. To date, few studies have utilized police strength as a 
control while examining correlates of jail use, and those that have report mixed results. 
Padgett (2002) reports police strength has no significant effect on jail population rates 
and Carmichael (2005) found a negative association between police strength and jail 
admissions. This study finds that a greater number of sworn police officers in a county 
increases jail use. Perhaps counties with larger police departments have more time and 
resources than counties with smaller police departments, which results in more arrests 
and bookings.  
Third, jails in the South show significantly higher rates of incarceration on three 
of the four outcome measures. This finding is consistent with prior literature examining 
jail admission and population rates (Applegate, 2004; Carmichael, 2005). The null 
findings regarding the impact of the South and Hispanic jail population rates might be 
explained by demographic distribution across counties in the United States. Racial and 
ethnic population compositions are unevenly distributed throughout the United States. It 
seems clear then that the impact of African American and Latino presence on jail use will 
vary across regions (Carmichael, 2005). In 2010, over three-quarters of the Latino 
population lived in the South or West, with over half of the population living in just three 
states: California, Texas and Florida (Ennis et al., 2011). County-level estimates reveal 
10 counties in five states comprise nearly one-third of the Latino population: California 
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(5), Texas (2), Florida (1), Arizona (1), and Illinois (1) (Brown & Hugo Lopez, 2013).32 
Prior research has found that percent Hispanic was not associated with state incarceration 
rates in non-Sunbelt states, yet the proportion of Hispanics had a negative effect on state 
incarceration in Sunbelt states (Campbell et al., 2015). It may be that Sunbelt states—the 
southeastern and southwestern states, ranging from South Carolina to California—reveal 
significant differences in Hispanic presence and local incarceration (see Campbell et al., 
2015).   
5.2 Limitations and Future Research  
The results of this study offer several important insights, but several limitations 
must be noted. First, while this project’s use of an enumeration of all county jails in the 
United States allowed the examination of contextual effects at the local level throughout 
the United States, the data are cross-sectional. The use of cross-sectional data does not 
allow for examination of how changes in the racial and ethnic population composition, 
economic, or political features are related to jail use. The Census of Jails—the main 
dataset for this project – is representative of jails in 2013 (USDOJ BJS, 2016, 
ICPSR36128).  The results may be bound to that particular time point, and the 
importance of specific factors for determining local jail use may vary with the political 
and social culture. The United States has experienced changes regarding several issues 
including the ethnic population composition, widening income inequality, and the 
political discourse (i.e., Trump administration), to name a few. Projections regarding the 
racial and ethnic population composition suggest continued diversity in America (Colby 
                                               
32 Ranked in order of largest percentage to least percentage of county population: (1) Miami-Dade County, 
FL, (2) Bexar County, TX, (3) San Bernardino County, CA, (4) Los Angeles County, CA, (5) Riverside 
County, CA, (6) Harris County, TX, (7) Orange County, CA, (8) San Diego County, CA, (9) Maricopa 
County, AZ, (10) Cook County, IL (Brown & Hugo Lopez, 2013).  
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& Ortman, 2015); the gap between the rich and everyone else has been widening since 
the 1970s (Kochhar & Cilluffo, 2018); and while it is unclear the impact of the political 
climate on criminal justice policy, some records suggest diminished reform (Grawart, 
2017). Future research should consider examining the impact of social, economic and 
political factors on jail use across a number of years and decades. Potential differences 
resulting from changes in demographic characteristics, socioeconomic characteristics, 
laws, and criminal justice policies and practices may be discovered using longitudinal 
data. This approach would also bring the knowledge base closer to identifying causal 
explanations of jail use. Further, exploring change over time would also allow for the 
examination of threat changes. Threat changes are an important tenet of Blalock’s (1967) 
minority threat hypothesis in which he discusses the influence of growth or changes in 
the proportions of minority group members and subsequent discrimination (Kent & 
Jacobs, 2005; Liska, 1992; Wang & Mears, 2010a, 2010b). Examination of minority 
population demographic change and its effect on jail incarceration, rather than static 
threat levels (i.e. percent Black) alone, may prove to be an important contribution to the 
jail literature. 
A second concern involves causal inference. The data allow for discussion of 
association among the observed relationships, however, causal conclusions cannot be 
drawn. It is possible that variables omitted from the models could account for the 
observed relationships. While this possibility is worthy of consideration and investigation 
in future work, this study sought well-specified models by including variables that are 
grounded in theory and have been identified in prior empirical work as important factors 
in describing formal social control mechanisms (e.g., Blalock, 1967; Beckett & Sasson, 
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2003; Campbell et al., 2015; Carmichael, 2005; Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; Garland, 
1990; Greenberg & Western, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Liska, 1992; Smith, 
2004). These factors include a wide range of community characteristics and were 
included as measures in this project– demographic, socioeconomic and political features; 
crime; locale and residential segregation; sentencing structures; and finally, police and 
jail features.  
A third concern is related to state laws regarding sentenced offenders’ place of 
confinement. Some states have sentencing policies that allow judges to order defendants 
to serve their sentence in local jails, even when they are convicted of a felony offense 
and/or ordered to serve more than a one-year term, a sentence that in the past typically 
required time be served in prison. In Alabama, for example, felony convictions whereby 
imprisonment is ordered for 12 months up to 3 years, can be served, at the discretion of 
the judge, in a state-run prison, county jail, or to hard labor for the county (Code of 
Alabama §15-18-1(b)). Moreover, some states mandate that inmates serve time in prison 
rather than jail for even low-level, minor offenses, offenses that normally would require a 
jail term given the relatively brief period of confinement ordered by a court. In South 
Carolina, for example, defendants who are sentenced to more than 90 days of 
imprisonment serve their sentence in state-run facilities (South Carolina Code of Laws, 
§24-3-20(A)). Taken together, these policies influence both the jail and prison 
populations. Of concern here is the impact on local incarceration. It may be the case that 
inmates held for felony offenses and sentenced to a three-year term are held in the local 
jail, thus inflating jail counts. Others, who traditionally would be represented in the jail 
population, could instead be included in prison counts, as is the case in South Carolina, 
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thus underestimating county-level social control. It is unclear how many states have such 
policies, the degree to which such policies are enforced, or the overall impact of such 
policies on jail use. Future research could conduct an analysis of place of confinement 
under state statues and control for such policies. Given the scope of this project, such a 
search of state policies was not possible.  
A related concern involves the dramatic effect that reforms can have on jail 
population levels. In contrast to sentencing policies regarding place of confinement, these 
policies—while they impact where an inmate will serve their time and, thus, jail and 
prison counts—are enacted primarily as reforms to alleviate mass incarceration. In 2011, 
California passed the Public Safety Realignment Act to “close the revolving door of low-
level inmates cycling in and out of state prisons” (California Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation, 2013, p. 1). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the realignment act made 
community corrections, more specifically county jails, responsible for detaining some 
offenders who previously would have been sentenced to state prison facilities. The 
implementation of this Act reduced the prison population and as a consequence, 
increased local jail populations in California (Couzens & Bigelow, 2017; Grattet, Tafoya, 
Bird, & Nguyen, 2016). Another reform, Proposition 47, enacted to reduce drug and 
property offenses from felonies to misdemeanors, alleviated some of the jail population 
increases driven in part by realignment (Grattet et al., 2016). These reforms influence 
offense types (i.e., more serious drug and property offenses), length of stay, jail 
(over)capacity, and release mechanisms (i.e., capacity releases and pretrial). Several 
states are enacting sentencing legislation and reforms to combat mass incarceration 
(Porter, 2016). It is not yet clear how such reforms may impact local communities and 
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jails across the United States (Grattet et al., 2016). It may be that alleviating one problem, 
for example prison overcrowding, results in other problems such as jail (over)capacity or 
the inability of community resources to keep up with the pace of individuals being 
released from county- and state-run facilities. Future research should consider the impact 
of such reforms on local communities and jails across the United States. 
Another complication involves the impact of transient populations on jail use 
estimates. The transient population includes individuals who are homeless, tourists or 
business travelers. These people are located throughout the United States but are often 
concentrated in particular areas and/or during particular seasons. For example, the highest 
rates of estimated homelessness are found in major cities such as New York City, NY, 
and Los Angeles, CA (Cortes, Henry, de la Cruz, & Brown, 2012; Henry, Watt, 
Rosenthal, & Shivii, 2017). The latest estimates report roughly 2.2 billion domestic 
travelers for leisure and business purposes, and 77 million international travelers (U.S. 
Travel Association, 2018a) in one year in the United States. Regardless of location or 
time of year, the transient population are included in the jail data if they are arrested and 
booked into a local jail. They are not, however, counted in county population figures.  In 
the current study, I cannot determine to what extent local jail admission and population 
rates may have been impacted by these transient populations or how much such bias 
might have varied across counties.  
This study has contributed to a better understanding of how the racial and ethnic 
composition influences jail use, with specific focus on black, non-Hispanics and on 
Latinos. It would be meaningful for future research to extend this line of inquiry to other 
racial and ethnic groups (e.g., Asians, American Indians) as it applies to local 
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incarceration. The latest reports from the Bureau of Justice Statistics report American 
Indians or Alaska Natives are incarcerated at a rate of 359 per 100,000 residents, a rate 
higher than non-Hispanic whites (171 per 100,000) and Hispanics (185 per 100,000) 
(Zeng, 2018, p. 3). The paucity of data examining non-primary racial and ethnic 
minorities in the United States, such as Native Americans and Asians, has been noted 
elsewhere both in the juvenile and criminal justice system literatures (see e.g., Franklin, 
2011; Leiber, 1994; Sampson & Lauritsen, 1997). Still, the research examining these 
minority group members in the criminal justice field is sparse and essentially non-existent 
in the jail literature. Future research should examine these group members in light of jail 
use to gain a better understanding of the influence of race and ethnicity on local 
incarceration.  
Lastly, it would also be worthwhile to examine the impact of individual-level 
factors in combination with contextual-level factors on local incarceration. As Britt 
(2000) accurately noted, contextual factors do not consider differences in decision 
making among judges within the same jurisdiction (Britt, 2000, p. 729). Britt’s (2000) 
discussion applied to sentencing but has implications for jail research. As described 
earlier, jail use is influenced by a number of criminal justice actors: from the police, to 
bail bondsman, to prosecutors, and judges. Individual practitioners may differ in their 
views regarding the racial and ethnic population, economic or political structure of the 
community, and accordingly, react and respond to socioeconomic and political 
jurisdictional issues in a different manner than their colleagues (Britt, 2000; Feldmeyer, 
Warren, Siennick, & Neptune, 2015). It may also be the case that offender-, court- and 
case-level characteristics (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, and prior record/incarceration) 
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impact jail use. Prior research has established that individual-level characteristics impact 
criminal justice decision-making and outcomes (Britt, 2000; Demuth, 2003; Demuth & 
Steffensmeier, 2004; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). Future studies should take both a micro- 
and macro-level approach to discover a more nuanced understanding of local 
incarceration and shed light on the decision-making processes of criminal justice actors at 
the local level.   
5.3 Conclusion  
This study has contributed to a better understanding of how social, economic and 
political conditions are related to use of local incarceration. Generally, local community 
characteristics—racial and ethnic population, economics and political conservatism—are 
linked to jail use. The effects of socio-economic and political factors are consistent even 
when violent and property crime rates and other county structural features are controlled 
for, suggesting that jail use cannot be explained solely as a response to local crime 
conditions. While a positive association between minority threat and jail use does not by 
itself demonstrate differential treatment, this project’s findings suggest that extra-legal 
factors may influence decisions made across the justice system that are reflected in social 
control through use of local incarceration (Carmichael, 2005; Wang & Mears, 2010a, 
2010b).  
Relatedly, future research should attempt to understand criminal justice actors’ 
views on racial and ethnic composition, economic conditions, and political views, and 
how they respond to such community issues (Britt, 2000). It would also be beneficial to 
develop a more complete understanding of interagency relations and how they affect jail 
use (Davis et al., 2004; Klofas, 1990a, 1990b). This study cannot speak to criminal 
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justice decision making directly, but it is clear that decisions among actors are linked to 
individuals being arrested and booked into a jail, held pretrial or released, prosecuted and 
sentenced to imprisonment or an alternative to incarceration, and held locally for 
probation or parole violations (Carmichael, 2005). Accordingly, it would be useful to 
assess criminal justice actors’ views and local practices in an effort to determine if, and 
the extent to which, issues such as interagency relations (or lack thereof), extralegal 
factors, and community resources impact jail use. Consequent to review of local 
community views and resources, subsequent steps and integrated solutions among 
criminal justice actors and community members could be taken to reduce identified 
problems and concerns such as social and economic inequality, implicit biases, or lack of 
collaboration or alternatives such as pretrial or jail diversion programs (Eaglin & 
Solomon, 2015; Kang-Brown & Subramanian, 2017).  
Since 2008, our country has seen a decrease in the number of individuals confined 
in local jails throughout the United States (Zeng, 2018), to include declines in African 
American and Hispanic jail incarceration rates since 2005 (Subramanian et al., 2018; 
Zeng, 2018). Similar declines have been found in state imprisonment since the mid- to 
late- 2000s for both the overall incarceration rate, as well as black and Hispanic 
incarceration rates (Carson, 2018; Kaeble & Cowhig, 2018). The reasons attributed to 
decarceration include sentencing law changes, justice reinvestment initiatives, crime 
reductions, and reclassification of felony offenses to misdemeanors, to name a few 
(Ghandnoosh, 2018; Grattet et al., 2016; Porter, 2016). While decarceration may offer 
some promise, the decreases in incarceration have not been consistent across states. Many 
states have reduced their number of confined individuals, some states have remained 
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relatively stable, and still, confined populations have increased in other states since peak 
years (Ghandnoosh, 2018). Further, it appears black residents and rural jurisdictions are 
at a disadvantage. Despite declines in the African American jail incarceration rate, black 
residents continue to have the highest jail incarceration rate of any other racial or ethnic 
group in the United States (Zeng, 2018). In contrast to declines in incarceration in urban 
areas, examination of local jurisdictions reveal that rural areas have actually seen 
increases in overall jail incarceration (Kang-Brown, Hinds, Heiss, & Lu, 2018; Kang-
Brown & Subramanian, 2017) and African American jail incarceration rates 
(Subramanian et al., 2018). As several others have pointed out, this realization indicates 
that locale matters (Kang-Brown et al., 2018; Klofas, 1990a; Lynch, 2011; Subramanaim 
et a., 2015), an observation reinforced by the findings of the current study.  While jail use 
may shrink in some areas, others—particularly those counties with high levels of 
minority residents, extensive political conservativism, and high levels of poverty—may 
be resistant to efforts to reduce how often people are jailed and how long they stay. It is 
imperative that we continue to examine “micro-level variation” (Lynch, 2011, p. 674; see 
also Klofas, 1990b) in our discussions of mass incarceration and decarceration.  
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APPENDIX A: MODELS FROM EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON EFFECTS OF MINORITY THREAT, ECONOMIC THREAT AND/OR 
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF JAIL INCARCERATION
 
Study Sample Dependent Variable Significant Predictors Insignificant Predictors 
Micro-Level  
McCarthy (1990) CA felony cases, 1981  JAR percent nonwhite, 
unemployment, property 
crime (-), violent crime 
poverty 
  MSA JAR unemployment, violent crime percent nonwhite, poverty, 
property crime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Non-MSA JAR  unemployment, percent 
nonwhite, poverty, property 
crime, violent crime 
 
Macro-Level 
Johnson (1992) 50 states, 1983a JPR  population enrolled in high 
school (-), young black 
males, violent crime 
mental health admissions, 
average welfare payment, 
drug arrests, unemployment 
rate, sub-employment rate  
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Study Sample Dependent Variable Significant Predictors Insignificant Predictors 
Macro-Level (continued) 
Johnson (1992) continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1987 JPR population enrolled in high 
school (-), young black 
males, violent crime 
mental health admissions, 
average welfare payment, 
drug arrests, unemployment 
rate, sub-employment rate  
Arvanites & Asher (1998) 50 states + DC, 1993 JIR  total crime, percent 
nonwhite, income inequality, 
crime prone ages, urban 
 
 
 
 
  JIR percent nonwhite, income 
inequality 
violent crime, crime prone 
years, urban 
 
 
 
 
 
Liska, Markowitz,  
Whaley, &  
Bellair (1999)  
100 US cities, 1978 JAR  percent black (-) d, jail 
capacity 
population, percent divorce, 
economic factor (percent 
unemployment, percent 
below poverty, and median 
family income summed and 
weighted), total crime rate 
index, violent and property 
crime b, specific crime rates b, 
desegregation, hospital 
capacity, white or nonwhite 
mayor b, arrest rates c 
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Study Sample Dependent Variable Significant Predictors Insignificant Predictors 
Macro-Level (continued) 
Liska, Markowitz,  
Whaley, &  
Bellair (1999) continued 
1983 JAR percent black (-) d, jail 
capacity 
Population, percent divorce, 
economic factor, total crime 
rate index, violent and 
property crime b, specific 
crime rates b, desegregation, 
hospital capacity, white or 
nonwhite mayor b, arrest rates 
c 
 
 
 1988  JAR percent divorce, jail capacity population, economic factor, 
total crime rate index, violent 
and property crime b, specific 
crime rates b, segregation, 
percent black, hospital 
capacity, white or nonwhite 
mayor b, arrest rates c 
 
 
Padgett (2002) 67 FL counties,  
1996-1998 
ADP income inequality, urban 
counties (-), drug arrest rate 
percent black, percent 
Hispanic, unemployment, 
police strength, counties in 
north Florida, violent index 
and burglary crime rate 
 
 
 
Applegate (2004) 1445 US counties, 1999 JAR percent black, percent 
Hispanic, percent 
unemployed, percent below 
the poverty level, median 
income (-), region 
 
 
 
median home value 
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Study Sample Dependent Variable Significant Predictors Insignificant Predictors 
Macro-Level (continued) 
Applegate (2004) continued  ADP percent black, percent 
unemployed, percent below 
the poverty level, median 
income (-), region, booking 
rate (JAR) 
 
 
 
 
 
percent Hispanic, median 
home value 
Carmichael (2005) 157 US cities, 1983 e JAR black-to-white income ratio 
(-), percent black, percent 
Hispanic, segregation, 
percent divorce (-), rate of 
liquor establishment, rate of 
sworn police (-), jail 
capacity, region  
unemployment, serious crime 
rate/Part I, presence of young 
males, black mayor b, 
determinant sentencing 
legislation b, overall income 
inequality b, presence of 
female-headed families b, 
median family income b, 
violent and property crime 
rates b, overall arrest rates c, 
arrest rate for Part II offenses 
c 
 
Notes: MSA = metropolitan statistical areas, JAR = jail admission rate, JIR = jail incarceration rate, JPR = jail population rates (total number of inmates per 
100,000 resident pop), ADP = average daily population.  
A negative symbol (-) denotes an inverse association between the predictor and outcome variable.  
In addition to the above studies, Arvanites (1997) examined the effect of percent nonwhite, poverty and crime on jail incarceration rates. This study is excluded 
from the present summary because the author provided correlates/description of results without detailed statistical analysis (e.g., tables).  
a Author could not correct for heteroscedasticity. 
b Author conducted supplementary analysis not shown and found this variable does not predict jail use. 
c Author substituted crime rates with this variable in supplementary analysis and found similar results. 
d Author conducted supplementary analysis and found percent black had a positive, indirect effect on jail admission – percent black effects jail capacity, and jail 
capacity effects jail admissions. 
e Author conducted similar analyses not shown using 1999 Jail Census data and found similar results. Author notes these results should be interpreted with 
caution as there are potential problems with utilizing IV’s that occur one year before DV; he provides justificatory reasons for conducting such an analysis. 
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTED SIGNS 
 
Dependent Variable 
Racial Threat 
(% black) 
Ethnic Threat 
(% Hispanic) 
Economic Threat 
(Gini coefficient) 
Political 
Conservatism 
(% Romney) 
Admission Rate 
Hypothesis H1 H4 H7 H11 
Predicted Sign Ո Ո + + 
Population Rate 
Hypothesis H2 H5 H8 H12 
Predicted Sign Ո Ո + + 
Black, non-Hispanic Jail 
Population Rate 
Hypothesis H3 
No Prediction 
H9 H13 
Predicted Sign Ո + + 
Hispanic Jail 
Population Rate 
Hypothesis 
No Prediction 
H6 H10 H14 
Predicted Sign Ո + + 
Note: “Ո” denotes an inverted U-shaped curvilinear pattern where the IV is positively associated with the DV until a certain threshold is met,  
and then the IV becomes negatively associated with the DV; “+” = positive association. 
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF U.S. STATES AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WITH DETERMINATE SENTENCING OR 
INDETERMINATE SENTENCING FOR MOST CRIMINAL OFFENSES, 2012
 
Statea Determinate 
Sentencing 
Indeterminate 
Sentencing 
Statutory Citation 
Alabama   •  Al. Code §13A-5-6, §13A-5-7, §15-22-28 
Alaska   •  As. Code §12.55.125, §12.55.135, §33.16.010 
Arizona •   Ariz. Rev Stat § 13-701 
Arkansas  •  Arkansas Code §5-4-401, §16-93-614 
California •   Cal. Penal Code § 1170 
Colorado  •  Col. Rev. Stat §18-1.3-401, §17-2-204 
DC •   DC Code §24-403.01, §24-403.02 
Florida •   Fla. Code Title XLVII §921.002 
Georgia  •  Ga. Code §17-10-1, §17-10-3, §17-10-5, §17-10-6.1, §42-9-40 
Idaho  •  Idaho Stat § 18-112, §18-113, §19-2513, §20-223 
Illinois •   730 IL Complied Stat §5/5-8-1 
Indiana •   Ind. Code §35-50-6-1 
Iowa  •  Iowa Code Title XVI §902.3, §903.1, §902.6 
Kansas •   Kan. Stat §21-6806, §22-3717 
Kentucky  •  Kentucky Rev Stat §532.060, §532.020, §439.340 
Louisiana  •  CCRP Art. 894.1, CCRP Art. 879, CCRP Art. 893, La. Rev Stat §15:574.4 
Maine •   ME 17-A §1252, 17-A §1254 
Maryland  •  Correctional Services §7-301 
Massachusetts  •  Mass Chapter 279 §24, Chapter 127 §133 
Michigan  •  Michigan Code §769.8, §769.10, §791.234 
Minnesota •   Minn. Stat §244.01 
Mississippib  •  MS Code Ann §47-7-3 
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State Determinate 
Sentencing 
Indeterminate 
Sentencing 
Statutory Citation 
Missouri  •  Missouri Code Title XXXVII §558.011, §217.690 
Montana  •  Montana Code Ann §46-18-20, Montana Code Ann §46-23-201 
Nebraska  •  Nebraska Rev Stat § 83-1,110, § 83-1,105.01 
Nevada  •  Nev Rev Stat §176.033, §213.120 
New Hampshire  •  NH Rev Stat Title LXII §651:2, Title LXII §651-A:6 
New Jersey   •  New Jersey Rev Stat §2C:43-6, §30:4-123.51 
New Mexico •   New Mexico Stat §31-18-15 
New Yorkc •   NYS Penal Law §70.00, §70.45 
North Carolina •   NC General Stat §15A-1340.13 
North Dakota  •  ND Code §12.1-32-0, §12-59-05 
Ohio •   Ohio Rev Code §2929.01, §2929.14 
Oklahoma  •  Ok. Stat §21-9, Ok. Stat §21-10, §22-991a, §55-332.7 
Oregon •   Oregon Vol. 4, Title 14 §137.010, §137.635 
Pennsylvania  •  Pa. Consolidated Stat. Title 18 §1103, Title 18 §1104, Title 42 § 9756 
South Carolina  •  SC Code §16-1-20, §24-21-610 
South Dakota  •  SD Code § 22-6-1, SD Code §22-6-2, SD Code §24-15-5 
Tennessee  •  Tenn. Code Ann. §40-20-107, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-115 
Texas  •  Texas Code §12.21-12.23, Texas Code § 12.32-12.34, Texas Code § 508.145 
Utah  •  Utah Code §76-3-203, § 77-18-4, §77-27-9 
Virginia •   VA Code, Title §19.2-295.2, §19.2-298.01 
Washington •   WA RCW §9.94A.505, §9.94A.728 
West Virginia  •  West VA §61-11-16, West VA §62-12-13 
Wisconsin •   Wis Stat §973.01 
Wyoming   •  WY Stat §7-13-201 
a Omitted are state unified systems as these states were excluded from the Census of Jails, 2013 (i.e., Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island and Vermont) (Minton 
et al., 2015; USDOJ BJS, 2016, Codebook). The Census included fifteen independently operated jails in Alaska, therefore this state is included in the table (Minton et al., 2015; 
USDOJ BJS, 2016, Codebook). Due to missing data on all Alaska counties, however, they were omitted from the analyses.  
b Parole eligibility applies to all offenders never convicted of a violent crime ((§47-7-3(1)(g)). Because most offenses are parole eligible, Mississippi is coded as indeterminate. 
c New York’s sentencing system has been described as “overly complex” (NY State Commission on Sentencing Reform, 2007, p. III). The difficulty in identifying New York as 
having a primarily determinate or indeterminate sentencing structure is noted elsewhere (see, e.g., NY State Commission on Sentencing Reform, 2007; NY State Permanent 
Commission on Sentencing, 2014). In brief, indeterminate sentencing generally applies only to non-violent felony, non-drug and non-sex felony offenses (NY State Commission 
on Sentencing Reform, 2007; NY State Permanent Commission on Sentencing, 2014), therefore it is coded as having a determinate sentencing structure.  
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APPENDIX D: UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU REGIONS CLASSIFICATION 
 
Region 1: Northeast  Region 2: Midwest Region 3: South  Region 4: West 
Connecticut Illinois Alabama Alaska 
Maine Indiana Arkansas Arizona 
Massachusetts Iowa  Delaware California 
New Hampshire  Kansas  District of Columbia Colorado 
New Jersey Michigan Florida Hawaii 
New York Minnesota Georgia Idaho 
Pennsylvania  Missouri Kentucky Montana 
Rhode Island Nebraska Louisiana Nevada 
Vermont  North Dakota Maryland New Mexico 
 Ohio Mississippi Oregon 
  South Dakota North Carolina Utah 
 Wisconsin Oklahoma Washington 
   South Carolina Wyoming 
   Tennessee 
   Texas 
   Virginia 
   West Virginia 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2010a) 
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APPENDIX E: CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 Admission rate 1.0                     
2 Population rate .06 1.0                    
3 Black pop ratea .06 .15 1.0                   
4 Latino pop ratea .07 .15 .32 1.0                  
5 Percent black .02 .13 .12 -.07 1.0                 
6 Percent black2 .02 .10 .07 -.10 .94 1.0                
7 Percent Hispanic .04 .03 -.06 .20 -.11 -.11 1.0               
8 Percent Hispanic2 .04 .02 -.08 .13 -.10 -.08 .92 1.0              
9 Gini Index .03 .09 .08 -.02 .42 .36 .16 .16 1.0             
10 Unemployment -.01 .09 .17 -.04 .33 .31 -.02 .04 .22 1.0            
11 Poverty .07 .13 .05 -.06 .49 .48 .18 .24 .57 .49 1.0           
12 Political (Romney) .05 -.01 -.08 .01 -.36 -.39 -.10 -.16 -.22 -.25 -.13 1.0          
13 Jail capacitya .02 .21 .46 .30 .22 .09 .16 .07 .20 .19 -.01 -.31 1.0         
14 Violent crime .03 .14 .12 .09 .43 .33 .16 .11 .35 .24 .33 -.26 .41 1.0        
15 Property crime .04 .12 .24 .15 .35 .25 .10 .05 .31 .22 .25 -.27 .53 .68 1.0       
16 Police strengtha .07 .08 .02 .11 .26 .20 .15 .09 .22 -.04 .08 -.13 .17 .33 .32 1.0      
17 Urbanization .03 -.04 -.31 -.18 -.14 -.04 -.06 -.01 .02 -.05 .23 .27 -.66 -.25 -.39 -.09 1.0     
18 White_black -.02 .04 .16 .08 .01 -.05 -.02 -.03 .11 .10 -.01 -.20 .42 .21 .24 -.01 -.31 1.0    
19 White_Hispanic -.02 .05 .20 .16 .14 .07 .19 .08 .15 .05 -.01 -.34 .48 .27 .30 .06 -.36 .47 1.0   
20 South .10 .13 .14 .01 .51 .38 .11 .09 .40 .19 .45 .20 .15 .25 .23 .17 -.07 -0.4 .01 1.0  
21 DSL -.08 -.04 .03 .01 -.15 -.13 -.01 -.02 -.18 .09 -.21 -.23 .09 -.06 .04 -.01 -.14 .06 .10 -.35 1.0 
a Variables are log-transformed 
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APPENDIX F: SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES, PREDICTED SIGNS AND OUTCOMES 
 
 
Dependent Variable  
Racial Threat 
(% black) 
Ethnic Threat 
(% Hispanic) 
Economic Threat 
(Gini coefficient) 
Political 
Conservatism 
(% Romney) 
Admission Rate 
Hypothesis H1 H4 H7 H11 
Predicted Sign Ո Ո + + 
Outcome Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported Supported 
Population Rate 
Hypothesis H2 H5 H8 H12 
Predicted Sign Ո Ո + + 
Outcome Not Supported Supported Not Supported Supported 
Black, non-Hispanic Jail  
Population Rate 
Hypothesis H3 
No Prediction 
H9 H13 
Predicted Sign Ո + + 
Outcome Not Supported Not Supported Not Supported 
Hispanic Jail  
Population Rate 
Hypothesis 
No Prediction 
H6 H10 H14 
Predicted Sign Ո + + 
Outcome Supported Not Supported Supported 
Notes: “Ո” denotes an inverted U-shaped curvilinear pattern where the IV is positively associated with the DV until a certain threshold is met,  
and then the IV becomes negatively associated with the DV; “+” = positive association. 
 
